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This PhD research investigates the relevance of non-Russian Siberian culture 
and identity both for the state institutions in the regions concerned, and for the 
Russian Federation’s central government. As the first chapter describes, Soviet-
era policy towards the Soviet Union’s non-Russian peoples brought about a 
massive cultural change, in the process generating a new awareness of non-
Russian ethnic identity. Current ethnographic and sociological research on the 
former Soviet Union indicates that this awareness continues to develop, while 
remaining subject to politically motivated attempts at interference. Politicians, 
academics and journalists have pointed out the capacity of strong ethnic 
identities to hinder a popular identification with a multi-ethnic federal state, 
even as other commentators have accused politicians of deliberately 
encouraging personal ethnic affiliations. The interaction between political 
propaganda and personal perception within the changing awareness of ethnic 
identity in the Russian Federation has not yet been clarified, and neither has its 
significance for post-Soviet Russia’s state-building project.     
 The introductory chapter explains the comparison of two Siberian non-
Russian peoples, the Buryat and Sakha, and their respective territorial 
administrations, the Republics of Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), which is 
intended to isolate general trends in the development of non-Russian ethnicity. 
This comparison is based on the assumption that culture itself is a network of 
collectively held ideas that determines social practice, as it changes in tandem 
with the course of events. The perceptions of non-Russian identity that appeared 
over the Soviet period are thus understood to arise from changes in the 
collective understanding of cultural difference. Hence, this study identifies and 
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then compares contemporary formulations of the Soviet-era terms connected to 
cultural difference in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia).  
The research method is a combined content and discourse analysis of 
regional newspapers. Both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) contain self-sufficient 
newspaper markets, producing a flow of discourse determined both by the needs 
of their local populations, and their regional political establishments. The 
discursive practices in these Republics’ newspapers therefore reflect both 
popular attitudes, and those that underlie political strategies. Simultaneously 
quantifying and interpreting the ideas connected to Soviet-era notions of 
‘ethnicity’ in these Republics’ mainstream newspapers shows how journalists 
and political publicists try to use their audiences’ ‘ethnic’ affiliations, in 
addition to the way they perceive their audiences to understand and value these 
concepts. 
The core material in this thesis consists of two chapters on each Republic, 
describing their respective regional newspapers, and the discussion of Buryat 
and Sakha ethnicity these newspapers produced. As the concluding chapter 
describes, the newspaper material revealed that the current development of 
Buryat and Sakha culture and identity is integrated into the development of their 
respective republican administrations. The newspaper discourse as a whole 
shows how rapid demographic change and inefficient governance poses 
challenges for both politicians and individual citizens – leading regional- and 
federal-level administrations to mask their inadequacies through appealing to 
personal ethnic identity, and their subject populations to elevate their ethnic 
affiliation into a quasi-religious commitment.   
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All the translations from Russian to English are my own. The Sakha-language 
newspapers were translated from Sakha to Russian in Yakutsk; I then translated 
the necessary quotations into English. I have transliterated sounded Russian hard 
vowels into English using y, as opposed to i. All the foreign words in italics are 
Russian, unless they are shown to be Buryat or Sakha. 
The Russian word for Sakha is yakut, and hence the Sakha Soviet 
Autonomous Republic was named Yakutia. I have however used the official 
name of the post-Soviet republican state, Sakha (Yakutia), throughout the 
dissertation. The Sakha generally use the word yakut when speaking Russian, 
however they sometimes refer to themselves in Russian as sakha. I have 




























In Russia August is the month for explosive events. August 2008 was no 
exception: the world was baffled by the Georgian President Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s decision to invade the disputed region of South Ossetia on its 
border with Russia, despite its vast and powerful neighbour’s explicit support of 
the Ossetian independence movement. Equally startling to the outside world was 
the scale of Russia’s response. Not content with forcing the Georgian army into 
a retreat from South Ossetia, the Russian forces bombed towns well within 
Georgia’s territory. The two governments showered each other with the kind of 
invective that might preclude their ever establishing a working relationship, each 
accusing the other of ethnic cleansing. 
 Neither country had followed strategies the world’s dominant nations 
and international organisations could understand. What was Saakashvili hoping 
to achieve by attacking South Ossetia? Why had Russia forfeited an easy 
relationship with the international community by humiliating Georgia so 
aggressively and openly? Why were Ossetian and Abkhaz nationalists so ready 
to take up a separatist movement, when full autonomy would bring them only 
the enormous challenge of establishing nation-states in multi-ethnic territories 
with no infrastructures? Events were following a logic unfamiliar to the West. 
The necessity of understanding this logic grows ever more apparent, as the 
world’s need for the former Soviet Union’s natural resources increases. The 
international community has to learn to do business with peoples and 
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governments previously indistinguishable within the Soviet Union’s melting 
pot.   
 It was clear, however, that ethnic identity and national pride had a major 
role in the August 2008 conflict. The two governments were attempting to 
manipulate strong national affiliations for their own purposes, while 
simultaneously acting under their influence. Saakashvili claimed that failing to 
respond to Russia’s earlier provocations would have caused “any Georgian 
government” to fail, hinting that his attack was motivated by his population’s 
national pride (The Economist, 16–22 August 2008). The Georgian population’s 
public demonstration of defiance against Russia on August 12 seems to bear out 
his comment, revealing the depth of their determination to retain their national 
integrity, even as the Russian tanks were rolling into Georgia (The Economist, 
16–22 August, 2008). The Russian government, meanwhile, has been fuelling 
Abkhaz and Ossetian nationalist aspirations throughout the 1990s – despite its 
long and costly struggle with the nationalist movements in nearby Chechnya. 
Both governments simultaneously condemned what they claimed to be their 
opponents’ chauvinist nationalism, citing it as justification for their aggression. 
 I first encountered the strong and yet contradictory significance of post-
Soviet ethnic identity while living in Saint Petersburg in early 2000. My hosts 
regarded themselves as a typical Soviet international family: the husband was 
western Ukrainian, the wife Tatar, and they lived in Russia’s historic ‘window 
on Europe’. They had had their son blessed at both a Catholic Church and a 
Mosque, Tatars being traditionally Muslim. And yet a terrible argument erupted 
when the husband’s Ukrainian father came to stay: his Tartar daughter-in-law, 
irritable after a month spent sharing a room with her husband, son and father-in-
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law, called Ukrainian a dirty language. She immediately repented and, weeping, 
begged his forgiveness – but the elderly Ukrainian couldn’t bring himself to 
pardon her, even though he felt such pity for her distress that he also was in 
tears.  
 More experience of the intense emotions that can be aroused by ethnic 
identities in Russia came while I was researching for my M. A. dissertation, on 
the newspaper coverage of the 2002 hostage siege at a Moscow theatre. A 
particularly striking example was an article published in the well-known 
broadsheet Izvestiya, claiming that the Chechen people, as an inherently vicious 
mountain race, were “the dragon’s teeth” in the Russian Federation (Izvestiya, 
November 13, 2002: p. 5). I was surprised that such an overtly racist article 
could be deemed publishable by a leading newspaper in a multi-national 
country, whose constitution defined four state religions – Christianity, Judaism, 
Islam and Buddhism – in acknowledgement of its ethnic diversity. 
 The power of ethnic identity to influence political change in the former 
Soviet Union was demonstrated at the beginning of the 1990s, when numerous 
non-Russian Soviet Republics made declarations of national autonomy, 
asserting the right of their titular ethnic groups to independence from what they 
implied was an imperialist central government. As has become clear with 
hindsight, the acquisition of power and resources was a strong motivation for 
many of these nationalists; however, they still regarded ethnic nationalism as a 
potent source of public self-legitimisation. They were using a strong popular 
attachment to ethnic identity to attain their political ends, just as the Russian and 
Georgian governments did in 2008.  
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 The Russian Federation now exists as a patchwork of regional 
administrative units, many of which are described as non-Russian Republics – 
such as the Siberian Republics of Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), home to the 
Buryat and Sakha peoples. Many of the natural resources that have been 
powering the Russian Federation’s recent economic success are situated in 
Republics with mixed-race governments. These Republics have their own flags, 
hymns and Presidents; they provide grounds for the aspirations of their titular 
non-Russian populations towards national independence, even though most of 
them are financially dependent on Moscow. Vladimir Putin’s administration has 
made considerable efforts to reduce the power of the Russian Federation’s 
regions, no doubt because of their capacity to threaten Russia’s central 
government. Personal ethnic identity in the Russian Federation remains a 
political issue.  
 So how is ethnic identity understood in the Russian Federation? What 
gives it such tremendous personal importance? And how does political policy 
interact with popular ethnic identity? I decided to address these questions by 
comparing notions of non-Russian ethnic identity and their political significance 
in two non-Russian Republics, Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia). I had several 
reasons for selecting these Republics: the Buryat and Sakha peoples are 
comparable, being the two largest non-Russian groups in Siberia, and descended 
from livestock-herding, non-indigenous animist cultures. However, they are also 
at either end of the major scales of variation in Siberia: the Buryat are a Mongol 
people, while the Sakha are Turkic; Buryatia’s territory has few natural 
resources, while Sakha (Yakutia)’s is extremely rich. In consequence, Buryatia’s 
republican administration has a subservient relationship with the federal 
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government, while Sakha (Yakutia)’s has proved to be a much more determined 
negotiator; the late Soviet Buryat nationalist movement quickly petered out, 
while Sakha nationalist organisations continue to exist.  
My pilot research trip to the two Republics in December 2004 confirmed 
my decision. I had enough contact with individual Buryat and Sakha to 
understand that they are two distinct peoples, living in different countries – and 
the effects of Sakha (Yakutia)’s natural wealth were immediately obvious. And 
yet the subtle influence of post-Soviet ethnic identity made itself felt in both 
contexts, whether as a festival of singing at Buryatia’s State Opera House, or as 
a remark from a journalist about the hidden tensions between ethnic groups.  
Both Republics are large, remote and under-populated.1 The Republic of 
Buryatia is situated along the east side of Lake Baikal in south-east Siberia, 
occupying a territory of 351,300 square kilometres – over twice the size of 
England. According to the 2002 census, Buryatia is populated by 981,200 
people, of whom 272,900 (27.8 per cent) are Buryat and 665,500 (67.8 per cent) 
are Russian (www.perepis2002.ru). 39.1 per cent of Buryatia’s population lives 
in its capital, Ulan Ude (Abayeva et al, 2004: p. 3). Sakha (Yakutia) currently 
occupies one fifth of the Russian Federation's territory, stretching north from 
Buryatia and Irkutsk Oblast' to the Arctic Ocean (Argounova, 2001: p. 19). It is 
around the size of the Indian subcontinent (3,103,200 square kilometres), with a 
population (according to the 2002 census) of 949,300, of which 432,300 (45.5 
per cent) are Sakha, and 390,700 (41.2 per cent) are Russian (Vitebsky, 1990: p. 
304; www.perepis2002.ru). Around 23 per cent of the Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
population lives in its capital, Yakutsk (Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 130).  
                                                 
1 Maps of these Republics and of the Russian Federation can be found in Appendix One. 
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Creating a product that attracts a paying audience is the overriding concern of 
every commercially owned media organ, whether or not external interest groups 
are also using it to promote their own messages. My experience of journalism in 
the UK, along with my MA dissertation research, showed me how mass 
communicators try to reproduce the opinions and mindsets of their target 
audiences in order to sell their media products. The first thing I was told as a 
trainee journalist was to avoid trying to inform the public for its own sake. 
Instead, I was to make my articles conform to the product a given newspaper or 
magazine was selling, which was tailored to the probable interests and desires of 
a specific group of people. The contrasts I found between Russian and British 
newspaper articles provided further proof of an intimate connection between 
media discourse and popular understanding. It was clear that similar words, like 
‘liberalism’ (liberalizm), ‘Islam’ (Islam) or ‘democracy’ (demokratiya), carried 
completely different connotations for Russian audiences, and were being used 
by writers for very different purposes. The Russian journalists were adapting 
their communication to their audiences’ distinct understanding of the world, as 
do British journalists. The development of commercial journalism in post-Soviet 
Russia has created the possibility of examining popular belief through the 
analysis of mass media discourse.  
The pilot research trip confirmed my intention to use regionally 
produced newspapers as my main source. I found that the newspaper markets in 
both Republics contained newspapers sponsored by the regional governments, in 
addition to a variety of newspapers whose primary function was to make a 
profit. The government-owned newspapers were intended to publicise the 
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government’s point of view, as their editors acknowledged. Regional 
newspapers in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) provided the opportunity to 
compare ideas about ethnic identity that had their origins in political policy, with 
the ideas produced in order to attract a target audience.  
I decided to deconstruct the discourse produced by samples of the most 
prominent newspapers in each Republic, both quantifying and interpreting the 
ideas they contained. This exercise would result in descriptions of each 
newspaper’s treatment of ethnic identity, from which the likely developments in 
audience perception or political policy could be inferred. The investigation 
would focus on learning more about non-Russian ethnicity through newspaper 
discourse, rather than addressing the debates occurring within a specific 
discipline. It would aim to benefit researchers of the Russian Federation, 
whether they are political scientists, sociologists or anthropologists.   
The research trips also confirmed my suspicion that I had undertaken an 
ambitious project. As it transpired, collecting newspaper material in Siberia is a 
complex and demanding task, riddled with unforeseeable difficulties – whether 
posed by uncooperative visa registration bureaus, power cuts or broken 
photocopiers. The supplementary audience research I had intended to carry out 
proved to be more limited than I had hoped, since the people I met were simply 
too nervous to be candid about their experience of ethnic identity to a foreigner. 
Again, the phenomenon of a politicised and yet hugely personally significant 
ethnic identity made itself felt: my status as an English woman (anglichanka) 
made me appear to be both a supercilious representative of one of the world’s 
‘civilised’ races, and a potential spy. Meanwhile the study of newspaper 
production and use in each region is minimal, and considerably hampered by the 
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unwillingness of newspaper and advertising organisations to publish their 
research.  
Two notable exceptions however were the editor of the newspaper 
Yakutia and Lyudmilla Badmayeva at the Institute of Mongolian and Buddhist 
Studies in Ulan Ude, who were extremely generous in sharing their research. 
These were among the many people and organisations that made this 
investigation possible. I am truly grateful to all of them, whether or not I have 
been able to include their names in the limited space I have here. Several 
academics and journalists in European Russia, Siberia, the UK and America 
have been equally generous with their time and resources, principally Anatoliy 
Alekseyev, Darima Amogolonova, Tatiana Argounova, John Barber, William 
Burgwinkle, Vladimir Dyatlov, Caroline Humphrey, David Lehmann, Tatiana 
Skrynnikova, Piers Vitebsky, Irina Yelayeva, and the members of the Magic 
Circle at the Scott Polar Research Institute. King’s College and Cambridge 
University helped to finance my research trip, while the Faculty of Journalism at 
Irkutsk State University provided the essential visa invitation. I am grateful to 
Yevgeniya Matyukova at Irkutsk State University and her colleagues at Buryatia 
and Sakha (Yakutia) State Universities for enabling me to be registered legally 
in Irkutsk, Ulan Ude and Yakutsk, and to the students and professionals in 
Yakutsk who translated Sakha-language newspapers into Russian. I would also 
like to thank the politicians, journalists and nationalist activists who granted me 
interviews.  
 I could not have managed without the kindness and support of many 
friends in Siberia, Europe and America, whether they were welcoming an 
unknown foreigner into their homes and lives, or easing the process of writing 
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up through their companionship and advice. I am particularly grateful to Anya 
and her family, Kirsten, Simon Barrington-Ward, Tina Burrett, Katrin Graber, 
Mette High, the Mikhailov family, Ayesha Nathoo, Tatiyana and Zhenya 
Prodopopovy, Madeleine Reeves, Alice Russell, Olga, Anastasiya and Sayan 
Ul’turgaschevy, Elana Wilson, and the Zhimbiyev family. My supervisor David 
Lane has played a crucial role in enabling this project, and I am thankful for his 
time, energy and advice. This dissertation would not have been written without 
the enormous help – material, emotional and intellectual – I received from my 
immediate and extended family.  
Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my mother, 
Rosamond Peers, whose insight, curiosity, humour and strength have always 
















     
 
 





Benedict Anderson describes nationalism as the “expression of a radically 
changed form of consciousness” (Anderson, 1991: p. xiv). This change came 
about through the simultaneous growth of the capitalist economy and the 
production of print media, and the techniques of government employed by the 
Western European colonialist states during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. This thesis describes a similar change in consciousness among the 
Buryat and Sakha peoples of East Siberia, seen through the medium of regional 
newspaper discourse: the political strategies of succeeding Soviet and post-
Soviet administrations have combined with rapid social change to turn Buryat 
and Sakha ethnic identity into religion.  
The cultural diversity of Russia’s population first posed a serious 
challenge to its central government in the early 1920s, in the aftermath of the 
Bolshevik revolution and the Civil War. The Bolshevik party’s state-building 
project required them to convert Russia’s entire population, irrespective of class, 
religion or culture, to the Marxist-Leninist values that justified their acquisition 
of power. By the 1980s the Soviet state had apparently succeeded in integrating 
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the non-Russian peoples on its territory into a dominant Soviet outlook, having 
created a series of non-Russian autonomous Republics and Regions (Okrugi) – 
such as the Republics and Okrugi populated by the Sakha and Buryat. The 
variations in cultural and religious heritage existing within these regions 
seemingly did not prevent their populations from sharing the attitudes, 
aspirations and values that corresponded with their common Soviet way of life. 
However, Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiation of the perestroika (rebuilding) and 
glasnost' (openness) policies in 1985, which encouraged the constructive 
criticism of the Soviet government, was to generate a range of non-Russian 
nationalist movements and attempts at cultural revival. These groups joined with 
the other dissident movements, to voice criticisms that began to undermine the 
Soviet Union's capacity to legitimise itself publicly. Non-Russian nationalist 
movements accused the Soviet government of having violated their nations’ 
right to independence at various points over the twentieth century, for example 
during the Stalinist repressions. These movements demonstrated the existence of 
non-Russian affiliations that superseded a personal loyalty to the Soviet state, 
even though non-Russian cultural practice – in lifestyle, religion and language – 
had been severely reduced.  
The Soviet Union could no longer exist under the terms that provided its 
self-justification – i.e., as a socialist union of Soviet republics – when the titular 
non-Russian parts of this union began to make declarations of independence, as 
the Buryat and Sakha Republics did in 1990. Such declarations facilitated Boris 
Yeltsin's agreement with the Presidents of Ukraine and Byelorussia in December 
1991, which reformed the Soviet Union as a Commonwealth of Independent 
States, and in doing so effectively broke up the Soviet state. One of these newly 
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independent states was the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics  
(RSFSR), shortly to become the Russian Federation, which consisted of a 
hierarchy of regional administrative units, with varying degrees of autonomy. 
Territories without titular ethnic groups, the Oblasti and Kraya, co-existed with 
non-Russian republican administrations that had their own Presidents, legislative 
organs, flags, hymns, and official non-Russian languages – although in most 
cases extensive Soviet immigration and industrialisation programmes had 
created Russian-dominated populations. Russians make up by far the largest 
ethnic group in the Russian Federation: according to the 2002 census, 79.8 per 
cent of the Russian Federation’s population is Russian (www.perepis2002.ru). 
However, by the end of the Soviet period over half of the Russian Federation’s 
territory had been allotted to formally non-Russian regional administrations 
(Kolstø, 2000: p. 195).  
Yeltsin’s conflicts with the Russian Federation’s legislative organs 
during the early 1990s led him to grant increased autonomy to several 
Republics, in order to gain the support of their leading politicians. The level of a 
specific region’s autonomy depended on the capacity of its leaders to bargain 
with the federal government, which could be greatly enhanced by the presence 
of valuable natural resources in the region’s territory. The opportunities the 
Yeltsin administration created for the non-Russian Republics had the potential 
considerably to threaten the federal government’s stability, since it cannot afford 
to lose control of the lucrative natural resources they contain. Siberia in 
particular has been the focus of conflicts over natural resources: it contains 79 
per cent of Russia’s oil reserves, 85 per cent of its natural gas, 91 per cent of 
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coal, 76 per cent of gold, and over 90 per cent of diamonds (Castells and 
Kiselyova, 2000: p. 188).  
Fourteen of the twenty-eight regional administrations that constituted 
Siberia’s government at the end of the twentieth century were non-Russian 
Republics or Okrugi, taking up by far the largest and richest part of Siberia’s 
territory, as the map in Appendix One shows. These governments increase the 
potential for non-Russian identities to be translated into political or social 
movements that interfere with the Russian Federation’s state building, or even 
under the right circumstances to undermine the federal state, as they undermined 
the Soviet Union. They provide an institutional mechanism for non-Russian 
nationalist attempts to influence federal government policy, while acting as a 
territorial focus for non-Russian identities that could override a personal 
affiliation with the federal state. The Slavic leaders of non-Russian titular 
Republics have also used non-Russian nationalist claims to justify their demands 
for greater control over their regions’ natural resources, even when their subject 
populations are heavily Russian-dominated. 
Vladimir Putin’s administration took steps to reduce the threat that the 
non-Russian regions presented to the federal government’s stability, by 
attempting to create a vertical power structure headed by the federal 
government, rather than a loose federation of semi-autonomous regions. The 
Putin administration’s efforts can be regarded as successful in many respects. 
The federal government is now able directly to impose its power over regional 
governments: it has the capacity to veto the choice of regional Governors or 
Presidents, and can in some cases merge non-Russian regions with their 
neighbouring Russian Oblasti or Kraya, removing their governments and 
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legislation (for example, the Buryat Okrugi, Ust-Ordinsk and Aga, have been 
unified with their surrounding Oblasti, Irkutsk and Chita respectively). The non-
Russian regions are no longer in a position to repeat the assertions of 
independence they made during the early 1990s.  
However, the federal government can still face attempts from non-
Russian groups or governments to contravene its interests. For example, the 
proposal to merge the Republic of Adegeya with its surrounding regions in 2006 
was met with such determined resistance from Adegeyan interest groups that it 
was dropped, even though the Adegeyans are in the minority; in Tatarstan, one 
of the most assertive non-Russian Republics, the President has continued 
publicly to advocate a structure for the Russian state that would allow the 
regions considerable autonomy. The conflict among the Caucasian peoples and 
the Federal Security Services (Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or FSB) 
continues to haunt Chechnya, Ingushetiya and Daghestan.  
The current federal administration faces the same imperative to generate 
a popular commitment to its state building project as the early Soviet 
government, in the aftermath of the rapid transformations in state and society 
during the 1990s. The Russian Federation was constituted as a modern mass 
polity, and therefore has to ensure a level of popular co-operation in maintaining 
its governing institutions, if they are not to fail. Non-Russian identities are one 
of the many potential barriers to the development of individual feelings of 
loyalty towards the contemporary Russian state and its government institutions, 
even among the non-Russian populations who do not manifest antagonism 
towards a powerful federal administration, or a strong sense of cultural 
distinction.  
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This dissertation aims to understand the nature of the relationship 
between the perceptions of non-Russian identity held by non-Russian groups, 
and the development of the Russian state. As this chapter describes, it seeks to 
identify the continuing development of the non-Russian identities that 
stimulated the non-Russian nationalist movements of the 1990s, by examining 
the ideas connected to perceptions of non-Russian identity among two Siberian 
non-Russian groups, the Buryat and Sakha.  
The research project has been formulated around the hypothesis that the 
cultural development engendered by Soviet policy and ideology has had a strong 
influence on current non-Russian perceptions of identity. This hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that culture itself consists of developing networks of 
communally held ideas; Chapter Two describes this theoretical understanding of 
culture in detail. The first section of this chapter presents a brief account of the 
Soviet government’s policy towards non-Russian peoples, and of the changes it 
stimulated in the popular perception of non-Russian ethnic identity. The second 
part of Section One discusses the problem of contemporary non-Russian 
identity, clarifying the way it is addressed by this investigation’s analysis of 
print media. Section Two introduces the Buryat and Sakha themselves, along 
with their Republics, Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), while the conclusion 









Section 1.1: Non-Russian identity in the Russian Federation 
 
Section 1.1.1: Soviet nationalities policy and ideology  
The discussion of the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy presented here is based 
on a variety of sources. These consist of histories of the policies themselves, and 
their effects (Slezkine, 1994; 2000; Hirsch, 2005; Martin, 2000; Vihavainen, 
2000; Shanin, 1989); ethnographic studies of non-Russian peoples, which reveal 
the influence Soviet nationalities policy has had over these communities’ lives 
(Humphrey, 1998; 2002; Vitebsky, 2005; Anderson, 2000; Grant, 1995; 
Argounova, 2001; Balzer, 1999; Hamayon, 1998; Ventsel, 2005; Crate, 2006); 
and historical and sociological studies of Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), carried 
out by academics based in these regions (Khamutayev, 2005; Stroganova, 2001; 
Yakovlev, 2003; Boronova, 2005; Amogolonova, 2005;Yelayeva, 2004). 
Further evidence comes from my own experience of the lingering effects of 
Soviet nationalities policy in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia); descriptions of 
Soviet-era ‘ethnos theory’ by both its practitioners, and Russian and Western 
commentators (Bromley, 1974a; 1974b; Bromley and Kozlov, 1989; Tishkov, 
1997; 2003; Gellner, 1988, Ilkhamov, 2006, Skrynnikova, 1999); in addition 
to anthropological, historical and sociological literature on other aspects of the 
Soviet Union (Ledeneva, 1998; Christel Lane, 1981; David Lane, 1981; 
Yurchak, 2003a; 2006; Volkov, 2000; Service, 2002; 2004; Volkogonov, 1998).  
This section describes what all these sources show to be the basic 
strategy of the Soviet nationalities policy: the modernisation of non-Russian 
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populations, which involved the promotion of specific forms of non-Russian 
cultural production, but which essentially worked to homogenise non-Russian 
cultures and ways of life. Although there were variations in the Soviet 
nationalities policy during the 1920s, 30s, 40s and 50s, the aim to modernise 
non-Russian peoples remained constant. As this account contends, the Soviet 
nationalities policy was to generate a development in the popular perception of 
ethnic identity. Individual ethnic affiliations acquired a strong personal 
significance, while simultaneously remaining a political concern throughout the 
Soviet era.    
Marxist-Leninism developed out of the philosophies that emerged during 
the European Enlightenment, in that it assumes the possibility of an ideal state 
for mankind, which can be achieved through the appropriate human endeavour. 
The Marxist-Leninist account of history entails certain absolute values, despite 
its atheist and materialist roots. As David Lane describes, Marxist-Leninism is 
predicated on the assumption that “objective laws of nature which condition the 
evolution of society” exist (David Lane, 1981: p. 5). It posits a universally 
applicable pattern of economic development that concludes with the foundation 
of the communist society. This development can however be accelerated by 
those with a sufficient knowledge of the laws of social behaviour, and in 
particular, of political class interests. Communists would have committed 
themselves so completely to a rational interest in the good of all members of 
society that any form of social inequality would have disappeared. The 
positioning of this society at the culmination of a universal economic 
development implies that every other society, along with its members, can be 
judged according to their proximity to it. Every social group therefore can be 
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allocated a place in a hierarchy of social organisations, according to the extent 
of their development towards communism.     
Francine Hirsch’s account emphasises that Marxist-Leninism was 
developed against the backdrop of Europe’s age of nationalism, and 
incorporated contemporary understandings of nationality, ethnicity, and their 
crucial influence over social activity (Hirsch, 2005: pp. 5, 15, 21–62). However, 
Teodor Shanin notes that the notions used in Soviet academia to describe 
cultural difference developed into paradigms that contrasted with the 
explanations of nationhood and ethnicity prominent in the West, such as those of 
Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983). The 
discussion of cultural difference throughout the Soviet period “focused on and 
gave credence to … ethnic entities of high consistency and political potential, 
historically formed and changing over time … ethnic particularity was treated as 
socially real and not as a mystified expression of something else.” (Shanin, 
1989: p. 412.) This discussion therefore concerned generalised notions of ethnic 
grouping (narodnost’), nation (natsiya) or ethnos (etnos), all of which refer to 
ontologically existing communities. The contrasts in mindset and practice 
between individuals belonging to different narodnosti, natsii or etnosy were 
understood in terms of the varying characteristics their particular ethnic or 
national affiliation entailed, rather than according to the specificities of their 
psychological, historical, economic, demographic or cultural backgrounds.  
However, Marxist-Leninism’s insistence on the future disappearance of 
national difference as the world’s peoples turned to communism ultimately 
made it an anti-nationalist ideology. National or ethnic cultural difference could 
not halt what was seen as the inevitable progress of history, being the ‘form’ 
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rather than the ‘content’ of social distinction, as Lenin remarked (Slezkine, 
1994: p. 142). This was to create an ideological contradiction throughout the 
Soviet period, since it clashed with the constant preoccupation of both state and 
academic institutions with real and influential narodnosti, etnosy and natsii. The 
contradiction was to some extent resolved through the Soviet establishment’s 
adherence to historical materialism. ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ were conceived 
in terms of their capacity to describe the various stages towards communism: 
‘ethnicity’ referred to the groups, cultures and traditions that had not yet become 
‘national’ (Slezkine, 1994: p. 346; Hirsch, 2005: pp. 43, 314; Bromley, 1989: p. 
431). 
This evolutionist paradigm allows for the eventual disappearance of 
ethnicity and nationality into world communism. It was to generate extensive 
academic work on ‘ethnos theory’ led by Yulian Bromley during the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s, which aimed to understand the various ‘ethnic processes’ leading to the 
merger (sliyaniye) of nations (Bromley 1974a; 1974b; Bromley and Kozlov, 
1989; Shanin, 1989; Slezkine, 1994: pp. 345–6).2 The academic discussion and 
policy relating to cultural difference naturally varied over the seventy-plus years 
of Soviet government, however it consistently referred to a hierarchy of 
objectively existing ethnic or national groups, arranged according to their level 
of progress. Ernest Gellner asserted in 1988 that, “A Soviet anthropologist is 
still a man primarily interested in the history of mankind and the evolution of 
human society” (Gellner, 1988: p. 3). Valery Tishkov states that academics in 
the Russian Federation continue to regard ethnic and national groups as 
objective social entities (Tishkov, 1997: p. 1; 2003: p. 10). The concern some 
                                                 
2 Bromley used the word etnichnost’ for ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic group’, rather than 
narodnost’; this is now common practice. 
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prominent academics continue to express with “nominally and actually 
functioning ethnicity (etnichnost’)” supports his claim (Drobizheva, 1995: p. 
1). Some scholars have recently tried to initiate debate over the nature of 
ethnicity and nationality – such as Tatiana Skrynnikova and Alisher 
Ilkhamov, both of whom argue for a more constructivist approach 
(Skrynnikova, 1999; Ilkhamov, 2006).  
Contestation over the meaning of etnichnost’ and natsional’nost’ is 
less explicit outside the Russian Federation’s academic discourse, but both 
words refer to a complex, changing and highly charged range of 
understandings, as the following sections will explain. The Soviet distinction 
between the two terms remains as an assumption that natsional’niye 
cultures and identities are connected to a titular nation-state, and its 
political institutions. Etnichnost’ and etnichniye identities and cultures do 
not automatically refer to nation-states, instead having a closer association 
with intimate, psychological experience. Etnichnost’ nonetheless retains a 
political dimension, from its capacity to be mobilised into political 
movements by nationalist (natsionalist) groups and ideologies. The object of 
this investigation is to elucidate the mix of political and personal 
significance in the Russian Federation’s contemporary understanding of 
etnichnost’, as section 1.2 describes. I will however be referring to this 
phenomenon in English as ‘ethnicity’ throughout the dissertation, in order 
to keep the implicit and unexamined connotations of the Russian word at a 
distance. Likewise, the English word ‘nationalism’ will be used to describe 
politicised attempts to promote a particular ethnic group or culture. The 
Russian term natsionalism has a problematic history, as this section 
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describes: it is now widely understood as a pejorative term, similar to the 
English word 'racism' (Argounova, 2001). Bruce Grant notes that the 
Soviet discourse on culture has engendered a widespread tendency to 
“objectify” cultural practice within a specific notion of kul’tura (Grant 
1995: p. 16). I have based this dissertation on a post-modernist conception 
of culture, which is set out in Chapter Two.  
 
The Russian Federation’s enormous territory is home to a huge variety of races 
and cultures, in addition to the Slavic peoples who have dominated its historical, 
political and cultural development over the past five centuries. The decline of 
the Mongol Empire allowed Russian colonists gradually to push the borders of 
Tsarist Russia ever further from the European continent, even reaching North 
America – until at the start of the twentieth century they stood at the Arctic 
Ocean to the north, the Caucasian mountain ranges and Mongolia to the south, 
and the Pacific Ocean to the east. The Russian Empire of the nineteenth century 
encompassed the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Buddhist or 
Shamanist Mongolian and Turkic tribes in Southern and Central Siberia, and the 
Shamanist reindeer-herders and hunter-gatherers indigenous to Northern and 
Central Asia. Its size and diversity prevented the Tsarist government from 
making consistent and systematic attempts either to remove the non-Russian 
peoples, or to impose Russian values and lifestyles, until the late nineteenth 
century. The Red Army’s victory in the civil war of the 1920s put the 
Bolshevik Party in charge of a country deeply divided not only by economic 
class, but by culture, language and religion. 
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The presence of non-Russian populations on the former Russian 
Empire’s territories presented the early Soviet government with a particular 
series of dilemmas. The Bolsheviks had identified themselves before 1917 as 
anti-colonialist, since they regarded colonialism as a form of capitalist 
exploitation (Hirsch, 2005: pp. 26–28; David Lane, 1981: pp. 35–43). However, 
the undesirability of giving up valuable territories to the indigenous non-Russian 
populations became obvious once the Bolsheviks had attained power. Their pre-
revolutionary calls for universal national self-determination also contradicted 
their avowal of an all-encompassing imperative to build a communist society, 
which itself would eventually erode the distinctions between the world’s 
nationalities. (Their creation of a communist society would start with the 
institution of a socialist state, hence the specification of the Soviet states as 
Socialist Republics.) The early Soviet government had to change its 
populations’ worldviews, in order firstly to win their sympathy for the Marxist-
Leninist endeavour that legitimised the Soviet accession to power, and secondly 
to bring the project itself to fruition. The Russian Empire’s non-Russian 
populations lived according to a wide range of Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, 
Jewish and Shamanist traditions, and there was no reason to suppose they would 
have attempted to construct a communist society, had they been granted national 
self-determination – in common, it has to be said, with the large proportion of 
the Russian population who also had no knowledge of Marxist-Leninism 
(Slezkine, 2000: pp. 319, 325).  
The historical materialist elements in Marxist-Leninist theory led the 
Bolsheviks to conceive the problem posed by the Russian Empire’s cultural 
variation as a difference in its population’s levels of social development. The 
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individuals and groups apparently inhibited by their culture and religious 
tradition from sympathising with the Soviet mission were categorised as 
‘backward’ (Slezkine, 1994: p. 144). The Soviet government believed it had to 
‘modernise’ its ‘undeveloped’ subjects, removing the attitudes that hindered 
their ‘progress’, while inculcating the values, practices and institutions that 
would enable their transition to communism. As Stalin put it at the Tenth Party 
Conference in 1921, “‘the essence of the nationality question in the USSR 
consists of the need to eliminate the backwardness (economic, political and 
cultural) that the nationalities have inherited from the past, to allow the 
backward peoples to catch up with central Russia’” (Slezkine, 1994: p. 144). 
However, it had to accomplish this change without appearing to be a newer 
incarnation of the pre-revolutionary colonists and missionaries it condemned as 
‘exploitative’. The task was complicated by the huge variety of culture, religion 
and tradition which had to be subsumed into Marxist-Leninism, and the central 
government’s poor knowledge of the Soviet Empire’s peoples and their 
territories. As Slezkine describes, the Siberian Office’s three employees would 
urge the Commissariat of Nationalities in 1922 to “know where things are 
located, and not confuse Azerbaijan with Siberia, and Siberia with the Ukraine.” 
(Slezkine, 1994: p. 140.)   
Hirsch and Slezkine show that the Bolsheviks co-opted academic 
ethnographers throughout the 1920s and 30s into an attempt to produce an 
exhaustive classification of all the ethnic groups living on their territory, 
involving a census of the entire population (Slezkine, 1994; Hirsch, 2005). As 
Hirsch notes, the Soviet government used a similar ‘cultural technology’ to 
establish its power as the West European colonialist empires, described by 
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Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities; this similarity displays the Soviet 
state’s inherently modern character (Hirsch, 2005: p. 13; Anderson, 1991: pp. 
163–186). This classification was regarded as the first stage of a conscious 
intervention into the historical process, which would convert Russia’s ‘ethnic 
groups’ into the ‘nations’ that would emerge into the communist society. The 
census would re-form the Russian Empire’s chaotic mix of cultures into a series 
of ethnic groups, each occupying a territory that would become its national 
homeland, while simultaneously defining each ethnic group’s stage of 
development. The Soviet state would then endow each ethnic group and its 
territory with the state institutions that befitted a nationality – including modern 
industrial, cultural and educational establishments. It would train its non-
Russian populations to run these institutions, building up Soviet ‘nationalities’ 
from their roots in the ethnic groups of pre-Soviet Russia. The Soviet name for 
this policy – korenizatsiya – expresses their emphasis on ‘rooting’ modernity 
into the lives of its non-Russian populations, being derived from the word 
koren’, or root. This re-education process would necessarily involve removing 
the traditional institutions, attitudes and practices that hindered the full adoption 
of a modernised lifestyle and outlook, along with the individuals who 
maintained them.  
Soviet ideological discourse described its modernisation as the 
‘liberation’ of the non-Russian peoples from Tsarist colonisation, which had 
prevented them from reaching their full potential – thereby distinguishing the 
benevolent Soviet policy from exploitative capitalist colonisation, in an attempt 
to gain non-Russian support (Martin, 2000: p. 353; Hirsch, 2005: p. 14; 
Vihavainen, 2000: p. 80). The Soviet Union was apparently to exist as a 
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‘friendship of the peoples’ (druzhba narodov), each living in their own 
‘autonomous’ nation-state – such as the Buryat and Sakha Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republics, created in 1923 and 1922 respectively, or the Ust-Orda and 
Aga Buryat Autonomous Okrugi, separated from the main Buryat Republic in 
1938. This ‘liberation’ entailed the public celebration of non-Russian cultures, 
despite its incongruity with the Soviet government’s primary intention to 
inculcate a Marxist-Leninist worldview, and in doing so to eliminate cultural 
difference.  
The contradiction was resolved at an ideological level through the Soviet 
government’s understanding of cultural production as limited to European art 
forms, which corresponded to its assumption that the European nation-states are 
the world’s ‘developed’ societies. The Soviet state claimed to be guiding its 
non-Russian peoples into bringing out their own ‘national’ cultural and 
academic achievements, as part of their modernisation (Slezkine, 2000: p. 335). 
It would provide non-Russian peoples with the intellectual and material 
resources they needed to produce their own European-style operas, ballets, 
literature, art and academia, and to record their traditional dances, songs and oral 
traditions for future generations – while adapting these dances, songs and oral 
traditions to fit a Europeanised understanding of ‘folk’ cultural production, as 
part of the process.3  Its education programmes would create an elite class of 
non-Russian intellectuals, who would direct their populations into their 
communist future (Slezkine, 1994: p. 157). If successfully carried out, these 
policies would eventually reduce cultural difference to a selection of traditions 
in European cultural production, existing among a population that otherwise 
                                                 
3 The results of this investment into cultural institutions can still be seen in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia). For example, Soviet-built Opera Houses remain in both of these Republics’ capitals, 
where Soviet-era national operas, such as the Buryat epic Geser, are still performed. 
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lived and thought according to Soviet paradigms. The Soviet government 
likewise removed the contradiction between its claim to be a ‘liberating’ force, 
and its mass destruction of religious and cultural institutions, through its use of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mullahs, priests, shamans, rabbis and lamas were 
publicly described as the ‘oppressive’ propagators of ‘backward’ institutions and 
practices, who needed to be removed as part of the Soviet ‘liberation’. 
Establishing the size and condition of Russia’s non-Russian populations 
proved to be more complicated than the policy makers had anticipated, partly 
because many peoples did not share the Soviet understanding of ethnicity, and 
therefore could not relate to the ethnic groups the researchers had identified 
(Slezkine, 1994: p. 160; Hirsch, 2005). The process of identifying Russia’s 
ethnic groups was hampered by a lack of agreement on the characteristics that 
defined a community as ‘ethnic’, rather than as arising from another form of 
social cohesion. The census itself suffered from a variety of local difficulties, 
particularly in Russia’s more remote territories (Slezkine, 1994). Several 
censuses were taken during the 1920s and 30s, producing ethnographic maps 
that differed according to the shifts in ideological debate and the circumstances 
of both researcher and participant. The Soviet policies intended to modernise 
‘backward’ peoples also changed radically over this period, transferring their 
emphases between the liberation of national cultures, and their enforced 
modernisation, as the early Soviet state’s condition demanded.  
The Great Retreat during the mid- to late-1930s brought an end to what 
Slezkine calls the carnivalesque culture of the preceding years: “The forces of 
gravity (in both senses) pinned buildings to the ground, peasants to the land, 
workers to factories, women to men and Soviets to the USSR” (Slezkine, 2000: 
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p. 332). The increasing consolidation of the Soviet state combined with the 
Stalinist terror and the threat posed by Nazi Germany to cause a homogenisation 
of state policy around the central tenets of the Soviet project – including the 
creation of ‘modernised’ nationalities. One effect was the decision to issue every 
individual with a formal state identification that included their nationality: a 
passport was issued to every Soviet citizen during the early 1930s, which 
displayed their name, time and place of birth, authorised address and national 
identity. A fixed national identity was thus assigned to every Soviet citizen at 
birth, until the nationality definition was removed from the Russian Federation’s 
passports during the 1990s. This identity often had a major influence over 
individual lives and prospects (Slezkine, 2000: p. 337).  
However, disparities remained between the national identities defined by 
the Soviet ethnographers and government officials, and the group affiliations 
claimed by individual people. Some non-Russian peoples still have an uncertain 
attitude towards their official ‘national identity’ – such as the Buryat, many of 
whom continue to feel a stronger personal connection with their particular tribe, 
clan or territorial community than with the Buryat national group.4 
The generation of a personal relevance for state national identities, along 
with the fundamental changes in self-perception this requires, was part of the 
modernising transformation the Soviet government hoped to bring about. The 
Soviet government’s modernising strategy had brought its citizens’ self-
perception into the remit of state policy, following the all-encompassing logic of 
Marxist-Leninist theory. The ideological and practical strategies the Bolsheviks 
used to address the problems created by the Russian Empire’s variety of culture 
                                                 
4 The ethnographies by Aimar Ventsel, Bruce Grant and David Anderson show similarly 
problematic national identities to exist among the Sakha, Nivkh and Evenk respectively 
(Ventsel, 2005; Grant, 1995; Anderson, 2000).  
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and identity had generated a phenomenon called ‘ethnicity’, or ‘nationality’, 
which incorporated personal identification and evaluation, collective cultural 
difference, and political action.  
Extensive industrialisation programmes that eradicated cultural 
difference became a major part of the Soviet government’s modernising strategy 
after the Second World War (Slezkine, 1994: p. 338). The rapid industrialisation 
of the entire Soviet Union during the 1960s and 70s brought the most radical 
lifestyle changes to the non-Russian peoples living in the more remote areas, 
such as the Buryat and Sakha. Increasingly, large proportions of the non-Russian 
population were encouraged or forced to abandon their traditional ways of life, 
moving into Russian-style houses and blocks of flats in the newly built villages 
and towns. Large migrations of Slavic industrial workers to northern and central 
Asia accompanied the construction of industrial towns, until many non-Russian 
populations found that within a couple of decades they had become minority 
groups in their own ‘national’ territories. The Sakha for example witnessed a 
sharp demographic shift over the twentieth century, as Section Two explains.  
The changes in ideological discourse that occurred during the Second 
World War brought another dimension to the contradiction between the 
purported ‘modernisation’ and ‘liberation’ of the non-Russian peoples. The need 
to mobilise the Soviet population against Nazi Germany led Soviet 
propagandists to emphasise the great historical and cultural tradition of the 
Russian people, in an attempt to encourage a patriotic attachment to a 
specifically Russian national identity (Slezkine, 1994: p. 303; Hirsch, 2005: pp. 
15, 231–273). The Soviet peoples were asked to fight not only for the sake of 
the Soviet Union, but also for the Russian state. The relationship between 
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Russians and non-Russians in these narratives emphasised the Marxist-Leninist 
notion of a hierarchy of nationalities, determined by their stage of 
‘development’. The Russian people was portrayed as a highly developed and 
therefore inherently superior nation, acting as a ‘big brother’ (starshiy brat’) to 
the other Soviet nations by bringing about their ‘development’ and ‘civilisation’. 
Slezkine contends that post-war ideological discourse went so far as to describe 
the Russian people as the ‘chosen’ advancers of the human condition, so that the 
history of humanity revolved around that of the Russian people and their state 
(Slezkine, 1994: p. 304).  
The Soviet Union’s ideological discourse thus accorded national 
difference a crucial significance within its account of human progress. It 
encouraged the non-Russian peoples to seek out and develop their nation’s 
cultural ‘assets’, within the boundaries set by the Soviet definitions of national 
difference and cultural production, while vilifying the ‘bourgeois nationalists’ 
who expressed opposition towards the Soviet modernisation (Argounova, 2001; 
Khamutayev, 2005; Yakovlev, 2003).5 Nationalism (natsionalizm) became 
known as a heinous crime throughout the Soviet Union, and was used to justify 
the repression of many non-Russians. In practice, natsionalizm often referred to 
a lack of respect for Russian culture, rather than an excessive desire to promote 
one’s own (Slezkine, 2000: p. 336; Yakovlev, 2003: p. 63).  
The contradictions within Soviet ideology on the ‘national question’ 
added to the emotional pressures Soviet policy could exert on non-Russian 
citizens. Soviet ideology encouraged them to regard their nationality and its 
peculiarities as aspects of their personhood and identity, while emphasising their 
                                                 
5 These authors describe either their personal experience of the punishment meted out to 
‘bourgeois nationalists’, or that of groups known to them.  
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nations’ inferiority to the Russian ‘big brothers’, the benevolent instigators of 
the massive changes that were making many pre-Soviet peculiarities 
increasingly impossible to maintain as the latter half of the twentieth century 
progressed. The enforced transition from pre-Soviet non-Russian social systems 
to sedentary6 European-style farming and industry during the 1920s, 30s, 40s 
and 50s was accompanied by widespread cultural, social and economic 
devastation, varying according to each region’s territorial and social 
specificities. For example, Caroline Humphrey describes the damage Soviet 
collective farming wrought to Buryatia’s thin and fragile soil: by the late-Soviet 
period imports of hay from Mongolia were needed in order to feed Buryatia’s 
sheep (Humphrey, 1998: p. 454).  
Non-Russian citizens had to adapt to radical changes, forcing them to 
develop new ways of coping with the problems they encountered, and of 
understanding their place in the world they lived in, reconciling their remaining 
traditional beliefs with the Soviet ideological narratives they absorbed as they 
dealt with the upheavals of modernisation and war. The younger generations of 
non-Russian Soviet citizens found it increasingly difficult to relate to their 
parents’ and grandparents’ values and aspirations, creating the potential for 
profound identity crises. For example, the children from Siberia’s indigenous 
reindeer-herding tribes who had been educated at Soviet boarding schools 
lacked their parents’ knowledge of the traditional practices needed to herd 
reindeer in an arctic climate, making them unfit for their peoples’ traditional 
way of life (Slezkine, 1994: p. 342; Vitebsky, 2005).  
                                                 
6 ‘Sedentary’ here refers to settled agriculture, as opposed to nomadic livestock herding. 
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However, many of the non-Russians who had had a predominantly 
Soviet education were deeply grateful to the Soviet government, believing the 
Soviet nationalities policy had given their nation the institutions and education it 
needed (Slezkine, 1994; 2000; Yakovlev, 2003; Boronova, 2005; Pesteryov, 
2000). They took pride in their national republics’ new universities, theatres, art 
galleries and industries, and in the non-Russian academics, politicians, artists, 
musicians and engineers who ran them. Elderly Buryat intellectuals for example 
would emphatically tell me that the Soviets had “given” them their cultural 
tradition; a leading Sakha intellectual sought to impress upon me that Lenin’s 
greatness lay in his decision to develop the Soviet Union’s less advantaged 
peoples. The corollary to this understanding of events is however a sense that 
the former generation’s mindsets and lifestyles are indeed ‘backward’, and 
perhaps also that the national group itself is inferior. The personal discomfort 
this suspicion would cause was exacerbated in some cases by a difficult 
relationship between Russian and non-Russian populations. Some non-Russian 
and Russian communities lived peacefully together in a genuine ‘friendship of 
the peoples’, while other non-Russian groups felt their Russian neighbours had 
the patronising or racist attitudes that might be expected from a people officially 
designated as the vanguard of human development. Vasiliy Yakovlev for 
example describes how Russians would pejoratively refer to non-Russian 
Siberians as ‘reindeer’ (oleney) (Yakovlev, 2003: p. 243).    
The pride non-Russians were encouraged to take in their ‘modern’, 
European-style intellectuals and artists also led them to value the non-Russian 
intellectuals who received a European-style education during the end of the 
Tsarist period as the initiators of their development as modern nations. Several 
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of these early nationalist intellectuals had assimilated the late nineteenth-century 
European understanding of nationhood that influenced Marxist-Leninism, which 
inspired them to develop their peoples’ culture and political standing. Most of 
them died during the repressions, along with the leaders of other non-Russian 
intellectual traditions, such as the Buddhist reformation movement of the 1920s. 
The anger some felt about these deaths helped to motivate the late-Soviet non-
Russian nationalist movements. For example, many late-Soviet Sakha 
nationalists complained about the premature deaths and subsequent public 
excoriation of three Sakha writers, Anempodist Sofronov, Nikolay Neustroyev 
and Aleksey Kulakovskiy, whom they regarded as having founded the Sakha 
literary tradition. As a result, criticism of the Soviet regime focused on the 
Stalinist repressions, instead of its modernisation of their culture and way of life, 
or a perceived Russian colonisation of their territory. Again, it reflects the 
unusually intensive exposure to Marxist-Leninism that accompanied the late-
Soviet non-Russian nationalist intellectuals’ high level of education.    
The Soviet government’s need to define its intentions, practices, 
population and state in terms of its purported aim to create humanity’s ideal 
social condition, and the all-encompassing nature of the aim itself, led to a 
centralised network of institutions and rituals that encouraged the lives of Soviet 
citizens to revolve around Soviet ideological discourse (Yurchak, 2006; Christel 
Lane, 1981). These institutions merged Soviet citizens’ public and private 
experience into a constant repetition of Soviet ideological narratives. 
Humphrey’s description of the holidays held for Buryatia’s collective farm 
workers during the 1960s and 70s shows how Soviet institutional practices 
integrated various dimensions of personal and private life, into a complex ritual 
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that both demonstrated the existence of a socialist lifestyle, and created 
opportunities for Soviet norms to be reiterated. Workers' holidays, such as ‘Day 
of the Pig-keeper’, were instituted by the central Soviet government to 
demonstrate how every group of workers is and should be valued, as in a truly 
rational and classless society. All associations in the Soviet Union had an 
official duty to organise a succession of public speeches, competitions, prize-
givings, criticisms and entertainments on the designated holidays belonging to 
each group of workers in their institution. Humphrey notes that on one of the 
collective farms she observed only two of the holidays were celebrated – ‘Day 
of the Shepherd’ and ‘Day of the Machine-Operator’ (Humphrey, 1998: p. 376–
377). These workers were the most important to the economic success of this 
particular farm, suggesting that the farm management used the institution of 
worker's holidays as a stimulus to production. The Soviet system had thus set up 
a form of institutionalised relaxation, a means by which Soviet values could be 
disseminated among the population, and a way for administrators to promote 
economic success. Political and economic activities were being merged with the 
encouragement of particular personal aspirations and values, during occasions 
that were acknowledged to be recreational holidays.  
The Soviet ideology on national identity generated its own public rituals, 
such as the exhibitions of folk dancing that accompanied state holidays. Each of 
the Soviet Union’s nations developed their own versions of the stylised ‘folk’ 
dances and songs intended for public display. A succession of different national 
folk dances would be performed, in order to demonstrate the ‘friendship’ and 
variety of the Soviet Union’s ‘liberated’ nations. These festivals served to 
reinforce the officially sanctioned understanding of national difference, of the 
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apparently harmonious relationship that existed between the Soviet nations, and 
of the national cultures’ specific characteristics and attributes. They were part of 
the Soviet government’s direct intervention into its populations’ understanding 
of themselves, and of the cultural differences they could observe – while also 
reminding them to maintain an outwardly friendly and respectful attitude 
towards one another, whatever they might actually feel. I found during my field 
trips that folk dancing displays are still an important component of public events 
in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia): different national dances are carefully 
alternated, even during the celebration of a specific ethnic group’s traditional 
holiday, such as the Buryat Surkharban.  
Alexei Yurchak’s analysis of late-Soviet discursive practice shows that 
urban Soviet citizens developed complex ways of using ideological discourse 
for their own purposes, during the decades after the Second World War 
(Yurchak 2003a; 2006). He argues that they accepted Soviet ideology as an 
inevitable part of daily life rather than as a creed, while creating their own 
parallel networks of values and beliefs. However, the centrality of Soviet 
ideology to Soviet education and practice did change individual value systems. 
More and more Soviet citizens became co-opted into the Soviet project, blurring 
the distinction between the architects of Soviet society and their subjects. 
Individuals working in every sphere of Soviet society had to balance ideology 
and the needs of daily life, along with personal experiences not covered by 
Soviet paradigms. This created contradictions within the ideology itself, such as 
the incompatible calls to modernise and liberate the non-Russian peoples, while 
also generating a disjuncture between social discourse and private experience 
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that stimulated Soviet citizens to develop the complex attitudes and discursive 
strategies Yurchak describes (Yurchak 2003a; 2006).  
The Bolshevik attempt to mould reality into their ideology had in fact 
created a new reality, giving the contentions and beliefs that made up Soviet 
ideology a life of their own in the unpredictable evolution of individual attitudes 
and practice. Alena Ledeneva’s analysis of the late-Soviet black market (blat) 
provides an example of the developments in practice Soviet policy generated. 
As she describes, “The Soviet system was not a planned economy. It was meant 
to be, but those living within its borders found that they had to counteract its 
over-centralisation and its ideological limitations through intricate schemes of 
informal exchange, regional and industrial lobbying, and a variety of practices 
for cheating the system.” (Ledeneva, 1998: p. 1.) 
Both non-Russians and Russians developed ways of adapting the 
ideology and policy on nationality into their lives, depending on their specific 
contexts and concerns, and their levels of exposure to the various ideological 
discourses. These efforts involved a negotiation of their attitudes towards the 
profound connection Soviet public discourse made between national identity and 
personal value. For example, the Soviet promotion of national difference 
stimulated a strong resentment among late twentieth-century Buryat and Sakha 
nationalist intellectuals against what they perceived as the underestimation of 
their respective Buryat and Sakha national traditions, understood according to 
Soviet paradigms – along with many other groups of Soviet-educated non-
Russian intellectuals.  
Several ethnographic studies show that non-Russians tended to 
assimilate Soviet ideology into their specific cultural mindsets, rather than 
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undergoing a complete transformation in attitude and belief (Slezkine, 1994; 
Vitebsky, 2005; Humphrey, 1998; 2002; Balzer, 1993; 1995; 1999; Anderson, 
2000; Grant, 1995; Stroganova, 2001). For example, Humphrey contends that 
the Buryat used their traditional shamanic practices to help them come to terms 
with the contradictions of Soviet life: the cycles of suffering and revenge 
inherent to Buryat shamanism helped the Buryat articulate and explain the 
suffering Soviet ideology and discourse would not admit. This led, for example, 
to the belief that the otters in Lake Baikal harboured the spirits of the 1871 
Parisian Communards, and could help farm workers fulfil their production plans 
(Humphrey, 1998: p. 408). Piers Vitebsky, Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer and 
David Anderson all describe the continuation of pre-Soviet shamanic practices 
among the reindeer-herding tribes, into the contemporary post-Soviet period 
(Vitebsky, 2005; Balzer, 1993; 1995; 1999; Anderson, 2000). This created a 
paradox, since the Soviet nationalities policy had succeeded in creating a new 
awareness of ethnic or national identity among much of the population. The 
constant exposure to a radically different set of ideas about ethnicity and 
nationality created the potential for a personal awareness of a non-Russian 
ethnic identity to take shape as a set of abstracted ideas, instead of remaining an 
unquestioned part of daily experience. However, these ideas and their personal 
significances did not necessarily correspond to the officially sanctioned 
paradigms. The uncontrollable development of non-Russian perceptions of 
ethnicity and nationality continued to pose problems for the central Soviet 
administration, ending in the non-Russian national movements during the 1980s 
and 90s. It remained the subject of Soviet government policy, while forming an 
integral part of individual self-perception and identity.  
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Yurchak’s study reveals how the different uses of ideological discourse 
fundamentally changed the relevance of the ideology itself, to the extent that it 
was no longer capable of justifying the existence of the Soviet state (Yurchak 
2003a; 2006). The difficulty of reconciling the Soviet Union’s project with the 
experiences of its purported authors and beneficiaries increased as time went on, 
until the project itself disappeared amidst the mass of conflicting intentions, 
attitudes and strategies its non-fulfilment had produced. The attitudes, identities 
and motivations that formed around the contradictions within Soviet nationality 
ideology and policy played their part in the transformation of the Soviet Union 
(Slezkine, 1994: p. 387; Hirsch, 2005: p. 324; Martin, 2000: p. 355). The non-
Russian intellectual nationalism movements collaborated with other dissident 
organisations to demand greater levels of autonomy for their ‘national’ 
republics, following the assertions of independence made by the Soviet states in 
Eastern Europe. The non-Russian nationalism movements had varying levels of 
support from their respective non-Russian populations, some of whom were 
unable to identify with the nationalist intellectual representation of their own 
nations and cultures, like the Buryat (Khamutayev, 2005; Stroganova, 2001). 
However, the combination of nationalist demands catalysed Russia’s 
transformation, legitimating Yeltsin’s decision to break up the Soviet Union. 
The late-Soviet nationalist movements revealed the potential for the networks of 
ideas and values associated with the Soviet ideology on ‘nationality’ to motivate 





Section 1.1.2: The problem of post-Soviet non-Russian identity 
The differing cultures, identities and affiliations associated with the Russian 
Federation’s ethnic groups still have the capacity to hinder the post-Soviet 
federal government from building up a consistent popular loyalty to the Russian 
state, just as they hindered the early Soviet government. However, the Soviet 
nationalities policies have increased the tendency for both politicians and 
ordinary people to subscribe to the view that differences in culture and mindset, 
and the problems associated with them, are manifestations of ‘national’ or 
‘ethnic’ identities with a decisive effect on personal characteristics, aspirations 
and capabilities. The downside is that the Russian Federation’s differing 
‘national identities’ are seen as potentially divisive, particularly when non-
Russian nationalist elites try to harness them for their own political or business 
purposes (Kolstø, 2000: p. 224; Tishkov, 1997: p. 248; 2003: p. 345).  
Prominent academics in both Russia and the West have advocated the 
promotion of a civic identity, attached to the Russian Federal state, which would 
replace the Soviet civic identity as a unifying alternative to potentially 
dangerous national identities (Tolz, 1998; Piirainen, 2000; Kolstø, 2000; 
Petersson, 2001; Solovei, 2003; Tishkov 1997; 2003). This civic identity would 
have to incorporate collective values, norms and aspirations, in the same way as 
the Soviet civic identity. Some claim that successive post-Soviet governments 
have indeed introduced a civic national identity: the Yeltsin administration 
promoted the concept of a rossiiskiy, rather than russkiy (ethnic Russian) 
identity, the adjective rossiyskiy being derived from the word rossiyanin, 
meaning a citizen of the Russian Federation. Western and Russian sociologists 
and political scientists have investigated the real importance of a post-Soviet 
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civic identity, often as part of an attempt to gauge the extent to which the 
Russian Federation’s formally democratic state institutions have taken root in its 
society (Tolz, 1998; Piirainen, 2000; Petersson, 2001; Kolstø, 2000; Tishkov 
1997).  
They use survey data, often in conjunction with the analysis of 
interviews conducted with samples of ethnic Russians. Their analysis consists of 
matching their participants’ statements about collective identity, the Russian 
people, and their state against various models of collective affiliation, to see 
which model best fits their data. This method assumes that perceptions of 
collective identity can be broadly categorised according to the community to 
which they are understood to refer – be it defined as a state, a state in tandem 
with its national group, an ethnic group, or by other collective attributes such as 
culture. Individual collective identities can therefore be described as specifically 
‘civic’, ‘national’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’. The attempt to isolate and define 
individual collective identities also posits a fundamental distinction between 
collective identity and its surrounding social context: political and cultural 
change is understood to generate collective identities, which take on an 
independent existence as abstracted, generally applicable concepts.  
Research by Vera Tolz, Timo Piirainen and Bo Petersson suggests that a 
pan-ethnic civic identity had little relevance for individual people at the end of 
the 1990s, despite the federal government’s alleged attempts to encourage it. 
Petersson’s analysis casts doubt on the reality of the federal government’s 
efforts to inculcate a civic identity. It reveals that Russia’s collective identity is 
conceived both in public discourse and private perception as a unification 
against a variety of internal enemies, sometimes identified specifically as ethnic 
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Caucasians, rather than a positive attachment to a state and its corresponding 
social project. Petersson’s research corroborates that of Ivan Zassourskiy, who 
claims Vladimir Putin won the 2000 presidential elections by promoting an 
impression that the Caucasian ethnic groups pose a substantial threat to Russia 
(Zassourskiy, 2001). Petersson’s and Zassourskiy’s results indicate that the 
federal government regards influencing popular perception as an essential task 
of government, in common with the Soviet government. By emphasising a 
specific threat from the Caucasian peoples, the federal government reinforces its 
populations’ awareness of ethnic difference, rather than promoting a pan-ethnic 
state identity that could reduce the relevance generally attached to ethnic 
identities.  
The creators of these government narratives incorporated their 
perception of popular feelings about ethnic identity into a political project, as 
did the Soviet government. They assumed that the Russian Federation’s 
population understands ethnic or national difference as highly influential. Their 
assumptions about their audiences entail a consideration of the Russian 
Federation’s non-Russian ethnic groups: a heightened popular awareness of 
ethnic difference could not exist in an exclusively Russian population. 
The ethnographies of specific non-Russian communities show that the 
identities that might be termed ‘national’ in the Russian Federation are dynamic 
and complex, often interacting with other collective identities in a process of 
rapid cultural development (Balzer, Petro and Robertson, 2001; Balzer, 1993; 
1995; 1999; Anderson, 2000; Grant, 1995; Ventsel, 2005). They are not a set of 
clearly defined, consistent and uniform affiliations with the Russian 
Federation’s officially acknowledged range of nationalities. For example, 
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Marjorie Balzer describes the kin-related identities that continue to have a 
profound importance for the Khanty people of western Siberia. These arise 
from the traditional Khanty belief in reincarnation: individual souls are 
reincarnated through successive family generations, perpetuating a strong 
sense of connection with the kin group (Balzer, 1999).  
All these ethnographies show that Soviet nationalities ideology and 
policy have strongly influenced the collective identities among the groups 
concerned, although this influence has taken very different forms. For example, 
Bruce Grant’s ethnography of the Nivkhi living on Sakhalin Island reveals the 
extent to which the Nivkhi assimilated the pan-national Soviet identity, so that 
the collapse of the Soviet state caused multiple identity crises rather than a surge 
of Nivkhi national pride (Grant, 1995). In contrast, Balzer and Tatiana 
Argounova show how the selective Soviet-era industrialisation of Sakha 
(Yakutia) encouraged Sakha populations to regard themselves not only as 
distinct from ethnic Slavs, but also as exploited by a Russian Soviet state 
(Balzer, 1993; 1995; Argounova, 2001). David Anderson claims that ‘national’ 
identities corresponding to the Soviet model are becoming increasingly 
important among the Evenki reindeer herders he studied, in tandem with the 
affiliations individual Evenki have towards their specific reindeer herding 
collectives (Anderson, 2000).  
The massive reductions in obvious cultural difference initiated by Soviet 
nationalities policy, and exacerbated by post-Soviet economic, cultural and 
demographic change, complicate individual identifications within non-Russian 
groups. These shifts in lifestyle and identity can also hinder the development of 
political non-Russian nationalist movements, as the Buryat case exemplifies. 
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The Buryat intellectual nationalist movement failed to attain overt popular 
support during the 1990s, largely because much of the Buryat population could 
not relate to the pan-Buryat identity and culture that the Buryat nationalist 
intellectuals promoted (Stroganova, 2001; Khamutayev, 2005; Yelayeva, 2004). 
This communication gap reflected the Buryat nationalist intellectuals’ 
assimilation of the official Soviet conception of the Buryat and their culture. 
Rural Buryats tended to identify with their clans or territorial communities, 
while much of the urban population had become so accustomed to a Russianised 
lifestyle that they could not associate the nationalist representations of Buryat 
culture with their own lives. Moreover, the post-Soviet economic collapse in 
rural Buryatia is stimulating more and more Buryats to move to Buryatia’s 
capital city, Ulan Ude, or to leave Buryatia entirely, and in doing so is bringing 
about further changes in Buryat lifestyle and culture (Randalov, Kharayev 
and Chukreyev, 2005). These changes are having a contradictory effect on 
Buryat identity: some Buryats are for the first time beginning to recognise a pan-
Buryat identity, while others believe that they are only distinguished from 
Russians by their Asiatic appearance (Yelayeva, 2004).  
Non-Russian nationalist movements are faced with a need to 
demonstrate their relevance to Russianised non-Russian populations, while the 
Putin administration’s increasingly successful assertion of the central 
government’s power is reducing the possibility for nationalist claims to have 
genuine political weight. The non-Russian populations are not immediately 
likely to generate a series of nationalist movements with the capacity to de-
stabilise the Russian Federation, as happened during the 1990s. The complexity 
and variability of non-Russian identities prevents them from forming an 
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inevitable barrier towards an individual’s loyalty to the Russian Federation’s 
central government. Under the right circumstances, however, they can lead to a 
sense of resentment against the Russian federal state. For example, the recent 
development of a pan-Buryat identity has been accompanied by some angry 
discussion about the federal government’s centralising policies in Ulan Ude’s 
Internet chatrooms, along with a youth nationalism movement called ‘The 
Association of Young Academics’ (Ob’yedinyeniye Molodykh Uchennykh).7 
The awareness of ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ identity stimulated by Soviet 
nationalities policy continues to develop; however, its significance for the 
Russian Federation’s state-building project is not yet entirely understood.   
The investigation of the nature of ethnic Russian identities using the 
sociological methods described above corroborate the impression of complexity 
and dynamic change produced by the ethnographic research, in addition to that 
of a strong influence from Soviet nationalities ideology. For example, Tolz 
concludes that Russian identity is predominantly ‘cultural’ – i.e., it is understood 
to consist of a commitment towards Russian culture and values, rather than as 
referring to an individual’s parentage or place of birth (Tolz, 1998: pp.1015–
1016). The prevalence of this particular ‘cultural identity’ does not preclude the 
existence of influential notions of ‘ethnicity’, or ‘nationality’ per se, since its 
main criterion is a positive relationship with a specific ethnic group’s culture – 
in this case, the Russian ethnic group. Tolz’s results therefore present a 
contradictory impression of the importance perceptions of ethnic difference and 
identity have for ordinary Russians. ‘Cultural’ identity appears to prevail over 
‘ethnic’ identity, although the nature of the cultural identity itself reveals a high 
                                                 
7 www.buryatia.org/modules.php.name=forums; August 30, 2008 
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awareness of ethnic difference as an abstracted social phenomenon. The 
contradiction Tolz’ results present is resolved when the possible influence of 
attitudes and beliefs generated during the Soviet period is borne in mind. A 
people who had grown up under a policy to homogenise different cultures into a 
dominant Russian worldview could well have a flexible attitude towards the 
attribution of Russian identity, understanding it to refer to the extent of an 
individual’s Russian acculturation. This attitude could combine the assumption 
that national difference is ultimately irrelevant within an all-encompassing 
Soviet project, with the belief in the inherent superiority of Russian culture 
encouraged by state ideologists since the Second World War.  
The complexity of contemporary post-Soviet identities suggests the 
effort to define them using theoretical models will tend to show a lack of 
correspondence, rather than a positive understanding of personal affiliation, as is 
the case with the research on the civic identities of Russian Federation. These 
theoretical models also elide the distinction Rogers Brubaker and Frederick 
Cooper draw between the concepts of identity used in academic analysis, 
and those incorporated into political and social strategies such as the Soviet 
nationalities policy (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). As Brubaker and Cooper 
note, a confusion of the categories used to investigate the relationship 
between the individual and collective with the notions of identity that 
underpin ideology can create false assumptions about the ontological reality 
of identity, and its causal status. The Soviet nationalities policy itself is a 
good illustration of the difference between the conceptions of identity 
promoted for specific political or social purposes, and the ways individual 
subjects interact with their social contexts in reality: as the previous section 
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describes, the attempt to create modernised ‘national identities’ did not 
have its intended effect. The effort to gauge the quality of democracy in the 
Russian Federation by quantifying civic identity reiterates the Soviet-era 
belief in the power of specific identities – formulated by the policy makers 
and academics themselves – to bring about social and political change.    
The ethnographic method is better able to distinguish the nuances within 
the collective identifications of particular groups – while a focus on region-
specific ideas avoids the danger of positing unnecessary concepts of 
identity, as Brubaker and Cooper describe. A number of ethnographies 
have analysed the interaction between Soviet policy and specific non-
Russian cultures, often paying particular attention to the cultural shifts 
engendered by the state transformation over the 1980s and 90s (Balzer, 
1999; Anderson, 2000; Grant, 1995; Ventsel, 2005; Humphrey 1998; 2002; 
Vitebsky 2005; Ssorin-Chaikov, 2003). Most of these studies focus on a 
single non-Russian people, and include extensive research into this people’s 
pre-Soviet history.  
These ethnographies are investigations into Soviet policy, culture 
and its effects, and address through this more abstract questions on the 
nature of the state, indigenous culture, colonialism, tradition, and cultural 
transformation. For example, Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov discusses the 
importance of institutional failure within the process of maintaining 
statehood, through a description of the Evenki people’s experience of 
Tsarist and Soviet governance (Ssorin-Chaikov, 2003). Some are especially 
interested in the capacity of belief and convention to survive historical 
change through reassimilation into new social and political contexts 
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(Balzer, 1999; Humphrey, 1998; 2002; Vitebsky 2005). For example, 
Humphrey explores the changing patterns of individual decision-making 
and practice existing in provincial Russia during the 1990s (Humphrey, 
1998). She notes attitudes and strategies that are rooted in the Soviet 
system, but which have adapted and now influence post-Soviet economic 
development. Others are more concerned with the state of contemporary 
indigenous cultures worldwide; for example, Balzer examines the relevance 
of the indigenous Siberian experience of Soviet power for the 
understanding and practice of indigenous politics (Balzer, 1999). This 
research goes a long way towards explaining the contradictory results 
produced by the sociological investigation of post-Soviet ethnicity. Its 
emphasis on detail and personal account shows the complexity of both the 
enactment of the Soviet nationalities policy, and popular responses – while 
also revealing a pattern of profound cultural change, stimulated by a 
conscious political strategy to mould popular self-perception.  
However, the detail of this description precludes the possibility of an 
equal comparison between different non-Russian groups within a single 
research project, although, as Balzer notes, the entire ethnographies can be 
compared as case studies (Balzer, 1999: p. 7). The difficulty of performing 
comparative ethnographies confines the relevance of ethnographic data to 
more general theories, rather than the workings of contemporary politics. 
These authors do not directly relate their findings to the work of political 
scientists and sociologists, which generally concerns the warp and weft of 
political and social development; this anthropological work does not 
therefore explore the influence non-Russian ethnicity has on Russia’s 
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politics. A study of the significance of non-Russian cultural identities for the 
Russian Federation’s governance would have to maintain the ethnographic 
freedom to define key concepts in local terms, while producing data that could 
establish their relevance to the Russian Federation in particular. It would also 
have to compare two or more cases, in order to deduce tendencies occurring 
throughout the Russian Federation.   
The influence of Soviet-era notions of ‘nationality’ and ‘ethnicity’ on the 
contemporary understanding of cultural difference and collective identity in 
Russia raise the possibility that these understandings are themselves a 
continuation of a mass cultural development, initiated by the early Soviet 
strategy to resolve the problems posed by Russia’s non-Russian populations. 
This investigation into the political relevance of popular perceptions of ethnic or 
national identity therefore seeks to locate the contemporary formulation of the 
Soviet-era terms connected to cultural difference, and their function within their 
surrounding context. It aims to identify common patterns of ideas about cultural 
difference, by searching for concepts that resemble the basic ideas of Soviet 
nationalities ideology. This project resembles Humphrey’s investigation of 
the continuities between the former Soviet Union and the Russian 
Federation, focusing on a particular aspect of Soviet culture, the 
understanding of ethnicity. It charts the contemporary stages of the late- 
and post-Soviet development in non-Russian culture and identity identified 
by the anthropological literature.   
Soviet ideology describes cultural difference primarily as the variations 
in practice and attitude that distinguish the world’s ‘ethnic’ groups, while 
‘national’ culture and identity are a more developed version of ‘ethnic’ culture 
 59 
and identity; hence ‘ethnicity’ is the phenomenon that ultimately accounts for 
cultural difference. Investigating the contemporary understanding of ‘ethnicity’, 
‘ethnic culture’ and ‘ethnic identity’ within the Russian Federation’s developing 
complex of collective concerns, aspirations, values and beliefs will provide an 
insight into its non-Russian cultural identities, and their political significance. 
The integration of Soviet ideology into the Soviet Union’s social life and 
cultural development enabled its representation of cultural difference to acquire 
significance within a huge variety of social spheres and practices. An 
individual’s officially designated national identity often had a major effect on 
their careers and personal relationships. The Soviet conceptions of ethnicity 
and nationality were integrated into public discourse in a way similar to the 
‘flagging’ of contemporary Western notions of nationhood described by 
Michael Billig in Banal Nationalism: Billig contends that the populations of 
contemporary nation states are exposed to constant reminders of these 
ideas, whether through news reports or weather forecasts (Billig, 1995). The 
investigation of post-Soviet non-Russian identity as a development of Soviet-era 
attitudes therefore requires a data set presenting a wide range of themes, while 
reflecting their importance within daily life. It would also have to combine the 
quantification of repeated sets of ideas, in order to establish their objective 
relevance, with the subjective interpretation that could draw out the detail of 
their content and meaning.  
The Russian Federation’s mass media discourse acts both to reproduce 
and stimulate contemporary cultural development, as Chapter Two explains in 
detail. Yurchak and Ellen Mickiewicz demonstrate the central role the mass 
media have played in recent Russian history and culture, showing how their 
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changing discursive practices undermined Soviet ideology, while creating an all-
encompassing ‘public sphere’ that transmitted these discursive practices to the 
entire Soviet population (Yurchak, 2003a; 2005; Mickiewicz, 1988). Their 
research corroborates Benedict Anderson’s account of the importance of print 
media in shaping the self-description and project portrayal of modern nations 
(Anderson, 1991). Michael Billig’s analysis of the way mass media 
disseminate the ‘common sense’ that holds nation states together is 
accompanied by an extensive literature on mass media discourse and 
politics, as Chapter Two describes. The discursive practices performed by 
newspaper organisations in particular reflect popular attitudes, and those that 
underlie political strategies – while the repetitive and formulaic nature of their 
communication creates the possibility of both interpreting and quantifying the 
ideas it presents. The discourse produced by a mainstream newspaper over a 
sufficient time period will contain repeated complexes of ideas, which are likely 
to have a specific relevance for their target audience. The systematic analysis 
of a sample of newspaper material will refocus the ethnographic study of 
the interaction between politics and culture, condensing the more typical 
analysis of an extended historical period into a direct juxtaposition of 
authoritative and popular discourse. This in turn enables a comparison 
between two cases.  
Each non-Russian region contains a self-sufficient print media market, 
determined largely by the needs of its local population, and their political 
establishment. Quantifying and interpreting the use of ideas connected to Soviet-
era notions of ‘ethnicity’ within a non-Russian region’s mainstream newspaper 
discourse, and identifying their interaction with other important themes, will 
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show how the producers of regional newspapers perceive their audiences to 
understand and value a non-Russian identity, within their immediate context. In 
doing so, it will indicate the contemporary development of the Soviet-generated 
awareness of ‘ethnic’ identity within a given region, and its significance for its 
local politics. This project places an emphasis on elucidating hidden, 
‘common sense’ ideologies, in common with Billig’s study Banal 
Nationalism, rather than exploring the way collectively understood 
categories become assimilated into individual self-perception (Hearn, 
2007).8 However, the relationship between the Russian Federation’s 
commercial newspapers and their audiences raises the possibility of 
inferring the personal significance their discourse has for their readers, as 
Chapter Two explains.   
The search for new formulations of notions generated within Russia – 
‘ethnic culture’ and ‘ethnic identity’ – can provide the basis for new models of 
personal identity for sociologists, which are likely to have a more immediate 
relevance for the Russian Federation’s population. The comparison of two non-
Russian ‘ethnic’ identities, the Buryat and Sakha, within their respective 
Republics addresses the variation between the Russian Federation’s different 
regional contexts, while creating the possibility of drawing general conclusions 
about the perception and political significance of non-Russian ethnicity in the 
Russian Federation as a whole. This comparison will provide the ethnographers 
who research non-Russian Siberian peoples with an indication of the social 
phenomena that can be generalised to all non-Russian Siberian populations, 
while analysing in detail the connection their ethnographies suggest between 
                                                 
8 Jonathan Hearn investigates the interaction between the ‘personal’ and ‘social’ aspects of 
national identity through a study of English and Scottish bank workers.  
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personal ethnic identity and political strategy. This investigation also benefits 
the political scientists who follow the Russian Federation’s political institutions, 
by casting light on a cultural development with the power to influence both 
political strategy, and public reaction.  
 
 
Section 1.2: Introduction to Buryat and Sakha culture and history 
The question as to whether or not pre-Soviet non-Russian religious and cultural 
traditions continue to influence contemporary attitudes imposes a need for two 
relatively similar peoples to be chosen for comparison – otherwise the 
identification of their ‘ethnicity’ would risk becoming confused by the variety of 
attitudes presented by the material as a whole. Although the Buryat and Sakha 
are distinctive peoples, they share enough historical and cultural characteristics 
to make them comparable within the context of this research project. They are 
the two largest indigenous Siberian groups, living on neighbouring territories. 
Their religious and cultural traditions display a combination of Turkic and 
Mongolian influences, although the Buryat are generally regarded as 
‘Mongolian’, and the Sakha ‘Turkic’. Both are descended from tribes who 
travelled north into Siberia, displacing but not entirely removing the Tungus 
populations which originally occupied the area. They were subject to similar 
processes of Russian colonisation, beginning with the Cossack occupation in the 
seventeenth century, and continuing into the Soviet period. Their current 
Republics were officially established through the Buryat and Sakha intellectual 
nationalism movements of the late 1980s, which caused their republican 
administrations to adopt republican constitutions in 1994 and 1992 respectively. 
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Both republican governments consist of an executive organ headed by a 
President, the pravitel’stvo, and a legislative organ made up of elected deputies, 
known variously by the Buryat term Khural in Buryatia, and the Sakha term Il 
Tumen in Sakha (Yakutia). These institutions co-exist with a network of sub-
regional and municipal administrations.  
In both cases nationalist attempts to gain political autonomy fizzled out 
over the 1990s, although some nationalist organisations continue to exist. Buryat 
and Sakha nationalism is still a politically sensitive subject. Nationalist activity 
itself sometimes took the form of polemic academic studies of Buryat or Sakha 
history and culture – leading to a wide variation in the available accounts. The 
Buryat and Sakha nationalist intellectuals do not generally display hatred 
towards Russians, who are often acknowledged as having an integral role in 
Buryat and Sakha history. Instead, accusations tend to be directed towards 
specific Soviet figures, policies and ideologies. 
However, the large differences between Buryat and Sakha cultures, 
histories and territories led to variations in the Soviet policies carried out in each 
area, and their consequent influences on present-day Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia). This combination of factors has resulted in two interconnected 
variations, which have a strong relevance for the relative Buryat and Sakha 
capacities to influence the federal government. As the following paragraphs 
explain, Sakha (Yakutia) contains extensive natural resources, while Buryatia 
has few; and Sakha nationalist intellectuals were able to attain popular support, 
unlike the Buryat.  
The difference in size and accessibility between the two Republics has 
had a considerable influence over the Tsarist and Soviet policies adopted in each 
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region. Buryatia’s capital, Ulan Ude, is on the trans-Siberian railway, however 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s capital, Yakutsk, is accessible only by air or road. Russian 
colonisation was ultimately to have a more profound effect on the Buryat than 
the Sakha, as the high proportion of Russians in Buryatia indicates: significant 
numbers of Russian immigrants were already moving to Buryatia during the late 
nineteenth century, creating a large population of Russian settlers that did not 
exist in Sakha (Yakutia). Slavs made up 11.3 per cent of Sakha (Yakutia)'s 
population in 1897, which was 82.1 per cent Sakha (Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 126). 
These early Slavic settlers tended to become assimilated into the dominant 
Sakha culture (Vitebsky, 1990: p. 305). However, only 27.7 percent of the 
population in the 'Buryat' regions lying West and East of Lake Baikal was 
Buryat, according to the 1897 census (Abayeva et al, 2004: p. 10). 
The Buryat people is made up of several tribes, including for example 
the Ekhirit and the Khori, who have populated the area west and east of Lake 
Baikal for about a thousand years. Their exact history and origins are unclear, 
and vary considerably from tribe to tribe, although the Buryat are usually 
assumed to be a Mongolian people. The Buryat languages are similar to 
Mongolian, although they contain Turkic and Tungus elements in addition to a 
Russian influence.  
The date when Buryat tribes became distinguishable as a distinct ethnic 
group among the various peoples living and migrating around Inner Asia is also 
controversial. This issue has had significant implications for Buryat ethnic 
nationalism, since the various tribal, area, or lineage related identities continue 
to hinder the development of a universal Buryat identity, as nationalist 
intellectuals recognise. Caroline Humphrey suggests that they became a people 
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when the Russian and Chinese governments established the border between 
Siberia and Mongolia in 1727 (Stroganova, 2001, p. 29), although tribes 
continued to migrate north from Mongolia and “become Buryat” (Humphrey, 
1998, p. 28).  
Tatiana Skrynnikova and Irina Yelayeva both suggest that a 
genuinely pan-Buryat identity only started acquiring a mass significance 
after the ‘national revival’ in the 1990s (Yelayeva, 2004; Skrynnikova, 
1999). Skrynnikova’s description of the various collectives named in the 
eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century accounts of Buryat-
populated regions show how the Buryat case provides a particularly clear 
example of the Soviet-influenced ethnic identity formation described in 
section 1.1.1 (Skrynnikova, 1999). The word ‘Buryat’, or the Buryat-
language form ‘Buryaad’, began to be used over the nineteenth century, 
and was initially the name for a grouping of tribes (Skrynnikova, 1999: p. 
8). Buryat peoples coexisted with other tribes (such as the Olyudoy and 
Khoridoy) that have since been classed as ‘Buryat’. According to 
Skrynnikova’s investigation, there are no references to a ‘Buryat people’ 
encompassing all these tribes until the early twentieth century, when the 
small number of Buryat progressives who had been exposed to European 
understandings of nationhood began to promote the interests of the Buryat 
people as a whole. Community meetings only began to take on a “pan-
Buryat character” (obscheburyatskiy kharakter) after 1917, under the 
influence of the Marxist-Leninist comprehension of the Russsian Empire’s 
non-Russian peoples (Skrynnikova 1999: p. 15). Even so, Buryat nationalist 
discussion concerned both the ‘Buryat’ and ‘Buryat-Mongol’ peoples 
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throughout the Soviet period: an attempt was made in the late 1980s by 
some Buryat nationalist intellectuals to restore Buryatia’s original name, 
the Buryat-Mongol Republic. Yelayeva’s study indicates that the 1990s 
nationalist polemic seems finally to have raised a mass awareness of a pan-
Buryat collective, especially among the younger generation. In Ust-Ordynsk 
25 per cent in a sample of all ages described themselves as 'Buryat' in 1997, 
although in 1990 no one had chosen this term (Yelayeva, 2004, p. 579). Just 
under 19 per cent described themselves as 'Buryat' in Buryatia; most of 
these were young people (Yelayeva, 2004: p. 577).   
By the time the Russians started colonising the region in the middle of 
the seventeenth century, the Buryat tribes lived as nomadic livestock herders – 
as opposed to the Tungus tribes, who hunted or herded reindeer. Buddhist 
missionaries also began to evangelise the hitherto shamanist Buryats from this 
time. They only succeeded in making Buddhism widespread among the Buryats 
living east of Lake Baikal, since the western Buryat tribes were exposed to a 
much heavier Christianising influence from Russian Orthodox missionaries. The 
Orthodox Church made determined attempts to evangelise eastern Buryats 
during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, although many eastern Buryat 
converts reverted to Buddhism in 1905, after the Tsarist government published a 
manifesto on the freedom of religious beliefs in the Russian Empire.  
The origins of the Sakha people are also controversial. As in Buryatia, 
the discussion and investigation of this subject has often been incorporated into 
nationalist polemic. The Sakha ethnic group is generally regarded to have a 
variety of forbears – most importantly, the Turkic tribes that migrated into 
central Sakha-Yakutia from southern Siberia in the middle ages. These tribes 
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either became assimilated with or displaced the Tungus and Yukagir peoples 
that then inhabited the region. The Turkic influence is strong enough for the 
Sakha to be regarded as a 'Turkic' people, although there are also Mongolian and 
Tungus elements in Sakha language and culture (Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 23). The 
Sakha were designated by the Tsarist government as 'semi-nomadic' 
(polukocheviye): they spent the winters in wooden houses (balaghani, Sakha), 
moving to summer accommodation for the two to three summer months. They 
lived mainly by herding horses and cattle, supplemented by hunting and fishing. 
Some northern Sakha populations also kept reindeer, like the Tungus. Their 
traditional religion is shamanic, although they were also nominally converted to 
the Russian Orthodox Church by the Russian colonists. The incoming Russians 
called the Sakha the Yakut, and hence the Soviet Republic was named the Yakut 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (YaASSR), or Yakutia. The renaming of 
Yakutia, as the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), was the Republican government's 
compromise between the Sakha nationalist and Federal government agendas. 
The Soviet nationalities policy described above was applied to both 
Sakha and Buryat territories and peoples, although it had a much weaker impact 
on the Sakha. The wide dispersal of the Sakha population over the republic's 
huge territory caused major problems in implementing Soviet policies, because 
the necessary infrastructures were unavailable. This in turn made it more 
difficult for the Soviets to overcome local opposition. For example, the 
collectivisation of agriculture happened more slowly in Sakha (Yakutia) than in 
the rest of Russia. Collectivisation was a major component of Stalin’s 
‘modernisation’ programme: it required the resettlement of all the Soviet 
Union’s agricultural workers into large, communally owned, industrialised 
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farms. In 1931 under 30 per cent of Sakha's households had been collectivised, 
while the average rate for Russia was around 90 per cent (Tichotsky, 2000: p. 
81).  
The Yakut ASSR’s government also showed a greater capacity to alter or 
ignore federal government policy than that of the Buryat. One example is the 
refusal of the Sakha education minister to ban Sakha-language schooling in the 
1970s. This has had major repercussions on Sakha culture and self-awareness, 
since the majority of Sakha continue to speak Sakha language, unlike the 
Buryat. In 1989, only five per cent of Sakha listed Russian as their main 
language (Balzer, 1995: p. 145), while 38 per cent of the Buryat participating in 
a study published in 2004 spoke mostly Russian at home (Yelayeva, 2004: p. 
582). In contrast to Buryatia, there are several Sakha-language newspapers with 
mass readerships, such as the government newspaper Sakha Sire. The reduced 
Soviet presence has given the Sakha more opportunity to retain elements of their 
traditional culture and way of life than the Buryat. Specific Sakha practices do 
in fact occur in various aspects of daily life. For example, many Sakha still 
winter their cattle in the traditional Sakha cow-byre (khoton, Sakh.), which has 
distinctive sloping walls and a turf roof. Buryat nomadic pastoralism meanwhile 
was entirely wiped out by collectivisation. The Sakha have managed to maintain 
a greater level of cultural specificity, making it easier for them to define 
themselves as a non-Russian group. 
The central Soviet government’s awareness of Sakha (Yakutia)’s natural 
resources also strongly influenced its policy in the Republic, and the effect this 
policy had on Sakha perceptions of the Soviet regime. Gold was discovered in 
Sakha (Yakutia) at the end of the nineteenth century, and began to be mined in 
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1924; huge diamond deposits were discovered in the 1960s (Argounova, 2001: 
p. 27). Sakha (Yakutia) currently provides 99 per cent of Russia's diamonds, 
which in turn constitute 25 per cent of world diamond production (Tichotsky, 
2000: p. 1). In both 1998 and 1999, Sakha (Yakutia)'s diamond production was 
worth 1.5 billion U.S. dollars (Argounova, 2001: p. 181). The Soviet 
management of the Republic's industrial growth was likely to stimulate Sakha 
resentment, creating the impression that the central government was exploiting 
their territory's natural resources, rather than using them to aid their economic 
development. There was a huge migration of Slavs into the Republic during the 
1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, who came to develop Yakutia's mining industries: the 
territory's Russian and Ukrainian populations increased from 215,000 and 
12,000 in 1959, to 550,000 and 77,000 respectively in 1989 (Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 
127). By 1989, the proportion of Sakha in the population had decreased to 33.4 
per cent (Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 127). (The proportion of Sakha in the Republic’s 
population has however increased to 45.5 per cent in 2002, as the breakdown of 
Soviet-era institutions and industries has encouraged ethnic Slavs to move back 
to their home regions.)  
The Slavic population tended to settle in the new towns built around the 
mines, such as Aldan and Neryungri, while the agricultural regions continued to 
be populated almost exclusively by the Sakha, and the other indigenous peoples. 
For example, the 1989 census shows Aldan and Neryungri to have been 
populated by 49,503 and 87,102 Russians respectively, as against 2,505 and 
1,520 Sakha (Argounova, 2001: p. 143). Although there has been some 
population movement since the Soviet period, the Slavic and Sakha populations 
continue to live in different areas of the Republic. Large numbers of Slavic 
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industrial workers also came to live in Buryatia, adding, however, to a 
longstanding Russian presence in the region rather than transforming a non-
Russian majority into a minority over a couple of decades.   
Industrial salaries in Yakutia were much higher than those of the 
agricultural workers, since the incoming Slavs were paid extra to compensate 
for the harsh climate. In 1992, agricultural workers, 87 per cent of whom were 
Sakha, were paid on average 16 per cent of the salaries received by industrial 
workers (Balzer, 1995: p. 143). Much more was invested into the new urban 
infrastructures, so that industrial populations were provided with running water, 
central heating and other amenities, while the largely Sakha rural communities 
were left without. Rural Sakha populations in some areas also suffered from the 
polluting effects of Soviet industrial development (Crate, 2002). The profits 
made by exploiting Sakha (Yakutia)'s natural resources were entirely the 
property of the central Soviet state. The Sakha were more likely to have 
experienced the Soviet development of the region as straightforward 
colonisation than the Buryat, and so the idea of reclaiming Sakha (Yakutia)'s 
natural resources from the Federal Russian state would have a strong capacity to 
generate mass support for Sakha nationalism. By contrast, the Buryat 
nationalists could only aspire to 'unite' the Buryat, thanks both to Buryatia's lack 
of economic resources, and the absence at the time of a salient pan-Buryat 
identity. They were also hampered by Buryatia's major post-Soviet economic 
crises, which distracted the public's attention away from anything other than 
their material condition (Khamutayev, 2005; Stroganova, 2001).  
The vital importance of Sakha (Yakutia)'s diamonds and gold for the 
Soviet economy created a much better bargaining position for the Sakha 
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nationalists than was the case for the Buryat nationalist movement. Sakha 
leaders were able to introduce themselves and their agenda directly into the 
factions that made up the central Soviet hierarchy. Sakha (Yakutia)'s first 
President, the moderate Sakha nationalist Mikhail Nikolayev, did in fact 
collaborate closely with Yeltsin. The Soviet korenizatsiya policy in Sakha-
Yakutia had created a disproportionately Sakha political elite, although both 
Russians and Sakha ran the Republic's industries. This made it easier for 
Nikolayev’s moderate version of the Sakha revival to become a central part of 
the regional government's policy during the 1990s, rather than turning into a 
peripheral cultural movement within the political mainstream, as happened in 
Buryatia. 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s first administration was successful in retaining some 
of the profits from the exploitation of Sakha (Yakutia)'s natural resources. 
Yeltsin and Nikolayev collaborated in the creation of the ALROSA (Almazy-
Rossii-Sakha) company in 1992, which controls the Republic's diamond 
production and sales. This is described as a private joint-stock company; 
however, its original share ownership was divided between the Federal 
Government (32 per cent), the Republican Government (32 per cent), and 
ALROSA's workers (23 per cent) (Tichotsky, 2000: p. 183; Argounova, 2001: p: 
174). The income from ALROSA, in addition to Sakha (Yakutia)'s other natural 
resource companies, generates considerable financial resources for both the state 
and private individuals. This wealth has given the republican government a 
capacity to carry out the large-scale Sakha nation-building projects that were 
impossible for the Buryat nationalists. Their effects can be seen in the results of 
a poll, carried out in 1997, which suggests a high level of support for Sakha 
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(Yakutia) to exist as a "sovereign state within the Russian Federation": 78.2 per 
cent of the Sakha respondents expressed their preference for this variant, 
compared to 41.8 per cent of Russians (Petrova, 2004: p. 149). In contrast, 9.3 
per cent of Sakha and 45.1 per cent of Russians preferred Sakha (Yakutia) to be 
a republic within the Russian Federation (Petrova, 2004: p. 149). The wealth 
from Sakha (Yakutia)’s natural resources also generates more job opportunities 
in the private sector, so that Sakha-Yakutia's poverty levels are less debilitating 
than those of Buryatia. More of the Sakha population therefore has the time and 
energy to take an interest in their ethnic culture. That said, the wealth 
distribution in Sakha (Yakutia) is very unequal: state and agricultural workers in 
particular suffer from the low wages they receive, in combination with the high 
costs of living with Sakha (Yakutia)'s extreme climate and territory. The 
Republic's infrastructures are breaking down in the absence of Soviet-era 
funding from the central government, so that the republican government is faced 
with the yearly problem of how to provide the more remote towns with basic 
supplies. 
Putin's centralising agenda has exerted an influence over Sakha 
(Yakutia). In 2002 the Russian Vyacheslav Shtyrov replaced Nikolayev as 
President. Shtyrov would have worked with Nikolayev during the revival and 
transition periods, since he had previously held the presidency of ALROSA. 
Since then he has demonstrated enough loyalty to Putin to be recommended for 
a second presidential term in 2006. The republican government has not 
prevented the federal government from reasserting control over ALROSA, by 
increasing its share holding to 50 per cent plus one share – thus giving the 
federal government the capacity to jeopardise a considerable proportion of the 
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Republic's income (Argounova, 2007a). The Sakha nationalist movement has 
also come under pressure, whether exerted by the federal or regional 
government. For example, eight students were arrested in March 2005, for 
taking part in a demonstration against the handover of ALROSA’s shares to the 
Russian Federation. 
Buryatia's status is currently undermined by its continuing economic 
dependence on Moscow: although there has been some improvement, Buryatia 
continues to suffer from one of the worst post-Soviet economic crises in the 
Russian Federation. Many of Buryatia's industries have collapsed, in addition to 
its agriculture. The Putin administration appears to be making the most of 
Buryatia’s current economic weakness. Federal news sources report that plans 
are being made to merge Buryatia itself with Irkutsk and Chita Oblasti, after the 
unification of the Buryat Autonomous Okrugy in 2007. However, a pan-Buryat 
identity has been developing over the 1990s despite the lack of a powerful 
nationalist movement, as I have discussed; this affiliation creates the 




This thesis is a study of the cultural development generated by the Soviet 
Union’s nationalities policy, and in particular of the changing notions of non-
Russian identity this policy stimulated, and their relevance to contemporary 
politics. Chapter Two clarifies the theoretical approach to culture, the mass 
media and their interaction that underlies the choice of methodology. As it 
explains, the method for this research consists of the content and discourse 
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analysis of popular newspapers from Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), aiming to 
locate the formulation and relevance of the ideas they contain that relate to non-
Russian identity. These analyses also identify the newspapers’ main functions 
and aims within their republican contexts – since, as Chapter Two describes, the 
significance of a newspaper’s contentions within its surrounding culture can be 
gauged from the effects its journalists expect them to have on target audiences. 
Chapters Three and Five describe the newspapers themselves, and their political 
and social circumstances, in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) respectively – while 
Chapters Four and Six concern the newspapers’ statements on Buryat and Sakha 
culture and identity. 
The two chapters on each Republic show that specific Buryat and Sakha 
cultures continue to exist – despite the homogenisation of lifestyle initiated by 
Soviet policies – along with abstracted notions of ‘ethnicity’ that can be traced 
back to Soviet nationalities ideology. Both cases reveal a strong potential for 
their respective non-Russian cultures to generate aspirations and affiliations that 
contravene the federal government’s interests, although in different ways. 
Chapter Seven draws together the data presented in the preceding four chapters, 
showing how Buryat and Sakha cultures are undergoing a similar process of 
rapid cultural development. This cultural development incorporates an 
interaction between personal perceptions of Buryat and Sakha identity, and 
politically motivated attempts to manage or manipulate them – revealing that the 
nature itself of contemporary politics in the Russian Federation accords non-













Chapter One explained the prominent role the Soviet ideology on cultural 
difference had within the massive cultural change generated by government 
policy during the Soviet era. Soviet nationalities ideology created a distinctive 
awareness of ethnic or national identity among both Russians and non-Russians, 
which still has the capacity to influence political decision-making. It should be 
noted that Soviet-era conceptions of ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnic culture’ and ‘ethnic 
identity’ do not necessarily refer to the complex and ambiguous phenomenon 
that makes it possible to distinguish one community from another. Investigating 
the contemporary political significance of non-Russian perceptions of ‘ethnic 
identity’ includes clarifying the difference between the theory of Soviet-era 
‘ethnicity’, and the reality of culture itself. The first section of this chapter is 
devoted to a discussion of culture, language and the mass media in the Russian 
Federation. Its purpose is to explain the understanding of culture that forms the 
basis of this investigation, and the consequent decision to use the analysis of 
regional newspapers as the method. It relates the history of Soviet nationalities 
policy presented in Chapter One to theoretical literature on culture and the mass 
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media, showing how an analysis of discursive practice in regional mass 
communication can reveal the networks of ideas that underlie the contemporary 
perception of non-Russian identity.  
 The second section of this chapter presents the research method, which 
combines content and discourse analyses of regional newspapers. The first part 
describes the regional newspaper markets in the Republics of Buryatia and 
Sakha (Yakutia), introducing the newspapers selected for analysis as it does so, 
and clarifying the sampling method. The second part presents the analysis 
techniques used to identify these newspapers’ discursive practices, along with 
the notions of ethnic culture and identity within them. The method as a whole is 
derived from a combination of Russian and Western academic literature, and a 
series of interviews with academics and journalists in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia), conducted during a field trip in November and December 2004; these 
will be described in detail in section 2.2.1. A further field trip, from April until 
October 2005, was needed to obtain the necessary newspaper material, while the 
experience of daily life in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) enriched the detailed 
interpretation of their regional newspaper narratives.  
 
 
Section 2.1: The role of the mass media in cultural development 
  
Section 2.1.1: Culture, language and knowledge 
Research into cultural change requires some consideration of the nature of 
culture itself, in order to develop a method that reflects the interaction between 
observable practices and attitudes, and the cultural system dictating their 
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inherent logic. The complexity of this relationship suggests cultures are best 
investigated by observing the social practices and attitudes that distinguish a 
particular cultural community, while maintaining the distinction between these 
phenomena and the culture itself. Clifford Geertz presents a methodological 
approach that sustains this distinction, by drawing out the ontological and 
methodological implications of using the term ‘culture’ to stand for systems of 
signification and understanding within societies:  
 
The concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, 
that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture 
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search 
of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing 
social expressions on their surface enigmatical. (Geertz, 2000: p. 5.) 
 
This model implies that culture is contiguous with the practices occurring within 
a given society, since these practices would not exist without a consensual 
understanding as to what they mean. However, social hierarchies and practices 
are taken to exist separately from the culture itself, revealing aspects of it when 
they are ‘read’ by the researcher:  
 
Analysis, then, is sorting out the structures of signification … and determining their social 
ground and import. … Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of ‘construct a 
reading of’) a manuscript – foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious 
emendations, and tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventionalised graphs of 
sound but in transient examples of shaped behaviour. (Geertz, 2000: pp. 9–10.) 
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The ‘transient samples of shaped behaviour’ are embedded in the external 
context, in such a way that the external context constitutes part of the 
‘manuscript’. Social practices will constantly be changing in conjunction with 
the flow of events that determines their contexts, along with the networks of 
ideas, beliefs and attitudes they reveal. Geertz’s model therefore implies that 
cultural meaning systems are necessarily developing combinations of ideas, 
rather than fixed patterns of perception. 
The collective systems of understanding Geertz posits must encompass 
the social practices involved in contemporary mass polities, as Michel Foucault 
implies in his analysis of the relationship between truth and political power 
(Rabinow, 1991: pp. 51–76). Foucault asserts that nation-states could not exist 
in their current incarnation without a ‘truth regime’, which dictates the form and 
content of the statements to which a truth-value can be accorded (Rabinow, 
1991: pp. 72–73). This ‘truth regime’ would have to be accepted by all the 
groups within a given polity, in order for it effectively to reproduce the power 
hierarchy it serves: the entire population has to agree on the type of discourse 
that relates to truth, otherwise it would be impossible for contemporary 
politicians to assert the legitimacy of their positions before the mass societies 
they governed. Systems of cultural meaning therefore determine the range of 
possible strategies and actions available to both politicians, and the general 
public. 
Cultural meaning systems will also encompass the perceptions and 
ideas that mediate the formation of selves in relation to their surrounding 
social contexts; these ideas will include the various contemporary 
understandings of identity. However, this is not to assume the existence of 
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what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper describe as the modern, 
Western notion of the self, a “homogeneous, bounded, unitary entity” 
(Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: p. 17). Jonathan Hearn (following Derek 
Layder) along with Brubaker and Cooper emphasise the continuity 
between the individual subject and their social environment (Hearn, 2007). 
Selves, others and communities are continuously negotiated within the 
‘systems of signification’ they inhabit.  
 Since Geertz is not principally concerned with creating theoretical 
models, he does not discuss the relationship between his conception of culture 
and observed social practices in detail, nor does he examine the implication that 
culture as a system of meanings must be closely related to language and 
knowledge. Jean-François Lyotard’s description of culture emphasises this 
connection, echoing Foucault’s indication of the possibility for discrete cultures 
to be distinguished through their specific discursive practices (Lyotard, 1984). It 
indicates a way to identify the meaning and function of the ideas surrounding 
ethnic culture in the Russian Federation, through performing the ‘reading’ of 
social practice described by Geertz in the quotation above, without using purely 
ethnographic methods.  
Lyotard contends that communication has a fundamental role in social 
practice. He describes us as living at the intersection of several “clouds of 
narrative language elements – narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, 
descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies 
specific to its kind” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv). However, “…we do not necessarily 
establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do 
establish are not necessarily communicable” (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv). Following 
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lyotard conceives of these ‘narrative language elements’ 
as taking the form of language games:  
 
What [Wittgenstein] means by this term is that each of the various categories of utterance 
can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be 
put – in exactly the same way as the game of chess is defined by a set of rules determining 
the properties of each of the pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them. (Lyotard, 
1984: p. 10.) 
 
Describing language as a ‘game’ assumes that utterances, or ‘speech acts’, are 
constructed according to the speaker’s particular aim, and their understanding of 
the ways language is used among their hearers. Lyotard echoes John Austin’s 
distinction between ‘locution’ and ‘illocution’ – i.e., the action of speaking, and 
the action performed by the speech itself (Wootton, 1975; Yurchak, 2006: pp. 
21–22). A ‘speech act’ is essentially an attempt to use the various linguistic 
forms a speaker believes to be available, in order to achieve a specific end.  
The supposition that ‘language games’ constitute social life, dictated by 
a collective understanding of the ways specific linguistic formulations can be 
used, has implications for the conception of knowledge, especially in relation to 
culture. It suggests that a given society’s knowledge is heavily dependent on the 
rules of its prevailing ‘language games’, insofar that knowledge is to a large 
extent determined by the form of its communication; at the same time, 
knowledge also enables people to participate in these language games. The 
variety of potential types of knowledge implied by this claim is reflected in the 
variety of different functions it can have, as Lyotard says:  
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Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes beyond the simple determination and 
application of the criterion of truth, extending to the determination and application of criteria 
of efficiency (technical qualification), of justice and/or happiness (ethical wisdom), of the 
beauty of a sound or colour (auditory and visual sensibility), etc. Understood in this way, 
knowledge is what makes someone capable of forming “good” denotative utterances, but 
also “good” prescriptive and “good” evaluative utterances. … From this derives one of the 
principal features of knowledge: it coincides with an extensive array of competence-building 
measures and is the only form embodied in a subject constituted by the various areas of 
competence composing it. (Lyotard, 1984: 18–19.) 
 
Lyotard regards knowledge as a range of ‘competences’, which enable 
individuals to engage in specific ‘language games’, rather than an awareness of 
self-sufficient, universally applicable ‘facts’.  
For different systems of knowledge to exist, there has to be a consensus 
among the particular community that shares this knowledge as to the language 
games it informs. Since knowledge can also refer to qualitative or normative 
statements, this consensus will involve a collective way of formulating moral 
claims. According to Lyotard, culture is constituted by this consensus: “The 
consensus that permits such knowledge to be circumscribed and makes it 
possible to distinguish one who knows from one who doesn’t (the foreigner, the 
child) is what constitutes the culture of a people” (Lyotard, 1984: p. 19). It is 
possible to regard Geertz’s ‘webs of significance’ as closely related to Lyotard’s 
representation of knowledge: the existence of both is dependent on social 
consensus, which they reflect in the conventionalised behaviours and discursive 
practices they maintain. 
Language use is therefore based on a given community’s mutual 
acceptance of specific networks of meanings, and hence on a series of 
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correlations in the way members of the community order and associate their 
experiences. Both language and knowledge would of necessity be in constant 
development, as the circumstances surrounding their society change. However, 
their capacity to influence collective responses to unforeseen events complicates 
their interaction with the external context, giving their development an 
independent momentum that distinguishes it from the flow of outside events. 
Discursive practice manifests a given community’s consensus as to how 
experience can be understood and evaluated, in addition to the extensive 
collections of ideas, beliefs and skills that constitutes the community’s 
knowledge. The systematic analysis of language therefore provides a way to 
interpret cultural systems of meaning, in order to locate the significance of a 
particular knowledge system, or ‘area of competence’ – such as the 
contemporary use and understanding of the ideas associated with Soviet 
nationalities ideology. 
The suggestion that societies revolve around shared systems of 
understanding enables us to explain the development of ethnic identities and 
cultures within Russia over the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and to account 
for its complex interaction with contemporary politics. As discussed in Chapter 
One, the early Soviet government was presented with an imperative to 
homogenise the networks of ideas and practices that distinguished the various 
communities living on its territory, in order to create a population amenable to 
the Soviet state’s assertion of authority. It had to inculcate the systems of 
knowledge and language that constituted its modern and Europeanised culture 
into the way the rest of the population understood and conducted their social 
experience. Its strategy involved promoting abstracted notions of ‘ethnicity’ and 
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‘nationality’, accompanied by a sustained attempt to introduce a specific 
perception of ethnic or national identity into its populations’ self-awareness. 
These ideas were assimilated into the overlapping knowledge systems that 
cohered Soviet society – including the logic determining Soviet politics itself. 
They acquired a complex and changing significance within the networks of 
ideas that distinguished the communities forming the Soviet Union’s different 
ethnic groups, which themselves entered a phase of rapid development under the 
influence of the homogenising Soviet policy. These ideas also generated a series 
of discursive practices in both political and personal communication, which 
reflected and reproduced their changing significances.  
The development in language and knowledge initiated by the early 
Soviet government ultimately proved to be beyond political control, resulting in 
the various perceptions and attitudes towards ethnic identity and culture among 
non-Russians that could still hinder the federal government’s state-building 
project. An investigation into the influence of non-Russian ethnic culture on the 
Russian Federation’s politics benefits from a Foucauldian methodology, since it 
necessarily consists of identifying the functions of two associated Soviet-era 
ideas – ethnic identity and ethnic culture – within the complex of attitudes, 
perceptions and notions that forms the basis of social practice, in addition to the 
strategies used to maintain power hierarchies.9 This identification includes 
analysing the extent to which these ideas refer to perceptible differences in 
outlook between particular non-Russian ethnic groups. A study of the speech 
acts that concern ethnic identity and culture, performed as a Geertzian ‘reading’ 
of the behaviours surrounding such communication, will reveal the ideas, 
                                                 
9 As Paul Rabinow notes in his Introduction to The Foucault Reader, “Foucault is highly 
suspicious of claims to universal truths. He doesn’t refute them; instead, his consistent response 
is to historicize grand abstractions.” (Rabinow, 1991: p. 4) 
 84 
attitudes and perceptions that constitute the way non-Russian ethnicity is 
experienced and understood in the Russian Federation. In doing so, it would 
show how the Soviet-era concept of ‘ethnic culture’ is developing, and its 
significance for both politicians and ordinary citizens.  
  
Section 2.1.2: Mass media and cultural change in the Russian Federation 
The mass media had a central role in the Sovietisation process, and continue to 
perform an important integrating function in the Russian Federation. This is in 
line with the findings of several authors who claim the mass media to have an 
essential role in shaping contemporary mass societies, among them Michael 
Billig, Benedict Anderson and Jürgen Habermas (Billig, 1995; Anderson, 1991; 
Habermas, 1964; 1996). Anderson and Habermas both assume that 
contemporary mass polities could not exist without a way for individual 
members of populations to interact with larger political entities they do not 
experience directly – which to a large extent consists of their national mass 
media. The mass media enable mass societies to form collective attitudes and 
responses, by presenting information within repetitive narrative conventions that 
help individuals to organise their impressions of the world. Theories of media 
effects suggest that “The media provide the materials for responding to 
experience and these accumulate over time in a long term process of 
socialisation” (McQuail, 1977: p. 76): 
 
Gerbner (1967) sees the key to the effects of mass media in their capacity to take over the 
‘cultivation’ of images ideas and consciousness in an industrial society. He refers to the main 
process of mass media as that of ‘publication’ in the literal sense of making public: ‘The 
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truly revolutionary significance of modern mass communication is … the ability to form 
historically new bases for collective thought and action quickly, continuously and 
pervasively across the previous boundaries of time, space and states.’ (McQuail, 1977: pp. 
89–90.) 
 
Mass communication acquires its power to ‘socialise’ individuals into 
mass societies in part from the imperative it presents journalists to attend to their 
audiences’ perceptions, if they are to transmit their material successfully. Stuart 
Hall asserts that mass communication requires the ‘encoding’ of a message into 
a form in which it can be transmitted, before being ‘decoded’ by the audience. 
This refers to the technical process of constructing media products, but also to 
the conceptual structuring of the message into a ‘story’:  
 
A ‘raw’ historical event cannot, in that form, be transmitted by, say, a television newscast. 
Events can only be signified within the aural-visual forms of the televisual discourse. … To 
put it paradoxically, the event must become a ‘story’ before it can become a communicative 
event. (Hall, 1980: p. 129.) 
 
As Hall describes, “distortions” or “misunderstandings” “…arise precisely from 
the lack of equivalence between the two sides in the communicative exchange” 
(Hall, 1980: p. 131): the journalist cannot control precisely how audience 
members will ‘decode’ their messages. However, this process is happening 
within the same overall cultural context:  
 
[codes in the communicative process] …refer signs to the ‘maps of meaning’ into which any 
culture is classified; and those ‘maps of social reality’ have the whole range of social 
meanings, practices, and usages, power and interest ‘written in’ to them. (Hall, 1980: p. 134.) 
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Mass media producers need to have an accurate perception of their target 
audience’s mindset, in order to ‘encode’ the information they seek to transmit 
into a way that their audience will understand and accept. Producers are likely to 
share this mindset to some extent, since they live and work in the same overall 
social context as their audience. Successful mass communication takes place 
within the shared networks of understanding described in the previous section, 
according the linguistic conventions they recognise. Mass media discourse 
therefore serves to integrate new ideas and events into a mass society’s 
knowledge systems, facilitating their development as circumstances change, 
while simultaneously cohering the society through its repetition of familiar 
discursive practice.  
The role of the mass media in the reproduction of modern mass 
cultures extends to the maintenance of political hierarchies, through their 
capacity constantly to disseminate representations of reality that legitimise 
the political status quo. Billig describes how the repeated ‘flagging’ of 
nation states in the western mass media leads to specific notions of 
nationhood being accepted as common sense (Billing, 1995). This ‘banal 
nationalism’ is powerful enough for national populations to accept the wars 
their leaders initiate, if these wars are said to defend the nation-state (Billig, 
1995: p. 2). A literature has developed against the background of classical 
political geography, which seeks to address the geopolitical influence of the 
“constitutive role of discourse in establishing and maintaining hegemonic 
regimes of representation” (Mawdsley, 2008: p. 510). These studies aim to 
elucidate the contentions in popular discourses that are generally treated 
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and accepted as ‘common sense’, although in reality they have an 
important role in the reproduction of hegemonic power dynamics (Megoran, 
2004; 2005; Mawdsley, 2008; McFarlane and Hay, 2003; Boykoff, 2007; 
Robison, 2004). For example, Thomas McFarlane and Iain Hay show how 
the prominent Australian broadsheet The Australian disseminated 
neoliberal hegemonic discourse, through its representation of 
environmental protesters at the 1999 World Trade Organisation conference 
in Seattle (McFarlane and Hay, 2003). Most of these authors analyse mass 
media discourse in Western nation states, however Nick Megoran has 
investigated the role discourses on borders and geopolitical danger have 
had within the domestic power struggles of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
(Megoran, 2004; 2005). This dissertation places a similar emphasis on 
drawing out the ideas so embedded in a newspaper’s representation of 
reality that they can be accepted unquestioningly as ‘common sense’, 
through the systematic reading of a sample of newspaper articles. However, 
the focus of investigation here is the specific set of ideas relating to Soviet-
era ethnicity, existing within a range of potentially hegemonic public 
discourses, rather than the state hegemonies themselves.  
 
The integration of Soviet ideology into the Soviet Union’s social life could not 
have occurred without the Soviet mass media. The Soviet government regarded 
the mass media as an essential aid to the creation of a communist society 
throughout the Soviet period, so that the form and content of the Soviet Union’s 
mass communication corresponded to the nature of the state project that 
generated it (Voltmer, 2000: p. 477). According to Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
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the role of journalism was not to inform or entertain but to formulate the type of 
citizen that will create a communist society (Mickiewicz, 1988: p. 26). 
Journalists were regarded as teachers rather than fellow-workers, implying a 
superiority in knowledge and understanding. Soviet citizens were subject to a 
constant stream of mass communication, designed to reinforce a particular 
understanding of the Soviet Union, its relationship with the outside world, and 
their position within it – which included the presentation of an ideal Soviet 
personality. The specific conception of ethnic identity which Soviet ideology 
promoted was incorporated into this representation, as part of the state attempt 
to change its populations’ cultures. The mass media thus played an important 
role in the development of contemporary ideas about ethnicity in the Russian 
Federation, by encouraging their audiences to perceive their ethnic identities 
according to the parameters expressed repeatedly in mass media narratives.  
However, a communist society could not be created by mass media 
discourse alone: mass media narratives have to have some correspondence with 
their audiences’ lives and experiences, if they are to be understood and accepted. 
The Soviet mass media and their discourse were incorporated into the all-
encompassing system of institution and practice described in Chapter One, 
which enabled the Soviet government and its citizens to conduct their lives 
within the boundaries imposed by the need to equate Soviet ideological 
narratives with reality (Christel Lane, 1981; Yurchak, 2006). The mass media 
created a public discursive space that integrated the Soviet population, its 
institutions and practices around a consistent demonstration of the ideological 
narratives appropriate at the time, and the various discursive practices they 
could generate – including at times the direct criticism of authority figures 
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(Mickiewicz, 1988; Yurchak 2006). They also had a number of specific roles 
within the functioning of the Soviet institutions themselves.  
The press was a particularly important medium during the Soviet period. 
Television networks that could broadcast throughout the Soviet Union were 
developed only during the 1970s, and television itself was not regarded as a 
politically significant mass communicator until the1980s (Mickiewicz, 1988: p. 
32).10 The Soviet press was embedded within the hierarchical system of 
organisations that constituted the Soviet polity. Each newspaper belonged to a 
different organisation – such as a local branch of the Communist Party, a factory, 
or a worker's council. Exchanges of criticism and debates had to occur within 
the boundaries set by the newspapers' function, which would change according 
to the needs of the group that controlled it. The press had a valuable role as 
mediator between the government and the population. Soviet newspapers 
frequently published audience letters: it was common to write to a local 
newspaper with complaints or praise, and people with poor access to power and 
resources could regard newspapers as their best hope. Newspapers enabled the 
Soviet Union’s different institutions and communities to negotiate their 
occasionally competitive relationships, even if limited by their need to remain 
within the fundamental discursive parameters set by dominant members of the 
Communist Party (Dagbaev, 1995; Murray, 1994; Voltmer, 2000).  
The Russian Federation’s public and private discursive spheres, and their 
interaction, have been in a process of rapid transformation since perestroika 
began in 1985 (Zassourskiy, 2002; Zassourskiy, 2001; Koltsova, 2001; 
Mickiewicz, 1997; Belin, 2002; McNair, 2000; Davis, Hammond and 
                                                 
10 Ellen Mickiewicz contends that glasnost’ was introduced as part of the government’s strategy 
to cope with the huge social changes the development of a universal state television system in 
the 1970s produced (Mickiewicz, 1988). 
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Nizamova, 1998). The network of Soviet media organisations has fragmented in 
conjunction with the network of institutions enveloping Soviet society, 
removing the nationwide public sphere that could inform the running of every 
community and institution in the country. Russia’s difficult economic 
circumstances during the 1990s forced many media organisations to sell 
controlling stakes to major economic or political figures, creating a mix of 
government- and privately sponsored media organs, with a corresponding 
variety of function. The popularity of local mass media has risen dramatically, 
to the point where the previously centralised Soviet market has broken up into a 
series of regional markets. Some media organs are now primarily commercial 
ventures, producing their material according to the overwhelming imperative to 
attract a paying audience.  
The range of commercial and quasi-commercial mass communication 
exists in tandem with a series of government-sponsored media organs, many of 
which are newspapers, which remain from the Soviet-era media network. 
Regional and sub-regional administrations generally own at least one 
newspaper, which is understood and expected to further the aims of its 
sponsoring organisation. Government-sponsored newspapers, whether owned by 
republican or sub-regional administrations, have a number of universally 
applicable official functions. One is publishing new legislation: according to the 
federal constitution, legislation cannot come into force until it is published in the 
press. Government-sponsored newspapers are regarded as forums for high-level 
political discussion. They disseminate political communications on behalf of 
their government organisation, in addition to acting as an important information 
source for government workers and businessmen. Government-sponsored 
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newspapers are closely integrated into their respective administrations’ 
functioning, as were their Soviet-era equivalents. Their content manifests the 
attitudes and strategies that influence their political institution’s activities.    
Vladimir Putin has succeeded in asserting the Presidential 
administration’s control over many of Russia’s media organs, after the public 
battles between powerful mass media owners that characterised Boris Yeltsin’s 
administration, in particular over the national television channels (Belin, 2002; 
Zassourskiy, 2001). Opposition journalism is now limited to marginal liberal or 
radical newspapers, radio stations or websites. The broadcast media in particular 
produce a more homogeneous range of content than in the 1990s, since their 
owners and functions are consistently loyal to Putin’s interests. However, the 
mass media still have a wider range of ownership and motivation than Soviet-
era mass media. They produce a greater variety of speech act, and therefore their 
content has a range of significances for both individuals, and society as a whole. 
The different individual media organisations present several overlapping 
regional or class-based discursive spheres, rather than variations on a set of 
discursive practices arranged by the central government, as in the Soviet Union. 
Thus the process by which mass communication reinforces and coheres 
the attitudes held by the Russian Federation’s citizens has undergone a 
qualitative change, and now occurs in a fragmented discursive space. These 
discursive spheres contain the repetitive promotion of the ideas deemed to be 
attractive to target audiences, in addition to statements that aim to achieve 
specific political ends. The discursive practice in regional discursive spheres 
varies considerably, and is often strongly influenced by the routine intentions 
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and strategies of local politicians and businessmen, as I will explain in the 
following section. 
The different media discourses, produced for very different reasons by 
very different actors, can now show both popular attitudes, and political strategy. 
They are likely to be influencing perceptions of ethnicity in several different 
ways, while simultaneously reproducing their formulation and significance in a 
number of discursive contexts. 
Mass communication can be regarded as a specific category of speech 
act, with characteristics that make it suitable for investigating the nature and 
function of particular knowledge systems within a mass society. On a practical 
level, it is especially useful to a foreigner conducting research in the Siberian 
context – given the suspicion both Russian and non-Russian Siberians can 
evince towards foreign investigators, also described in detail in the following 
section.  
The speech acts produced by mass media organs have a much more 
consistent range of motivations and conventions than those that occur during 
face-to-face conversation. Journalists ‘encode’ their material into the form they 
believe will achieve their intention – whether this is attracting a paying audience, 
encouraging a population to accept a particular version of events, or some other 
exercise. They receive limited feedback from their audiences, and so are forced 
to rely on reproducing formulas that appear to have the desired effect, developed 
on the basis of their own perceptions of both their audiences and the material 
itself. The motivations behind speech acts in the mass media arise from the 
specific social, economic and political circumstances of their media organisation, 
rather than the complex ebb and flow of personal emotion and perception. 
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Defining the motivation, meaning and significance of a mass communication is 
therefore relatively easy, if enough is known about the circumstances around it. 
The speech acts themselves cannot change once they have been made: they 
continue clearly to exhibit the specific set of circumstances, decisions and 
attitudes that led to their construction. This consistency facilitates the 
quantification of ideas, meanings and motivations appearing over a given time 
period – so that the interpretation of mass media speech acts can be combined 
with the production of empirical data. The Russian Federation’s mass media 
therefore present an opportunity to perform the detailed analysis required by the 
complexity of post-Soviet ethnicity, while generating the quantitative data 
needed to make valid assertions about its political influence.  
Interpreting the speech acts produced by mass media organs reveals 
networks of ideas and attitudes, which will have a range of possible 
significances for individual target audience members. Some will have personal 
relevance for their target audience, presented repeatedly over a period of time in 
order to stimulate the sympathetic emotional response that encourages 
individuals to attend to mass communication. Mass media speech acts can 
therefore reveal ways of understanding ethnic culture and identity. The attitudes 
of their producers will echo the necessarily abstracted perceptions that lead to 
political action: like journalists, politicians have to rely on generalised 
conceptions of their populations’ beliefs, whether these arise from their own 
suppositions, or systematic investigation. The mass media will also contain 
speech acts that manifest directly the way notions like ethnic culture are 
understood and manipulated by the political sphere, since it is one of the means 
by which politicians promote and legitimise themselves.  
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The Russian Federation’s regional newspapers have the greatest variety 
of ownership, and therefore also of motivation and speech act. The relative 
simplicity of newspaper production facilitates the development of newspapers 
orientated towards smaller and more closely defined communities than 
television or radio, while allowing newspapers to be more responsive to 
variations in their target audiences’ attitudes. Newspapers do not have 
television’s capacity to create a strong sensual impact, and therefore have to rely 
more on the meaning and relevance of their stories in order to attract an 
audience. They offer a greater variety of discursive and intellectual strategies, in 
a form that is simpler to analyse in detail. Local commercial newspapers are 
under an especially strong imperative to attend to their audiences’ concerns and 
attitudes, in order to create a sufficiently attractive and relevant discursive 
product to ensure the newspaper’s commercial viability. It is possible to assume 
that the journalists working on popular commercial newspapers have a good 
understanding of their audiences, since individual members of the public find 
their product meaningful enough to be worth the money and time needed to read 
the newspaper.  
A qualitative and quantitative analysis of mainstream regional 
newspapers will reveal ideas about non-Russian ethnicity that are important both 
to politicians and the ordinary population, in addition to the use and function of 
the various notions of ‘ethnic culture’ within different social and political 
practices. The analysis of the entire content produced by the newspapers over a 
given time period will show how the discursive strategies that concern 
perceptions of non-Russian ethnic culture interact with other important 
knowledge systems in each region. It will have the capacity to reveal the 
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developing significance of ethnicity within superficially unrelated thematic 
contexts, thus allowing for the extensive integration of the Soviet ideology on 
nationalities described in Chapter One: it will locate both the ‘flagging’ of 
‘common sense’ notions of ethnicity, and the explicit contestation around 
these sets of ideas. A further comparison of these ideas in two specific contexts 
– the Republics of Sakha (Yakutia) and Buryatia – will indicate trends in the 
understanding and manipulation of ethnicity that are relevant to the Russian 
Federation as a whole. 
 
 
Section 2.2: Methodology 
 
Section 2.2.1: Media markets and regional newspapers in the Republics of 
Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia)  
My data collection began with a pilot field trip in November and December 
2004, during which I gathered information about the newspaper markets in 
Sakha (Yakutia), Buryatia and the neighbouring Irkutsk Oblast’. 11 I hoped 
to identify each region’s main newspapers, their owners and readerships, as 
part of a broader attempt to understand the way newspaper markets in 
eastern Siberia function, and their political and social roles. I wanted to 
check the viability of the research project, and explore the possibility of 
balancing the newspaper data with audience research. I spent this trip 
conducting semi-structured interviews in Moscow, Irkutsk, and the capitals 
                                                 
11 I had initially hoped to include a sample of newspaper material from Irkutsk, a Russian-
dominated city and region, which would show how perceptions of Russian ethnicity are 
developing. I succeeded in gathering the newspaper data, but when I got back to 
Cambridge I realised that I would not be able to include Irkutsk in this dissertation.  
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of Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), Ulan Ude and Yakutsk respectively. I 
spoke to six academics in Moscow – two anthropologists working on Siberia, 
and four media specialists; in Irkutsk, three media academics, the 
journalist and main editor of the region’s government-sponsored 
newspaper, a director of an independent newspaper company, the director 
of the Irkutsk branch of a Moscow-based newspaper company, the director 
of an environmental charity, and a museum curator and history specialist. I 
interviewed in Yakutsk a journalist and main editor from two newspapers, 
an anthropologist, a secretary at the state university, a local businessman, 
and the editors of the region’s government-sponsored newspapers. Finally, 
in Ulan Ude I met a Buryat national writer, the editor of the government-
sponsored Buryat-language newspaper, a journalist on a commercial 
newspaper and her friend, a public relations specialist, the Republic’s 
Minister of the Press, and two specialists in Mongolian history. 
Almost all of my informants were very generous and helpful, 
however there were limitations on what they felt able to tell me. For 
example, they were sometimes happy to tell me the names of the individuals 
or organisations that owned their region’s newspapers, but they were less 
forthcoming on the relationships these actors had with other businessmen 
and politicians. A newspaper owner’s interests have a strong influence on 
its content, as I will explain below; a list of names on its own does not reveal 
very much about the likely motivations of a newspaper’s editorial team. I 
realised that coming to a full understanding of each region’s media market 
was a PhD project in itself, and so decided to design a method for my 
newspaper analysis that would take owner influence into account, but 
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which would not require an exhaustive study of each media market’s 
political economy.  
I continued to interact with academics, journalists and ordinary 
citizens during my main field trip in 2005, in the limited time I had that was 
not taken up with gathering newspaper material – while making an effort 
to attend all the local cultural events I could manage, such as the traditional 
Buryat Surkharban, a summer sports tournament. As part of this, I got to 
know sociologists, anthropologists, historians and university administration 
workers at Irkutsk’s state university, anthropologists, historians, Buryat 
nationalist activists and media specialists in Ulan Ude, and trainee teachers, 
media specialists, Sakha nationalist activists, anthropologists and students 
in Yakutsk, in addition to the five newspaper journalists who interviewed 
me for their respective publications in Sakha (Yakutia). I was fortunate in 
coinciding with two American anthropologists in Ulan Ude, with whom I 
was able to discuss my experiences. I have continued corresponding with 
my Siberian friends and colleagues since returning to Britain, while 
periodically visiting Buryat and Sakha websites and chatrooms.  
I tried in each region to obtain audience research from newspapers, 
universities or advertising agencies, or conduct focus groups myself. There 
was very little audience research available, and newspapers or advertising 
agencies were often unwilling to share what they had. Organising focus 
groups proved to be impossible, partly from lack of time, but also because 
ordinary east Siberians tend to be wary of unfamiliar researchers, 
especially if they are foreign. I found out in Irkutsk that the only people 
willing to participate in sociological studies are the regular ‘professional 
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focus group attendees’, who hope to supplement their incomes. My attempt 
to conduct unstructured interviews in a sub-region of Sakha (Yakutia) was 
unsuccessful, because my informants were so terrified of the situation that 
they were visibly distressed. (Most of them agreed to be interviewed 
because I happened to be staying with their boss. It was obvious that they 
were torn between a desire to help me, and a fear that I could turn out to be 
a spy.) I believe it is impossible to use their information, for both ethical 
and practical reasons. These interviews paralleled Megoran’s experience 
with audience research in Kyrgyzstan; his interviewees “either tended to 
repeat the messages in government newspapers, or vouchsafed dissenting 
opinions on the understanding of anonymity, rendering their material 
difficult to use” (Megoran, 2004: p. 739). Like Megoran, I decided to focus 
on the newspaper data, using my informal contact with local friends and 
colleagues as a way to increase my understanding of the newspaper articles. 
I will not name my informants unless referring to their published research, 
in order to avoid the possibility of causing them trouble, and thereby 
betraying the trust they placed in me when agreeing to talk openly about 
their experience.  
   
The Russian Federation’s mass media and their markets differ considerably 
from region to region. However, I found enough similarities to exist between 
Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia)’s mass media to enable the comparison of 
equivalent media organisations – in particular, local newspapers. In Buryatia 
and Sakha (Yakutia) these compete with a variety of broadcast and Internet 
media, produced for both federal and regional audiences. Newspapers continue 
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to attract mass audiences in both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), retaining their 
significance for both politicians and ordinary people. Lyudmilla Badmayeva 
contends that the importance of the press in Buryatia has in fact grown, despite 
the huge drops in newspaper circulations that have occurred, principally due to 
economic hardship. Badmayeva found in 2002 that 59.1 per cent of a sample of 
businessmen said they read republican newspapers (Badmayeva, 2002a: p. 80). 
Politicians value the press sufficiently to support unprofitable newspapers, while 
elections are accompanied by the appearance of 'one day' newspapers 
(odnodnevniki). Buryatia's ordinary citizens try to read newspapers when they 
can. If they are unable to buy newspapers, they borrow them from neighbours or 
go to the local library.  
Sakha (Yakutia)’s print market has significantly declined over the past 
decade, partly because of the collapses in the economy, but also because of the 
increasing difficulties in newspaper distribution caused by the loss of Soviet 
transportation infrastructures. However, newspapers are still a significant source 
of information. According to research carried out by the newspaper Yakutia in 
2003, 64.3 per cent of the population gain information about current events from 
newspapers, compared to 86.3 per cent and 28.1 per cent from television and 
radio respectively. The research conducted by Buryatia’s and Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
advertising agencies has led them to draw similar conclusions, since they invest 
considerable amounts of capital in newspaper advertising. The most popular 
commercial newspapers in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), Inform Polis and 
Yakutsk Vecherniy respectively, are owned by organisations that also function as 
advertising agencies.  
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Mass media consumption in both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) is much 
affected by the size of their territories, in conjunction with their sparse 
populations. The more remote settlements in both Republics have a very limited 
access to the Internet and to privately owned broadcast and print media, due to 
insufficient transportation and broadcast infrastructures. The mass media 
sources generally available to rural audiences consist of the federal broadcast 
channels, republican government-owned newspapers that have retained their 
Soviet-era distribution networks, and the newspapers produced in the sub-region 
concerned. Every sub-region in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) contains a 
newspaper owned by the local area administration, often left over from the 
Soviet period, while the more prosperous and densely populated sub-regions 
may also produce privately owned sub-regional newspapers. The capital cities in 
each Republic, Ulan Ude and Yakutsk, together with the larger towns, support 
diverse media markets containing a variety of privately owned print and 
broadcast media.  
The privately owned commercial newspapers were selected from the 
newspaper markets in Ulan Ude and Yakutsk, partly because these towns have 
mixed Russian and non-Russian populations – unlike the newer industrial towns 
that are dominated by Russians – and are thus under an imperative to address the 
issue of ethnicity in some way. Another reason for the choice is that the 
commercial newspapers published in the capitals have a closer connection with 
their republican administrations, giving them a greater relevance for the 
Republics’ entire populations than the newspapers from other towns. Some of 
the commercial newspapers under analysis claimed to have widespread 
distribution networks, showing that they aspired towards audiences outside Ulan 
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Ude and Yakutsk, and hence were designing their content for republic-wide 
audiences.  
I found during my pilot research trip evidence that journalists in 
Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) do have to negotiate the requirements of the 
regional business and political elites, in common with journalists in other 
parts of the Russian Federation. For example, the journalists I spoke to in 
Buryatia mentioned that the Republic of Buryatia’s only printing press is 
owned by the state, making it easy for the republican government to monitor and 
control the Republic’s newspapers. Working conditions in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia) seemed to have much in common with the Saint Petersburg 
newspapers Olessia Koltsova describes, on the basis of her ethnographic 
research. She reveals the close relationship that can exist between 
journalists and politicians: 
 
The boundaries between media organisations and their environment are blurred, and real 
people often form teams across them, as well as divide into competing groups within their 
institutions. ‘State’ actors tend to form temporary alliances among themselves and with 
external agents and pursue their short-term group interest rather than the interests of ‘the 
state’. (Koltsova, 2001: p. 319) 
 
These complex relationships create a dynamic and unstable working 
environment, as Koltsova describes:  
 
Values are unclear and rules are predominantly informal, individuals identify themselves 
with their institutions very loosely, and act counter to institutional interests; agents make 
choices in an atmosphere of uncertainly and relatively low predictability; their decisions are 
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situational and their strategies are short-term. … In this situation, it is not surprising that 
owner control is most often legitimised by journalists (though they admit that in theory it is 
not desirable). To ‘work for the company’s policy’ is considered normal and even a mark of 
professionalism. (Koltsova, 2001: pp. 319, 323) 
 
My fieldwork and subsequent newspaper analysis was eventually to reveal 
that the journalists, politicians and businessmen in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia) form relatively cohesive communities – as might be expected, 
given these Republics’ small populations and remote situation. Many of the 
actors involved know each other personally, if not by reputation. The 
working atmospheres in Sakha (Yakutia), and to a lesser extent Buryatia, 
are similar to that described by Koltsova: decisions are erratic and 
unpredictable, reflecting the flows of events and personal relationships 
within elite communities.  
The elites can exert their control over journalists directly, in specific 
instances. However, the restriction of newspaper content generally takes the 
form of self-censorship, within particular working cultures: the journalists 
have a good idea of what they can get away with, although they are capable 
of testing the boundaries. Conversely, influential politicians and 
businessmen feel they know and can trust the people who work for them, 
and hence can allow their editorial collectives a high degree of autonomy in 
the day-to-day running of the newspaper. Censorship therefore is not 
complete – the assumptions elites make about different working collectives 
mean that journalists can find ways of slipping challenging statements into 
print, without the establishment knowing. (This practice is discussed more 
fully in Chapter Three.) The journalists’ self-censorship also mirrors more 
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general practices, arising from the pressures exerted by these Republics’ 
forceful and unpredictable power hierarchies, which are described in 
Chapters Three and Five. Individual citizens from all walks of life in 
Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) can often find themselves under a 
requirement to communicate with care, whether they are protecting their 
interests, or attempting to exploit a situation in their turn.  
 The limitations on journalistic freedom in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia) do not remove the capacity of republican newspapers to reflect 
local cultural attitudes. Commercial newspapers in both Republics need to 
attract an audience for their advertisers. Nonetheless they have to strike a 
balance, producing what the public will buy, but also publishing the articles 
demanded by their political or commercial patrons, and avoiding the 
consequences of publishing undesirable material. The strategies newspapers 
use to resolve the contradictions generated by these demands form a complex 
mix (as Chapters Three and Five show), primarily revolving around their 
journalists’ attempts to create close relationships with imagined audiences. In 
doing so, these journalists point the way towards the perceptions of Buryat or 
Sakha ethnicity held by members of the public. 
I was aware from an early stage that my method of analysis was 
going to have to allow for the presence of political interference. I needed to 
find a way to elucidate the functions of the narratives on ethnicity, in order 
to judge their significance and meaning; this entails an understanding of a 
given newspaper’s role within the broader republican community, and the 
motivations of its journalists.  The analysis method had to enable a comparison 
of the assertions made by different newspapers, in order to build up a 
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convincing picture of the circumstances within which they were produced – 
while simultaneously establishing their intended function within these 
circumstances, along with its effect on their representation. It uses a 
combination of coding and interpretation to achieve this, as the following 
section explains in detail.   
The two chapters on each Republic analyse separately the newspapers as 
a whole and their discourses on Buryat and Sakha culture. Chapter Three on 
Buryatia and Chapter Five on Sakha (Yakutia) present a content analysis of each 
newspaper’s themes, enabling as far as possible an objective view of their 
relative functions within each Republic’s newspaper market. A further analysis 
of the ideas occurring repeatedly in each newspaper’s discourse provided a more 
detailed knowledge of their individual motivations, leading to a fuller picture of 
each Republic’s current affairs. Chapters Four and Six, on Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia) respectively, contain content analyses of the references to Buryat and 
Sakha ethnicity in each newspaper. These occur as mentions of Buryat or Sakha 
‘ethnic culture’ in the abstract, or as ideas and practices associated in the 
Republics with the Buryat and Sakha ethnic groups in particular. The content 
analysis in both cases is followed by a detailed description and interpretation of 
the articles in question, showing how their representation of ethnicity 
corresponds to the material presented in Chapters Three and Five. The discourse 
analysis in all the chapters explains the results obtained through the content 
analyses, building on the quantitative data to generate a detailed understanding 
of the newspapers, and of the underlying assumptions behind their use of ethnic 
culture. Sakha (Yakutia)’s economic and political setting is more complex than 
that of Buryatia, since its extensive natural resources accord it a greater 
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significance for the Russian Federation as a whole than Buryatia. Chapters Five 
and Six on Sakha (Yakutia) build on the material presented in the earlier 
chapters on Buryatia, which explained influences and practices common to both 
Republics. 
The audience research I was given showed Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa 
Plyus to be among the most popular newspapers in Ulan Ude, while Nashe 
Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy are widely read in Yakutsk. I was able to 
ascertain that Yakutsk Vecherniy is directed by Vyacheslav Levin, a 
powerful businessman. Nashe Vremya was owned in 2004 by three 
organisations – a non-commercial fund called Semya Severa, the Stolitsa 
media holding, and the Prima advertising agency. Both Inform Polis and 
Pyatnitsa Plyus are owned by advertising agencies. Inform Polis and Nashe 
Vremya are intended for audiences with a higher level of education and social 
capital than Pyatnitsa Plyus and Yakutsk Vecherniy. In addition to these locally 
produced newspapers, there are newspapers owned by Moscow-based 
commercial companies, which try to attract regional audiences by adding 
region-specific supplements to the editions distributed throughout the entire 
Federation. The most popular federal commercial newspapers in Buryatia and 
Sakha (Yakutia) are Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Argumenty i Fakty 
respectively. These newspapers’ attraction is however limited by their reduced 
ability to cover local news. Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Argumenty i Fakty 
were nevertheless included in the content analysis, to develop an understanding 
of the discursive practices occurring in the Moscow-based mass media, against 
which the republican newspaper discourse could be compared.  
The most prominent government newspapers in each Republic are the 
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Russian-language newspapers Buryatia and Yakutia, owned by the executive 
administrations of the Republics of Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) respectively. 
Both of these were included in the analysis. The republican-level government 
newspapers have variable readerships that go beyond the classes of government 
worker with a professional interest in the information they provide. This is 
especially true of Yakutia, thanks to its more attractive, populist articles, and the 
dynamism of Sakha (Yakutia)’s government.  
Newspaper readerships are also influenced by the Republics’ 
demographic characteristics, and the current use of the Buryat and Sakha 
languages. The use of Buryat language is decreasing, whereas the Sakha 
language continues to be widely spoken. As a result, some of Yakutsk’s 
commercial newspapers are published in Sakha, as is the government-sponsored 
Sakha Sire, while Ulan Ude’s commercial newspapers are almost exclusively 
Russian-language. Buryatia’s administration, however, continues to produce a 
newspaper (Buryaad Unen) in Buryat. Non-Russian language newspapers were 
part of the Soviet strategy for resolving the problem of ethnic identity, and 
continue to have an important role in the way post-Soviet administrations deal 
with this issue. Buryaad Unen has a very low readership, since Buryatia’s few 
remaining Buryat speakers find its specific literary dialect difficult to read. 
Sakha Sire in contrast has a high readership, especially in agricultural areas. 
This reflects the demographic changes in Sakha (Yakutia) brought on by 
Sovietisation and its consequences. While the Russian and Sakha populations 
are roughly equal, the latter are concentrated in the agricultural regions around 
Yakutsk, and the Slavic populations live in the industrial towns built during the 
Soviet era. This situation is complicated by the current migration of rural Sakha 
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populations into Yakutsk, but Sakha Sire remains a popular news source in the 
Republic’s Sakha-dominated sub-regions. These sub-regions’ administrations 
also publish their newspapers almost entirely in Sakha. Buryatia’s sub-regional 
newspapers on the other hand are generally published in Russian, although they 
sometimes contain Buryat-language articles or pages (Graber, unpublished).12 
Sub-regional government-owned newspapers in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia) tend to have high readerships within their administrative territories, 
since they are useful sources of local information, while acting as ‘notice-
boards’ for their communities. They contain speech acts that have a high 
relevance for the communities they serve, while revealing the political practices 
and discursive strategies occurring in their sub-regions. Each Republic’s sample 
included a representative sub-regional government-sponsored newspaper, 
chosen from regions with typical populations and economies. The sub-regional 
newspaper selected for Buryatia’s sample is the Russian-language 
Barguzinskaya Pravda, from Barguzin sub-region, while Sakha (Yakutia)’s sub-
regional newspaper is the Sakha-language Erkeeyi, from Maya sub-region. The 
opportunity to visit both areas and interview their inhabitants facilitated the 
analysis of their newspapers.  
The full quantitative and interpretative analysis was performed on the 
government newspapers Buryatia and Yakutia, the sub-regional government 
newspaper Barguzinskaya Pravda, and the republican commercial newspapers 
Inform Polis, Pyatnitsa Plyus, Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy. The 
federal-level newspapers Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Argumenty i Fakty were 
subjected to the content analysis, while translated material from Sakha Sire, 
                                                 
12 Katrin Graber is currently writing a doctoral thesis on the use of Buryat language in Buryatia’s 
sub-regional newspapers, and was kind enough to share her data with me.   
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Erkeeyi and Buryaad Unen were interpreted in the light of what had been 
learned from the other newspapers. The full sample of each newspaper consisted 
of the editions published during the month of June 2004, and over the period 
between 25 August and 22 September 2004. These periods were selected in 
order to compare a relatively uneventful month (June) with a month around an 
event that had a major significance for the entire Russian Federation – the 
hostage taking in North Ossetia on 1 September 2004, and Putin’s consequent 
decision to abolish regional voting for the Presidents and Governors of the 
Russian Federation’s regions. This made it possible to gauge the significance of 
important federal events on the newspaper content, and thus increase the 
understanding of their news agendas and functions.  
The samples contained around forty editions of the daily newspapers 
Buryatia, Yakutia and Sakha Sire, and eight to ten editions of the remaining 
weekly newspapers. These samples provide a sufficient amount of material to 
reveal the way Buryat and Sakha ethnicity is consistently understood and used 
in these Republics’ mainstream public discourse, when analysed according to 
the method described in the following section. Many of the newspapers based in 
the republican capitals have websites, making it possible to monitor changes and 
developments in their content since the samples were published, and hence to 
verify the long-term relevance of the knowledge systems identified during the 
analysis. 
  
Section 2.2.2: The analysis method 
The newspaper analysis aimed to locate the communicative acts made by the 
publications described above concerning Buryat and Sakha ethnicity, with a 
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view to identifying the beliefs and intentions that led to their formation. Its 
method was developed on the assumption that these communicative acts are 
integrated into a variety of apparently unrelated discourses, and therefore 
necessitated a comprehensive survey of the newspaper content, as section 2.1.2 
describes. The articles themselves were understood to be distinct speech acts, 
both determined by and contributing towards the speech act performed by the 
newspaper as a whole. It would be impossible to define the function of a 
newspaper article, and therefore the presuppositions behind its construction, 
without a detailed knowledge of its newspaper’s functions. This in turn requires 
a good understanding of the context within which the newspaper is published. 
The analysis also had to provide the required combination of detailed 
interpretation and empirical data on their treatment of non-Russian ethnic 
culture. It therefore had several stages, incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques to deconstruct the newspaper as a whole, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the articles that concerned the Buryat and Sakha ethnic 
groups. Investigating these newspapers’ discussion of the Buryat and Sakha 
within an analysis of the entire newspaper also made a comparison with other 
themes possible, thus establishing the relative importance of ethnicity-related 
issues within the newspapers’ overall output.  
The newspapers in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) constantly reproduce 
different formulations of the same assertions. Their content is so repetitive that 
sufficient experience of a given newspaper enables the reader to predict an 
article’s narrative from its headlines and rubrics. This is to be expected, since 
the producers of these articles, their personal inclinations and their 
circumstances will change at a slower rate than the succession of events the 
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production of a weekly or daily newspaper requires them to depict. The 
repetition in fact demonstrates the mass media’s capacity to integrate new events 
and ideas into familiar discursive practices, described in Section 2.1. These 
repeated assertions interact with more generalised themes and functions to form 
the newspaper’s characteristic genres and narratives. For example, Inform Polis 
contained a series of articles that recounted a narrative about a stubborn citizen’s 
fight for justice. A superficial description of these articles might identify them as 
typical ‘human interest’ stories, produced by a commercial paper to entertain its 
readers; however, a close reading showed that they were distinctive and 
repetitive enough to constitute a genre specific to Inform Polis, which repeatedly 
calls on Buryatia’s citizens to be more proactive in their dealings with 
government institutions. Such stories present a particularly clear formulation of 
one of Inform Polis’ main contentions. These consistent article genres and 
narratives are the means by which newspapers try to carry out their main 
functions, and therefore organise the choice and presentation of the events the 
newspapers describe. Many media analysts call these narratives ‘frames’, 
and draw attention to their capacity to help “journalists and readers 
organise the world by drawing attention to particular aspects of a reality 
described” (McFarlane and Hay, 2003: p. 217). ‘Frames’ reveal their 
producers’ basic presuppositions about their audiences, in addition to any 
substantive changes in the newspapers’ circumstances that have required their 
producers to adapt their material and its function to a new status quo: these 
changes can produce ‘critical discourse moments’, when events 
“‘potentially challenge existing discursive positions and constructs or, in 
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contrast, may contribute to their further sedimentation’” (Carvalho, 2005, 
in Boykoff, 2007: p. 474).  
The analysis method therefore had to identify the series of overlapping 
claims that dominate each newspaper’s content. They appear in a huge variety of 
forms, depending on the changing circumstances of each newspaper, and the 
particular current events it covers. Coming to an understanding of a newspaper’s 
speech act is a cyclical process, since the overlapping networks of ideas it 
contains can only be encountered chronologically as the newspaper reports 
unfold a continuous succession of events. This succession does not correspond 
to the rhythm of change within the newspaper’s immediate surroundings, and so 
creates a disjuncture between the reader’s experience of a consecutive 
development of newspaper stories, and the subtle configuration of circumstances 
and ideas that constitutes the newspaper’s speech act. This disjunction makes it 
impossible to understand a newspaper’s content fully without re-forming the 
linear succession of article narratives into networks of repeated ideas. With 
repeated readings it proved possible to detach a newspaper’s contentions from 
their position in the newspaper’s successive presentation of material.  
The complex and dynamic interaction between circumstance and 
newspaper convention meant that the process of investigating these newspapers 
in relation to their surroundings was self-reflexive, as was the process of 
identifying their discussion of ethnicity. A reflexive method of analysis enabled 
patterns of ideas located after an extensive reading of the sample to be referred 
back to articles read at an earlier stage. A greater knowledge of a newspaper’s 
repeated narratives and genres revealed the likely motivations and beliefs of its 
journalists, which themselves increased the understanding of intentions, 
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strategies and circumstances identifiable through its articles – while also 
clarifying the presuppositions behind these newspapers’ representations of the 
Buryat and Sakha.  
Atlas Ti software has been designed to facilitate the analytical technique, 
developed by Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, known as ‘grounded theory’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This technique initially requires a given text to be 
broken down into phrases or ideas, to which the researcher assigns concepts or 
‘codes’ (Flick, 1998). Maxwell Boykoff’s study of American and British 
newspapers uses this technique, in combination with qualitative analysis 
(Boykoff, 2007). Atlas Ti makes it possible to create a series of codes and 
connect them to relevant statements in the text, while attaching extensive notes 
to sections of text, to the codes themselves, or to the entire analytical project. It 
quantifies the number of times the codes are used, while recording the specific 
statements to which the codes are connected. In this research, Atlas Ti enabled a 
quantitative content analysis that consisted of attaching codes denoting 
particular themes and functions to the articles published over a monthly sample 
period, and hence establishing the number of times these themes and functions 
appeared over the month concerned. For example, the code ‘Ethnic Culture’ was 
attached to all the articles that mentioned a conception of ethnic culture, and the 
code ‘Information’ to all the articles that aimed to inform their readers, rather 
than entertain or shock them.  
The samples of daily newspapers contained so much material that only 
the June sample needed to be coded in order to gain an accurate idea of their 
consistent narratives – even though the weekly newspapers were much larger 
than the dailies, consisting of on average forty tabloid pages, rather than around 
 113 
eight tabloid pages (Buryatia) or six broadsheet pages (Yakutia). All the articles 
in the news sections of both the daily and weekly Russian-language editions 
appearing over the month of June were coded, together with the articles in the 
news sections of the weekly editions published during the August-September 
sample period. This method of coding made it possible to compare, for example, 
the number of times the newspapers mentioned ethnicity over the period of one 
month, or the different ways they treated the same news event. The month of 
June was a sufficient sample to show how the daily newspapers’ repeated 
narratives interacted with the flow of surrounding events, the difference between 
dailies and weeklies being that the former have to react more quickly to 
unfolding circumstances. Nevertheless, the analysis of the June dailies was 
supplemented by comparisons with their August-September samples.  
The material for the quantitative analysis consisted of all the headlines 
from the samples (which had been transcribed during the 2005 field trip), 
together with a sufficient number of photocopies (approximately two-thirds of 
the entire sample) to ensure that there were enough examples of the newspapers’ 
genres to code the articles that had not been photocopied. The codes referred to 
the article as a whole, since the photocopied articles were read for a second time 
while coding, as were any notes made during the transcription of headlines from 
articles that were not photocopied.    
The coding increased the validity of the discourse analysis, since it made 
it possible simultaneously to locate and quantify the newspapers’ specific 
narrative elements, while providing quantitative data that corroborated the 
general trends identified through the discourse analysis. Atlas Ti enables notes 
to be attached during the coding process, thus initiating the cycle of close 
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reading and interpretation that reveals the newspapers’ main narratives, genres 
and functions in detail. Codes could be used to mark the occurrence of 
seemingly important narrative elements for future reference, by creating specific 
codes or combinations of codes. For example, the codes ‘Environmental Crisis’ 
and ‘Accident’ were attached to the articles in Yakutia that recounted its 
repetitive narrative about flooding or forest fires. Atlas Ti’s ‘query tool’ could 
then locate the instances of this narrative by collecting all the articles in 
Yakutia’s sample marked with the combination ‘Environmental Crisis’ and 
‘Accident’, showing how many times this narrative was repeated. Atlas Ti’s 
capacity to list the articles connected to a particular code could also be used to 
find relevant articles – for example, a list of the articles marked with the code 
‘Unusual’ could quickly identify all the anomalous articles in the sample. A 
number was attached to each headline before it was imported into Atlas Ti, 
showing the page and date of the article to which it referred.13 The lists of 
articles Atlas Ti produced therefore made it easier to ascertain any development 
within a particular narrative over time, and whether or not it regularly appeared 
in conjunction with other types of narrative or event.   
The codes had to represent all the individual newspapers’ themes and 
functions, while having a sufficiently generalised meaning to be applicable to 
most or all of the newspapers, and therefore appropriate for use in a comparative 
content analysis. The introductory newspaper reading in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia) helped to formulate preliminary lists of codes, which were refined as 
the newspaper headlines were read and formatted in preparation for the analysis. 
The codes were created by inventing a name to describe the repeated themes, 
                                                 
13 For example, the number 01-01-02 refers to the second article on the first page of the Yakutia 
edition published on the first of June.  
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functions and genres that had been identified during the first and second 
readings, or a word to stand for the concept or type of article that needed to be 
quantified or marked for a later reading – such as the code ‘Sakha Cultural 
Practice’, which was attached to all the articles that appeared to manifest Sakha 
culture. The names used to describe the newspaper content were kept as close to 
the theme or function they concerned as possible, sometimes by using a Russian 
word that often appeared in conjunction with a given theme or genre. For 
example, the code ‘Torzhestvennoye Sobytiye’ uses the Russian for ‘ceremonial 
occasion’ (torzhestvennoye sobytiye), and referred to a particular type of public 
communications event, usually sponsored by local government or business, 
which generated common article genres in both government and commercial 
newspapers.  
The lists of codes were adapted slightly during the early stages of the 
analysis, either by removing unnecessary codes, or by adding the codes that 
were needed to reflect the newspaper’s content accurately. Each newspaper had 
its own list, made up of between sixty and seventy different codes, all of which 
were needed either for the content analysis, or to help with the discourse 
analysis.14 The aim was to keep these lists as repetitive as possible, in order to 
retain their capacity to show relative differences between the newspapers; 
however, the newspaper content varied to such an extent that using the same list 
of codes would have distorted the analysis. There were themes and functions 
that formed an integral part of some newspapers, but were irrelevant to others. 
For example, the commercial newspapers usually aimed to attract readers by 
stimulating an intimate, personal attachment to the article subjects or to the 
                                                 
14 Please see Appendix Two for examples of these code lists (it presents the lists of codes used 
on Yakutia and Inform Polis). 
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journalists themselves. The code ‘Human Interest’ marked the appearance of 
this strategy, and was often attached to more articles in a given newspaper 
sample than any other code, apart from ‘Information’. However, the government 
newspaper Buryatia did not employ this technique at all, and therefore its 
analysis did not require the code ‘Human Interest’, as Chapter Three explains.  
Codes were subject to revision, and it was occasionally necessary to 
create adapted versions of specific codes, to suit the newspapers’ varying 
formulations of similar ideas. Short lists of codes were created for the editions 
of daily and non-Russian newspapers that were not coded in detail, in order to 
identify relevant, typical or strikingly unusual articles, which could have 
indicated a fundamental change in the newspaper’s content.   
Extensive notes were made on the codes themselves as part of the 
discourse analysis, recording each newspaper’s different formulation of the 
theme or function they denoted. These changes in meaning did not however 
affect their use in the content analysis: the generalised theme or function to 
which they referred had to be constant, otherwise the code was changed or 
discarded. For example, the material presented by Yakutsk Vecherniy as 
‘information’ did not have the clarity, detail or rigour of Nashe Vremya’s 
‘informative’ articles, and was often intended less to inform than to arouse the 
reader. However, its presentation showed that it was intended to be taken as 
‘information’ by the reader, whether or not the reader paid any attention to its 
substance. It constituted the informative speech acts that could occur within the 
parameters imposed by Yakutsk Vecherniy’s main product, and therefore 
required the ‘Information’ code. 
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The later stages of the discourse analysis clarified these newspapers’ 
main narratives, along with their circumstances and motivations, through the 
close reading of the articles identified using Atlas Ti. The discourse analysis was 
not limited to the news sections: articles from the entire editions published over 
both sample periods were interpreted in detail in every case, if they were 
particularly good examples of an important narrative. References to the Buryat 
and Sakha were noted and interpreted throughout the analysis process, so that an 
understanding of these discourses could develop in tandem with an 
understanding of the Republics and their newspapers. 
Another technique – useful in understanding the more complex and 
ambiguous narrative elements – was a system of memo headings, which were 
attached to the relevant articles. For example, notes made on one recurring 
narrative in Yakutia were headed ‘ordinary citizen’. This meant that they were 
stored together in the memo file, and so could be read consecutively. The 
memos helped the recognition of repetitions of narrative, which could then be 
compared with earlier examples. Codes, combinations of codes and memos 
could be used in the same way to record the appearance of important current 
events, in order to relate them to repeated narratives. For example, the code 
‘Beslan’ identified all the articles published about the hostage taking in North 
Ossetia. These various types of identification made it possible to navigate 
around the combinations of narrative and event each newspaper contained, 
enabling an increased understanding of the newspaper’s central narratives, and 
their interaction with its representation of current events. Comparing the ways in 
which different newspapers represented the same key event revealed their 
 118 
distinguishing characteristics still further, in addition to providing useful 
insights into the event itself and its circumstances.  
Finally, repeated readings of the articles about the Buryat and Sakha 
enabled me to interpret their narratives according to my knowledge of their 
newspapers and context, in order to understand both the assumptions their 
producers were making about their audiences, and the possible audience 
responses. The analysis as a whole revealed networks of ideas about the Buryat 
and Sakha in their Republics’ public discourse, generated both for political and 
commercial reasons. The ideas themselves and the way they were used had clear 
implications for the republican and federal political establishments, as Chapters 
























This chapter is concerned with describing the main narratives and functions of 
the newspapers selected for analysing the Buryat case, and what they show 
about the nature of Buryatia’s political processes.15 It examines the importance 
of public representation within the Republic of Buryatia’s governance, given the 
difficulty of managing Buryatia’s current economic and political climate. In 
doing so, this chapter presents a distinction between commercial and 
government-sponsored newspapers that occurs in both Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia), arising from the varying demands different sponsors make on 
their editorial collectives. 
The following section of this chapter shows the differences a quantitative 
analysis of these newspapers revealed between the commercial and government-
sponsored newspapers, before using a qualitative analysis of the newspaper 
discourse to explore this distinction in greater detail. The second section 
                                                 
15 As Chapter Two explained, the newspapers chosen for the study of Buryatia are 
Buryatia and Barguzinskaya Pravda, owned by the republican executive and Barguzin sub-
region’s administration respectively, and the commercial newspapers Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa 
Plyus. The samples of each newspaper consisted of the editions published during June, 2004, 
and between August 25 and September 22, 2004. However, only the June sample of Buryatia 
was subjected to a quantitative analysis, since Buryatia is a daily rather than a weekly, and thus 
produced a much larger volume of material.  
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discusses what the interpretation of this newspaper material reveals about daily 
life and political activity in contemporary Buryatia. Both sections incorporate 
a comparison with some 1989 editions of the Soviet newspaper Pravda 
Buryatii, illustrating the continuities between Soviet and post-Soviet 
strategy and practice.16 
 
Section 3.1: The difference in function between government and 
commercial newspapers 
The quantitative analysis method consisted of attaching codes representing 
specific themes or discursive functions to the newspaper articles, as described in 
Chapter Two. Table 3.1 presents the six ‘function codes’ used most often during 
the coding of the articles in Buryatia, Barguzinskaya Pravda, Inform Polis and 
Pyatnitsa Plyus. The quantitative analysis incorporated several ‘function codes’, 
referring to the newspaper articles’ different purposes; for example, articles 
designed to celebrate an occasion or person were marked with the codes 
‘Celebration’, or ‘Celebration of Person’. ‘Ceremonial Occasion’ (from the 
Russian torzhestvennoye sobytyye) identified the articles publicising public 
events. The code ‘Cultural creativity’ (kul’turnoye tvorchestvo) was attached to 
articles that offered cultural production, through either the description of cultural 
events or the presentation of creative, as a opposed to informative, writing. As 
the use of Russian in these code names might suggest, the ceremonial 
occasions or cultural production sometimes took forms that are specific to 
the post-Soviet space. The codes ‘Information’, ‘Useful Information’ and 
‘Human Interest’ were attached to articles offering information, specifically 
                                                 
16 I would like to thank Caroline Humphrey for sharing this material. 
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useful information, or a pleasant emotional drama. ‘Appeal’ (obraschenie) 
referred to general requests for money or action, whether made by individuals, 
businesses, government organisations or charities – while the more assertive 
demands marked as ‘Demand on Politician’ were addressed to politicians in 
particular. Table 3.1 thus shows the six most commonly occurring functions in 
each newspaper.17 
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Table 3.1: Percentages of articles coded with common functions (the figures 
in brackets are the number of articles coded; N = the number of articles in 
the sample) 
 
These figures reveal the variance in news agenda between Buryatia’s 
privately and government-owned newspapers, resulting from the different uses 
                                                 
17 A single article could have more than one function, and therefore could be marked with more 
than one function code. This is why the percentages in the table do not add up to 100. 
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they have for their sponsoring organisations. There were roughly twice as many 
promotions of public events in the government newspapers. ‘Ceremonial 
Occasion’ was attached to 31 per cent of the articles in Buryatia’s sample, 30.3 
per cent of Barguzinskaya Pravda’s, but to 11 and 7.8 per cent respectively of 
the Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa Plyus articles. The high proportions of articles 
marked ‘Ceremonial Occasion’ in the government newspaper samples 
correspond with the dominance of the ‘Celebration’ function: this was the most 
commonly occurring article function in Buryatia, and the second most 
commonly occurring function in Barguzinskaya Pravda. The frequent use of 
these two codes during the coding process shows that the government 
newspapers’ main function was to publicise and celebrate prominent events. It 
indicates the importance of a previously organised timetable of political or 
cultural occasions in determining the government papers' news agendas, a 
timetable which takes precedence over the reporting of contingent events; it is 
clear that these newspapers’ informative function is subservient to the 
communication they are making on behalf of their sponsors. Similarly, the high 
proportion of articles marked ‘Information’ in Buryatia (48 per cent) consisted 
largely of informative pieces about timetabled public occasions or political 
activities, rather than reports on current events.  
In contrast to the government newspapers, the most commonly used 
function codes for the commercial newspapers were ‘Information’, followed by 
‘Human Interest’ (in Inform Polis), and ‘Cultural Creativity’ (in Pyatnitsa 
Plyus). Inform Polis’ sample contained a large proportion (24.2 per cent) of 
‘Celebration’ articles. However, the majority of its articles aimed to offer their 
readers ‘Information’, ‘Human Interest’ or ‘Cultural Creativity’, as did those 
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published in Pyatnitsa Plyus. The conclusion is that for both these commercial 
newspapers providing their paying audiences with an attractive publication takes 
precedence over communicating a politically expedient message. 
The frequency with which the codes ‘Economic Crisis’ and ‘Political 
Aktsiya’ (see Table 3.2) were used on the government newspapers indicates their 
emphasis on positive political action. These codes refer to the articles’ subject 
matter, rather than their function. ‘Economic Crisis’ was attached to articles 
about a problem caused by a lack of money, while ‘Political Aktsiya’ was 
attached to articles on an event or initiative explicitly intended for political 
communication: the Russian word for such events is aktsiya. Table 3.2 shows 
the proportion of articles marked with these codes. 
 
Code Buryatia 




(N = 218) 
 
Inform Polis 
(N = 298) 
Pyatnitsa 
Plyus 








24 (89) 5.0 (11) 8.4 (25) 16 (12) 
 
Table 3.2: Percentages of newspaper articles marked with the codes 
‘Economic Crisis’ and ‘Political Aktsiya’ (the figures in brackets are the 
number of articles coded; N = the number of articles in the sample) 
 
In their coverage of serious news, the commercial newspapers contain more 
articles on economic crises than on political initiatives – unlike Buryatia, which 
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contains a high proportion (24 per cent) of articles on political aktsii, and a 
relatively low proportion (9.4 per cent) of articles on economic crises. This 
contrast indicates a decision on the part of Buryatia’s editors to concentrate on 
the positive initiatives of the Republic’s politicians, rather than on their region’s 
economic difficulties. 
The discussion of economic crises in all the newspapers shows that lack 
of money is an all-pervasive problem in Buryatia, particularly in agricultural 
sub-regions like Barguzin. This corroborates the complaints I heard 
throughout my fieldwork about Buryatia’s poor economy. Barguzinskaya 
Pravda’s references to economic crises reveal the extent of Barguzin region’s 
post-Soviet economic breakdown. One article describes the poor state of 
Barguzin’s milk production, after the electrical supply to the milk processing 
plant had been cut due to the non-payment of bills; a ‘mini’ milk processing 
plant had been brought in from another area, but there was no money to repair it 
(Barguzinskaya Pravda June 21, 2004: p. 1). Another piece mentions that 900 
out of Barguzin town’s 6,500 inhabitants are unemployed (Barguzinskaya 
Pravda June 21, 2004: p. 1). Similarly, the low proportion of ‘Political Aktsiya’ 
articles in Barguzinskaya Pravda (5.0 per cent) is likely to reflect a lack of funds 
on the part of the regional administration, which prevents the undertaking of 
political initiatives. Barguzin Region’s administration, in tandem with 
Barguzinskaya Pravda, uses instead frequent celebrations to cheer and divert 
their population, as the dominance of ‘Celebration’ and ‘Ceremonial Occasion’ 
articles in Barguzinskaya Pravda’s sample shows. Buryatia’s emphasis on 
celebratory descriptions of political initiatives also creates a positive impression 
of the Republic’s economic and political wellbeing. It is notable that neither 
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newspaper is primarily concerned with seeking out information relevant to their 
audiences’ daily experience.  
Buryatia’s positive spin contrasts with Pyatnitsa Plyus’ preoccupation 
with economic crisis, revealed by the frequent occurrence (33.3 per cent) of 
‘Economic Crisis’ articles in its sample. Pyatnitsa Plyus is directed towards the 
‘average citizen’ rather than the elites, as its small size (eight broadsheet pages) 
and low price (3 rubles, as opposed to Inform Polis’s 10) show. The last four 
pages of every edition of Pyatnitsa Plyus are devoted to a supplement for 
kitchen-gardeners, designed for those who in part depend on the produce they 
grow: kitchen gardening has become increasingly important as a means of 
economic survival in post-Soviet Russia (Humphrey, 1998).18 The high 
proportion of ‘Useful Information’ articles (25.3 per cent, in Table 3.1) and 
‘Economic Crisis’ references also reflect the emphasis by Pyatnitsa Plyus on 
providing information of direct practical use to a low-income target audience.  
Pyatnitsa Plyus displays a more irreverent attitude towards the political 
establishment than Inform Polis, as the unusually high occurrence of ‘Demand 
on Politician’ articles (11 per cent, in Table 3.1) indicates. It took the risk of 
publishing a damaging article from the Moscow-based newspaper Izvestiya, 
which described the arrest of the President of Buryatia's spokesman Andrei 
Kapustin for taking bribes, and his subsequent death in prison under suspicious 
circumstances (Pyatnitsa Plyus September 1, 2004: p. 2). It is interesting that 
while Pyatnitsa Plyus regards this sort of scandal as publishable news, at other 
times it toes the officially acceptable line: for example, like Inform Polis it 
contained no comment on Vladimir Putin’s decision to abolish the election of 
                                                 
18 These pages were not included in the newspaper analysis. 
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regional heads, following the obedient example set by Buryatia’s statement of 
support for this measure (Buryatia September 16, 2004: p. 1). Pyatnitsa Plyus 
could be compromising a commercial requirement to adapt its content to an 
audience which suspects elite politicians and businessmen, with the need to 
maintain a positive working relationship with influential political actors. The 
higher incidence of irreverent or scandalous articles in Pyatnitsa Plyus suggests 
that its journalists perceive a lower level of political surveillance than Inform 
Polis’ producers, understanding both the newspaper and its audience to be 
sufficiently detached from the political establishment to make occasional 
damaging articles irrelevant. I had noticed a similar phenomenon in Irkutsk: 
the publishing house SM Nomer Odin’s cheapest tabloid Pyatnitsa 
contained the strongest criticism of the political status quo, in well-written 
analysis pieces. When I put this to a well-connected Irkutsk media 
academic, he mentioned that the regional political elites would probably 
consider both Pyatnitsa and its low-status target audience to be too lacking 
in political agency to be worth serious attention.   
Inform Polis’ content shows it to be making a similar compromise, 
although with a different, higher-status target audience in mind. Inform Polis 
covers the same republican-, federal- and international-level political and 
economic issues as Buryatia, as the similar occurrence of the codes ‘Foreigners’ 
and ‘Federal Level’ shows. These codes were attached to articles on events or 
issues that concerned the Russian Federation as a whole, or other countries. The 










(N = 218) 
 
Inform Polis 
(N = 298) 
Pyatnitsa 
Plyus 
(N = 75) 
Federal Level 
 
25.3 (94) 10.6 (23) 24.2 (72) 29.3 (22) 
Foreigners 
 
15 (57) 5.0 (11) 17.4 (52) 11 (8) 
Agriculture 
 
5.7 (21) 9.6 (21) 1.7 (5) 4.0 (3) 
 
Table 3.3: Percentages of articles marked with the codes ‘Federal Level’, 
‘Foreigners’ and ‘Agriculture’ (the figures in brackets are the number of 
articles coded; N = the number of articles in the sample) 
 
The codes ‘Federal level’ and ‘Foreigners’ were attached to 25.3 and 15 per cent 
respectively of Buryatia’s articles, and to 24.2 and 17.4 per cent of Inform Polis’. 
The similarity of these figures reflects Inform Polis’ probable orientation 
towards the professionals, government officials and businessmen who also read 
Buryatia. Inform Polis provides these groups with information on Russian and 
world events which Buryatia represents through the prism of its political 
communication.  
Pyatnitsa Plyus contained a greater proportion of ‘Federal Level’ articles 
than either Buryatia or Inform Polis (29.3 per cent), since a large part of its 
space is devoted to articles taken from Moscow-based commercial newspapers. 
The low proportion of ‘Foreigners’ articles (11 per cent) reflects its emphasis on 
covering the Russian Federation’s immediate concerns, whereas Inform Polis 
contained regular digests of high-quality foreign news sources, such as the 
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Financial Times, revealing its editors’ orientation towards a target audience with 
the time and education required for an interest in the wider world.  
Inform Polis also identifies itself as a ‘high-quality’ newspaper through 
its commitment to the professional practices considered to be the mark of ‘high-
quality’ journalism. For example, when it publishes articles paid for by a 
business or politician these appear in a different font, unlike all the other 
commercial newspapers used in this study. It has also made the effort to create 
an accessible style of news reporting, adopting the technique (normal in Western 
newspapers) of summarising a news story in its first paragraph.19 Inform Polis 
uses repetitive language to create recognizable ‘styles’ of article, which are 
published on similar pages from week to week. For example, the Inform Polis 
editions usually contained an ‘accident’ (proisshestviya) section on pages eight 
and nine, containing shocking crime or accident stories. By contrast, Pyatnitsa 
Plyus has not worked out a consistent set of compact narrative techniques, using 
a verbose linguistic style instead of attracting the reader’s attention through the 
succinct communication of striking information. Textbox 3.1 compares the 
headlines and introductory paragraphs of news stories from Inform Polis and 






                                                 
19 As I discovered during my own journalism training, journalists in the UK are taught to write 
‘pyramid’ news stories, encapsulating the point of the story in the first few lines, and putting 
progressively less important information into the succeeding paragraphs.  
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Inform Polis  Pyatnitsa Plyus 
Headline: A corner of Manchuria will be 
built in Ulan Ude 
Headline: It could have been worse 
Introductory paragraph: The Chinese 
will build a residential micro-region and 
commercial centre in Ulan Ude, using their 
own money, and in their national style. 
The capital’s municipality is prepared to 
allocate the best land allotments to the 
‘Heavenly Land’s’ businessmen’s project 
(Inform Polis June 2 2004: p. 4.) 
Introductory paragraph: At the latest meeting of 
the members of the Town Council, changes and 
additions were made to the town’s main financial 
document. Despite their incredible efforts (as the 
Council members themselves evaluated their work 
on the budget), they did not escape a deficit of ten 
percent. The people’s elected representatives tried 
to preserve the financing of the important social 
welfare stipulations to the maximum. (Pyatnitsa 
Plyus June 2, 2004: p. 1.) 
 
 
Textbox 3.1: A comparison of Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa Plyus 
 
The rest of the Inform Polis article presents further details about the Chinese 
businessmen’s proposal, and their meeting with Ulan Ude’s municipal 
administration – while the Pyatnitsa Plyus article continues into a discursive 
account of the council meeting, touching on the various issues it raised.   
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Inform Polis’s professionalism extends to helping its readers by exposing 
and criticising damaging elite activity. Its willingness to take risks in informing 
its audience can be seen in its presentation of foreign news sources. For example, 
it published foreign articles criticising Putin's policy in Chechnya after the 
Beslan hostage siege (Inform Polis September 8, 2004: p. 15). On the other hand, 
it also publishes articles (similar to those in Buryatia) which promote either elite 
figures or the official version of events. The tone is optimistic, with a lower 
proportion of ‘Economic Crisis’ articles than Pyatnitsa Plyus (11 per cent, as 
opposed to 33.3 per cent), and a higher proportion of ‘Celebration’ pieces (24.2 
per cent, as opposed to 7.0 per cent), indicating a generally upbeat attitude likely 
to be acceptable to Buryatia’s ruling classes. Like Pyatnitsa Plyus, Inform Polis 
is carefully balancing its target audience’s desires against the interests of 
Buryatia’s leading politicians, who themselves form part of Inform Polis’ 
readership.  
The government newspapers also display the priority of their political 
functions by publishing articles written in a demanding official jargon, which 
even the native Russian-speakers I interviewed found tedious and difficult to 
read. For example, the following quotations are the headlines and first 







Buryatia Barguzinskaya Pravda 
Headline: The reform of local government 
has been brewing for some time… : The Vice-
Chairman of the National Parliament of the 
Republic of Buryatia I. I. Kalashnikov 
describes the legal provision made by the 
organs of government power of the reforms of 
local government, and the execution of the 
measures taken during the transition period in 
the Republic of Buryatia.  
Headline: Salary – on time! 
 
 
First paragraph: The main aim of the 
conference was the consolidation of the efforts 
of the organs of government power to enact 
the stipulations of the new edition of the 
federal law “About the general principles of 
the organisation of local government in the 
Russian Federation”. (Buryatia June 22, 2004: 
p. 3.) 
First paragraph: And so, a verification of the 
execution of the employment legislation, about 
the punctual payment of salaries, was done by 
the procurator of the region at Barguzin’s STK 
ROSTO. The fact of the violation of the dates 
for salary payment at the institution was 
established by the verification. This institution 
has been in debt over salary payment since the 
start of the year (Barguzinskaya Pravda June 
17, 2004: p. 3.). 
 
  
Text box 3.2: A comparison of Buryatia and Barguzinskaya Pravda 
 
Buryatia’s use of this style makes it unlikely to have much attraction or 
relevance for those who are not the academic, military, cultural, economic or 
political professionals who require this type of information. Indeed, many Ulan 
Ude residents described Buryatia as boring. It was never recommended to 
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me as a ‘high quality’ political newspaper, unlike Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
equivalent, Yakutia.  
In Textbox 3.2, the variation between Buryatia and Barguzinskaya 
Pravda arises out of the difference between the two communities within which 
these two newspapers operate. Barguzinskaya Pravda contained a higher 
proportion of articles marked with the code ‘Agriculture’ than Buryatia (9.6 per 
cent, as opposed to 5.7 per cent), and lower proportions of articles marked 
‘Federal Level’, and ‘Foreigners’ (10.6 and 5.0 per cent respectively, instead of 
25.3 and 15 per cent). This contrast is an indication of Barguzinskaya Pravda's 
concern with Barguzin Region's schools, government offices, factories and 
farms, rather than federal- or international-level current affairs.  
The content of Barguzinskaya Pravda, as a sub-regional newspaper, 
indicates that rural and agricultural communities have a much closer relationship 
with their local administrations than the urban population. A report of a meeting 
between Barguzin town’s municipal administration and citizenry describes the 
complaints made by elderly inhabitants of Barguzin town about their town’s 
poor sanitation, before attacking the younger attendees for not participating 
enough (Barguzinskaya Pravda June 21, 2004: p. 1). The journalist’s comments 
about the meeting reveal their expectation that Barguzin’s ordinary citizens 
should interact directly with the sub-region’s administration, making their 
concerns known. Barguzinskaya Pravda itself facilitates this interaction, 
publishing letters of complaint from local residents in addition to making critical 
comments in its political reports. These criticisms can be sharp, although they 
never went as far as to suggest that the political establishment as a whole was 
ineffective. For example, the report described above expressed a hope that “the 
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decisions taken don’t stay on paper, and that we won’t have to talk at the next 
conference about the same thing for the tenth time [po desyatomu krugu].” It 
was notable that Barguzinskaya Pravda published the Izvestiya article on 
Kapustin’s death appearing in Pyatnitsa Plyus, unlike Buryatia (Barguzinskaya 
Pravda September 6, 2004: p. 6). Barguzinskaya Pravda’s complaints 
resemble the forthright criticisms published by 1989 editions of Pravda 
Buryatii, indicating the continuation of a Soviet-era belief in the critical 
function of print journalism. For example, the director of the Uoyan state 
collective farm in the north of Buryatia claims that the Ministry in charge 
of building the village Noviy Uoyan (New Uoyan) is deliberately ignoring 
the fact that ten thousand people are living in a settlement designed for 
three thousand: “Of course, it’s much easier to feign ignorance than 
recognise the tangle of Uoyan’s problems.” (Pravda Buryatii February 7, 
1989: p. 1.)  
  The different techniques the government and commercial newspapers 
use to entertain their audiences further illustrate their contrasting relationships 
with their readers. They reveal the commercial newspapers’ greater willingness 
to engage with their audience members’ daily experience in order to create the 
sympathetic emotional relationship that attracts and sustains a mass readership. 
As Table 3.1 shows, the ‘Human Interest’ code was attached to 43 and 26.7 per 
cent of Inform Polis’ and Pyatnitsa Plyus’ articles respectively; strikingly, it was 
not needed at all for coding the government newspapers. ‘Human interest’ is a 
technique for providing a pleasurable emotional experience, through dramatic 
accounts of ‘ordinary’ life that stimulate an emotional relationship between the 
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reader and the story’s subjects. Its success depends on the capacity of the 
journalist to present narratives to which the audience will relate.  
The quotation from Inform Polis below shows how human interest can 
be introduced into a current affairs story, in this case about Ulan Ude’s energy 
shortage:  
 
Last Friday, the seventeen-year-old Zhenya Sagaleyeva, from the village of Zarechnogo, 
started to iron her dress for the school-leavers’ evening party three times, and three times had 
to lay down the iron: the micro-region’s electricity cut out literally every two hours. The girl 
only managed to arrange her outfit and do her hair by five o’ clock. The holiday mood was 
spoiled (Inform Polis June 23, 2004: p. 3.) 
 
A reader is likely to sympathise with Zhenya’s frustration, particularly since a 
school-leaver’s end-of-year party in Russia is a highly charged public ceremony, 
marking a young person’s initiation into adult life. Many of Inform Polis’ 
readers are likely to have endured similar situations themselves, given the poor 
state of heating, electricity and hot water supplies in post-Soviet Buryatia. 
Zhenya’s story immediately generates an emotional response, combining a 
personal sympathy for Zhenya with the irritation aroused by the reader’s own 
memories of electricity shortages, and engaging the reader’s interest in the 
article that follows. The photograph accompanying the article, shown in Figure 
3.1 on the page opposite, adds to the poignancy. The paragraph eventually 
resolves the crisis it presents – Zhenya did manage to get ready in time – 
stimulating the reader’s relief and satisfaction on her behalf, even as they turn to 
the rest of the article with a feeling of indignation towards those responsible for 
the situation as a whole. The article’s writer has used what they know to be a 
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common experience to create an emotionally engaging mini-drama. The 
commercial newspapers’ frequent publication of ‘human interest’ articles shows 
the influence their audiences’ perceived emotional reactions have over their 
content. 
The government newspaper material lacked this emotional engagement 
with its audience, being (as already noted) a political act rather than an attempt 
to attract a paying readership. This political purpose requires government-
sponsored journalists to present a politically expedient version of Buryatia’s 
reality, rather than interpreting their audiences’ everyday lives. When 
government newspaper articles do seek to entertain they resort to self-
consciously literary creative writing, rather than dramatic narratives about 
‘ordinary people’. Buryatia in particular made much use of this technique, as the 
high proportion (36 per cent, in Table 3.1) of its articles marked ‘Cultural 
Creativity’ indicates. Pyatnitsa Plyus also produced a high proportion (33.3 per 
cent) of ‘Cultural Creativity’ articles; however, the common occurrence of the 
codes ‘Human Interest’ (26.7 per cent) and ‘Useful Information’ (25.3 per cent) 
show that it combined references to cultural production with the emotionally 
engaging drama described above, or information with an explicit use for its 
target audience.  
The following quotation is an example of Buryatia’s creative writing, the 
headline and first paragraph from an account of a trip to an academic conference 
in Tashkent:  
 
Headline: In the burial-vault of Tamerlane 
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First paragraph: The main point of the tour’s programme was a visit to the mausoleum and 
burial vault Gur-Emir, which was of interest to Ivan Aleksandrovich and myself as a unique 
monument to ancient eastern architecture; as the burial vault of the legendary astronomer and 
mathematician Ulugbek, and as the burial vault of Tamerlane – the great conqueror and 
creator of old Samarkand. (Buryatia June 24, 2004: p. 8.) 
 
As this quotation illustrates, Buryatia’s literary narratives are located in places 
and times set apart from ‘ordinary’ daily existence – whether these are 
ceremonial political or cultural occasions, tours outside the Republic, or forays 
into history or the natural world. Their depiction of emotion is incorporated into 
their political communication, so that their subjects’ or authors’ emotional 
responses display idealised personalities rather than spontaneous subjective 
reactions. The excitement and erudition the author of this article and his 
companion manifest over Gur-Emir is typical of Buryatia’s idealised creative 
personality. Their fascination with and knowledge of the mysteries of past 
cultural traditions displays their high moral and intellectual quality, 
distinguishing them from the mass of ordinary human beings absorbed in 
everyday life. The preoccupation with glorious past tradition, combined 
with the higher moral status attributed to those sharing this preoccupation, 
reflect a Soviet-era understanding of the Russian word for culture, kul’tura. 
As Chapter One describes, kul’tura came to mean a series of idealised 
cultural traditions (Grant, 1995). Reportage of the traditional Buryat 
Sagaalgan holiday published in a 1989 edition of Pravda Buryatii also 
emphasised the holiday’s ancient origin, its display of “universal human 
feelings and wishes” for the good of humanity, and the enthusiasm and 
good nature of its participants (Pravda Buryatii February 11, 1989: p. 4).  
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The place of such narratives in Buryatia’s government legitimisation strategy is 
discussed fully in Chapter Four.      
The authors of Buryatia’s creative pieces write as if they assumed their 
readers were equally devoted to their ideals: they present them without 
justification or explanation. In doing so, these writers flatter their readers by 
implying them to belong to the circle of those who are committed to high moral 
values. Their linguistic style provides an aesthetic pleasure explicitly orientated 
towards individuals who are sufficiently educated to have an appreciation for 
high quality literary language. The pleasure these articles afford relies on a 
mutual regard for high-level cultural production between journalist and reader, 
rather than on exciting common emotions – limiting their attraction to the 
minority of citizens who share these journalists’ education and values.  
As this content analysis has shown, each of the newspapers sampled 
offers a distinct product or service, although as we have seen some of them 
could have overlapping readerships. Above all, the nature of their output is 
determined by their ownership. The government-owned newspapers function as 
an extension of the political organs, while the privately owned newspapers are 
commercial businesses. The requirement for commercial newspapers to 
respond to their target audiences’ needs and interests is manifested in the 
way commercial newspapers have adapted western and Soviet-era article 
genres into an attractive product, rather than perpetuating Soviet-era 
forms, as have the government-sponsored newspapers. These newspapers 
complement each other in this investigation, since official representations of 
‘ethnicity’ can be compared with those intended to please a mass audience, as 




Section 3.2 Public faces and private realities in the Republic of Buryatia 
 
Section 3.2.1: The republican government’s political communication 
As the previous section discussed, the government newspapers in particular 
contained a large number of articles reporting on public ceremonial events. 
These occasions were recreational, cultural or academic – for example, the 
Russian-German forum organised by Buryatia's State University and the 
Minister of Education – or they were integral parts of the Republic's legislative 
processes, such as policy discussion meetings. The event itself is covered in 
tandem with pieces on the political or social issues related to it. For example, the 
pieces covering the celebration of the Day for the Defence of Children were 
accompanied by a report on Buryatia’s children’s homes (Buryatia June 1, 2004: 
pp 4–5). The state holidays could be a form of state-sponsored recreation for 
some, particularly in rural areas with few entertainment providers. 
The list of "main undertakings of the regional administration and its 
departments during June 2004", published in Barguzinskaya Pravda, shows 
them all to be public occasions of one kind or another, whether meetings 
between the regions' citizens and politicians, or state holidays such as ‘Day of 
the Social Worker’ – indicating that the organisation of ceremonial occasions is 
conceived of as one of the government's duties.  (Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 
10, 2004: p. 2). The republican executive's activities also involve a high 
proportion of cultural and official occasions, according to the weekly summary 
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in Buryatia (Buryatia June 29, 2004: p. 2).  For example, President Potapov’s 
activities from 21 to 26 June 2004 included attending four academic events, a 
concert, a visit to a vodka factory, and a discussion about a training centre for 
the Russian Federation’s Olympic contenders.  
The reporting of these occasions tends to follow a formula. A political 
figure will almost always be mentioned as being present, thus clarifying the 
nature of the political patronage the event has received. The propaganda 
function, which always coexists with the occasion's ostensible purpose, lies in 
the public demonstration of the energy and enthusiasm of its patrons, and of 
their commitment to the ideals that officially motivate their organisations. These 
together present positive impressions of the Republic's current circumstances, 
which correspond to ideals frequently expressed in other articles. For example, 
Buryatia's coverage of the State University's International Russian-German 
Forum celebrates the academics and politicians who organised it, its participants, 
and the existence of the German Department itself (Buryatia June 3, 2004: p. 3). 
These are taken as a sign of Buryatia's rich academic and cultural heritages, its 
cosmopolitanism, and its astute and energetic regional and federal politicians: as 
Buryatia points out, the creation of friendly relations with Germany will help 
Russia's economy. As Chapter Four describes in detail, Buryatia constantly 
associates traditional cultural production and academia with high moral value. It 
thus espouses a set of ideals, while using events such as the Russian-German 
Forum to demonstrate that they correspond to Buryatia’s reality.  
The propaganda function is less marked in the coverage of political 
meetings, where the reporting takes a matter-of-fact tone. Reports may contain 
careful, although sharp, criticism of elite figures, especially in Barguzinskaya 
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Pravda. However in sum they demonstrate the good will, energy and 
professionalism of the politicians. Naturally, the politicians' speeches stress the 
positive initiatives the politician has made, in addition to their personal goals 
and ideals. For example, Barguzin's regional head mentions his general 
aspiration to create a better connection between the administration and the 
citizenry, in tandem with his specific intention to conduct a survey among the 
population on the type of administration leader they would like, and to introduce 
a system of elected representatives for every micro-region of Barguzin 
(Barguzinskaya Pravda June 21, 2004: p. 2). He raises a problem while 
suggesting a solution, thus demonstrating his own idealistic and committed 
personality.  
These reports therefore imply that the solutions to Buryatia's problems 
are ultimately to be found in the present government – although ironically the 
solution often proposed is to leave the problem in the hands of the citizens. For 
example, the report of a meeting held in honour of President Potapov’s visit to 
Barguzin sub-region claimed that the “human factor” is the “most important for 
the development of the region’s economy”, and that the “psychology” of the 
region’s inhabitants must be changed to “overcome a dependent mood. 
[izhdivencheskikh nastroyeniy]” (Barguzinskaya Pravda, September 16, 2004: 
pp. 1–3.) 
The coverage of President Potapov's working trips forms a promotional 
genre in itself, which illustrates the qualities attributed to politicians in 
paradigmatic form. These articles illustrate Buryatia’s and Barguzinskaya 
Pravda’s tendency to present repetitive narrative sequences espousing morals 
and ideals alongside reports of events or activities designed to show that the 
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political elites are committed to these morals. An example of one of these pieces 
can be found in Figure 3.2 on the opposite page. President Potapov is being 
conducted around the factories and government organisations of Barguzin town, 
as the pictures show. The representation of Potapov echoes the traditional 
Russian ideal of the 'good emperor' (dobriy tsar'), whose love for his people is 
always thwarted by the incompetent or criminal government officials 
(chinovniki) that surround him. Potapov is portrayed as deeply concerned with 
the citizenry's well-being. The reportage consistently mentions a moment when 
on his own initiative he departs from the planned tour to ask individual citizens 
about their problems, which he immediately takes steps to solve – for example, 
by promising two war veterans a car (Buryatia September 14, 2004: p. 3). His 
disinterested concern for his population’s welfare shows him to correspond to 
the idealised moral personality constantly portrayed in Buryatia, which will be 
described in detail in Chapter Four. Similarly, Buryatia's articles show that 
idealised conceptions of the politician involve a professional knowledge of 
economics and political science. Buryatia, as the officially recognised 
politicians' newspaper, enacts this ideal by publishing informative articles that 
are difficult even for those with a relatively advanced understanding of 
economics, such as the piece on local government presented in the previous 
section. 
The contemporary use of Buryatia's government newspapers, together 
with the resources devoted to politicised public events, suggest that the attempt 
to merge reality with the ideologically appropriate representation is still 
regarded as an important aspect of government – hence the importance of state-
sponsored occasions in the government-sponsored newspapers’ news agenda. 
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The combination of public event and mass media coverage resembles the late 
Soviet use of public discourse described in Chapter One, which was designed to 
merge the description of an idealised reality in the mass media with the 
demonstration of its existence through a variety of institutional practices. The 
articles from Barguzinskaya Pravda provide good examples of this 
communicative technique. They are written as if author, subject and 
audience behaved and evaluated according to the officially recognized 
Soviet norms. For example, a front-cover spread celebrates the personal 
success of Buryatia's leading milkmaids, with the following headlines: 
 
Top banner: The Republic's rally of leading milk farms opens in Ulan Ude today  
Headline: A warm welcome to the masters of high milk yields! 
Banner over photographs: Group leaders 
Feature headline: A beacon for farms (Pravda Buryatii February 17, 1989: p. 1.) 
 
 The journalist takes the initiative in extending the warm welcome on 
behalf of their readers, as if they assume their readers will inevitably also 
be delighted by these milkmaids’ achievements – as they would be, if they 
had the concern for their society that befits the idealized Soviet citizen. The 
following article contains a mixture of information about Buryatia’s milk 
production, praise and criticism for the Republic’s collective farms, and 
exhortations for all to increase their organization and commitment.  
The article and the conference itself share a communicative aim, 
such that one becomes an extension of the other. They are the dual 
components of the important Soviet ritual described in Chapter One, the 
worker’s holiday. The conference of the leading milk-producing farmers 
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and its coverage is part of a five-year plan (pyatiletka), aimed at increasing 
the Soviet Union’s production. These five-year plans were part of Soviet life 
since Stalin launched the first in 1928. Workers in all sectors had to 
respond (if only superficially) to the demands for increased production. 
Meanwhile those not directly involved in production would have some 
ideologically defined role in supporting it – such as this journalist, who 
provides both positive and negative incentives (public praise or criticism) 
for collective farmers to work harder, at the same time as demonstrating 
the politically correct way of describing Buryatia's situation, including the 
milk shortage they were then experiencing. The conference and article 
together present a version of the Soviet Union’s reality, in collaboration 
with the farm workers involved in the pyatiletka. These activities show the 
Soviet Union to be the kind of state where organisation, improvement and 
achievement are both possible and prioritized, at a time when the state was 
in reality at the point of collapse.  
 There is in fact a degree to which the activity of the Republic’s current 
legislative and administrative organisation appears to be determined by the 
public demonstration of the morals and ideals these newspapers portray. The 
various public holidays are not merely an effort to promote a convenient set 
of ideas about Buryatia’s reality, as Caroline Humphrey describes, but can 
also exert a decisive influence over the way Buryatia’s institutions function 
(Humphrey, 2007). For example, according to both Buryatia and 
Barguzinskaya Pravda, the Republic's legislation and policy result from political 
meetings and scientific conferences which provide the politicians with the 
necessary information about the public's needs. The entire process apparently 
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takes place in the newspapers' public sphere – from the raising of citizens' 
concerns in public political meetings to the eventual publication of the law or 
policy in the newspaper. This correlates with the consistently expressed desire 
of the politicians to interact with and help the public. As the Vice-Chairman of 
the Khural's Committee for Social Policy Konstantin Sobolev puts it: “The MP 
[deputat] is an initiator and motivator. ... But it's necessary not just to act, but to 
involve the population in the solving of problems, awakening their social 
activity. That's possible if you systematically inform the voter about your 
activities. My principle is simple: a deputat is a deputat to the extent that they 
resolve the mandates of the voters, and is accountable to them!” (Buryatia, June 
10, 2004: p. 3).  
Another illustration of the influence public representation has over 
administrative processes comes from Barguzinskaya Pravda, in the Procurator’s 
report quoted in the previous section. These reports display the Procurator’s 
efforts to enforce new legislation, describing the legislation itself, and a 
selection of cases where it has been applied. The latter paragraphs of this article 
present the strong penalties that can be incurred by breaking the law on salary 
payment, such as an 80,000 ruble (£1,724) fine, or imprisonment for up to two 
years (Barguzinskaya Pravda, 17 June, 2004: p. 3). They highlight the 
Procurator’s intention to find and prosecute those who are contravening the law 
by not paying their workers on time. However, the worst punishment the 
Procurator’s office actually imposed was a fine of 700 rubles (£15), on a 
company that had been in debt to its workers for six months: the other offenders 
were given a “statement about the removal of the violation of the Russian 
Federation’s employment legislation”. A close reading of the article in fact 
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creates a negative impression of the Procurator’s office, showing it to be 
strangely unwilling to exert the full force of the law in its effort to discourage 
the non-payment of salaries.  
The non-payment of salaries continued: Ulan Ude's municipal 
organisations owed their employees 41.9 million rubles (about £838,000) in 
April 2006, which was 52 per cent of the entire sum of money then owed by 
Buryatia's employers.20 These figures, and the report itself, raise the suspicion 
that Barguzin region’s Procurator’s office works under a strong imperative to 
legitimise its existence in the face of an inefficient legal system. It has adopted a 
legitimisation strategy that shows it to correspond with the ideal of an active 
politician or political organisation, which is keen on ‘systematically informing’ 
the general population, as Sobolev describes. The necessity of publishing an 
article as evidence of Barguzin Procurator’s activity and eagerness to 
communicate, regardless of its content, has apparently taken precedence over 
presenting a carefully written and flattering account of its work. The public 
forms of policy-making and legislation are therefore to some extent determined 
by the motivation to demonstrate the elite’s observance of the morals they 
espouse. 
Throughout the sample the influence of the federal government on 
Buryatia was noticeable. The few major legislative initiatives mentioned in the 
sample were all a response to changes in federal policy. For example, articles in 
the August/September sample discuss the move to make the President and 
Pravitel'stvo Chairman separate positions, which is presented as being in 
accordance with the federal drive to strengthen the power vertical (Buryatia 
                                                 
20 http://new.bol.ru/bol/news/10180.html: “Na stolitsu Buryatii prikhoditsya 52% 
respublikanskoy dolzhnosti po zarplate”; May 20, 2006. 
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September 3, 2004: p. 3). (This will not necessarily change the Republic's power 
hierarchy however, since the President will choose the Pravitel'stvo Chairman.) 
Other articles refer to the problems federal policy is about to cause regional 
administrations – in particular, the transfer of responsibility for social welfare 
payments from the federal budget to regional budgets (Buryatia June 23, 2004: p. 
2). These pieces indicate that the republican government’s capacity to effect 
change is hampered by its submission to the federal government. 
In the absence of stable and effective legislative practices, and a marked 
improvement in Buryatia's economic position, the public representation of 
Buryatia's idealised polity must have an important role in maintaining the 
present power hierarchy. It sets the parameters within which communication 
between citizenry and the government has to occur, in addition to providing a 
version of reality that acts as a consistent resource of strategies for self-
legitimisation. The Pravda Buryatii articles indicate it to be the continuation 
of a resilient Soviet-era practice, and hence another example of the 
incremental transformation of Soviet society Humphrey examines in The 
Unmaking of Soviet Life (Humphrey, 2002). The communities that read these 
newspapers and the newspapers themselves both participate in the public 
representation of the government of Buryatia – whether it be in helping to 
organise public holidays, or presenting reports at official meetings. This 
collective self-legitimisation is directed towards several audiences, from the 





Section 3.2.2: Political practice and daily life   
As we have seen, the commercial newspapers Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa Plyus 
frame their material within a particular emotional engagement with an identified 
target audience. Their representations of the political sphere are constructed 
around their readers' perceived experiences of interacting with state and 
economic organizations. The material presented in this section shows how these 
newspapers’ appeal rests on their capacity to help their readers cope with 
Buryatia’s post-Soviet political and economic circumstances. The newspapers 
provide either helpful information on legislative processes and political events, 
or a way to resolve the negative emotions aroused by contemporary politics, or 
both. Buryatia's political and economic processes, as revealed by Inform Polis’ 
and Pyatnitsa Plyus’ strategies to attract readers, are characterised by the 
authoritarian conceptions of government implied by the ‘dobriy tsar’ paradigm 
described in the previous section, combined with a lack of coherent policies.  
Inform Polis aspires to raise its readers’ mood, at the same time helping 
and encouraging them to adapt to post-Soviet circumstances. Inform Polis never 
attacks the governing system as such: its central message is that the informed 
citizen, willing to make an effort, can make the system work for them. The 
clearest statement of this appears in a repeated narrative genre describing how 
various ordinary people manage to overcome bureaucratic hurdles to attain their 
just demands. Nine of these pieces appeared in a sample of ten editions, 
indicating that Inform Polis regularly publishes these stories. They present 
attractive personal dramas alongside practical advice on how to go about 
achieving certain aims, likely to be of immediate use to Inform Polis’s 
readership. For example, readers are told how to establish their ownership of 
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houses built without the officially recognised permission, or how to install water 
meters (Inform Polis June 9, 2004: p. 6; Inform Polis June 30, 2004: p. 9). The 
judicial and bureaucratic systems come across as faulty, plagued in particular by 
inefficient chinovniki, but capable of delivering justice: again, the system itself 
is never questioned. This representation enables Inform Polis to criticise official 
activity without jeopardising its positive relationship with the political 
establishment.  
Pyatnitsa Plyus takes a proactive line, encouraging readers to engage 
with the state, for example through trade unions. Trade union lawyers contribute 
answers to readers' legal questions, while in the sample studied there was an 
instance of a Pyatnitsa Plyus journalist participating in a trade union court case 
(Pyatnitsa Plyus September 15, 2004: p. 1). Like Inform Polis, Pyatnitsa Plyus 
implies that the legal system is essentially just, despite the damage done by 
unprofessional chinovniki. It thus remains within the boundaries of official 
political discourse, although the level of criticism it directs towards the elites 
precludes the close relationship Inform Polis has developed with the political 
sphere. 
The attraction of Pyatnitsa Plyus is the quality of the relationship it 
offers between journalist and reader. It is a mediator between government and 
the citizenry, a provider of information, and a personal friend. One of its 
subscription advertisements carries the headline, “Friends don’t change over the 
years” (Pyatnitsa Plyus September 1, 2004: p. 1). The two leading journalists 
come across as distinct individuals: many of their articles are based on 
narrations of their personal experience. Reading these pieces is like listening to a 
friend chatting about their difficult day, and since the friend lives in the same 
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circumstances their frustrations are very pertinent to one's own life. The 
following quote is the first paragraph of an article about Ulan Ude’s public bath 
houses:  
 
Last Sunday I went to the bath-house. They had turned off the water, but one wants to keep 
one’s flesh clean. Heating water in pans and shivering in a cold bathroom is somehow 
unappealing. I rang round all the town’s public bath-houses. It turned out that only three 
work. And so one morning I set off for one of them. I, and everyone who had just come into 
my bath section, were on the lookout. No, I wasn’t looking for a tub, like Zoschenkov’s 
character, and I didn’t see how someone ‘stood in one tub, washed their head in another, and 
held on to a third so that others didn’t steal it’. Five people, baring all as nature made them, 
ran their eyes over the washing area, trying to solve the problem: where to settle one’s 
backside. Tummies and legs were everywhere, there wasn’t anywhere to sit. ‘But standing up 
to wash – what kind of washing is that? It’s sinful’, I thought, exactly as Zoschenkov. 
(Pyatnitsa Plyus, June 9, 2004: p. 2.) 
 
These articles afford the reader the satisfaction of feeling that their daily 
irritations can be publicly articulated, while suggesting that they have a helpful 
'friend' and spokesperson in the public sphere.  
The legal dimension of the negotiation between businesses, government 
bodies and individual citizens is well illustrated by the newspaper sample as a 
whole, and by Inform Polis’ descriptions of court cases in particular. Legal 
language and procedures are shown to be one of the mediums through which 
bodies with conflicting interests conduct their struggles. Both laws and 
government policies are operated by means of definitions, which can be used in 
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various ways either to exert control, or to avoid acting against one's interests.21 
For example, Inform Polis covered a hunger strike by former builders of the 
Baikal-Amur Railway, who were campaigning for their village to be officially 
declared closed, so that they would receive housing certificates (zhilischniye 
sertifikaty) enabling them to return to central Russia. The administration of Mui 
region initially refused to give the strikers shelter and medical help, although 
they had spent several days lying in tents outside the administration in sub-zero 
temperatures: the administrators alleged the absence of the word 'hunger strike' 
(golodovka) in the federal legislation on striking and picketing meant that the 
strike was illegal (Inform Polis September 5, 2004: p. 5). The sample of 
Buryatia contained an article designed to ameliorate the damaging effects of 
another public protest, which corroborated Inform Polis’ coverage of the Mui 
hunger strike. The inhabitants of Zagorsk village were demonstrating against the 
handover of their boiler-house to the Buryatenergo energy company, which 
would have left them vulnerable to large heating bill increases (Buryatia 
September 16, 2004: p. 3). Buryatia described the demonstration itself as illegal, 
since it was not officially registered: the lack of registration meant that the 
demonstration lay outside the sphere of officially recognized and hence legal 
activities.  
Every organisation has to have an official legal definition in order to 
exist, while citizens have to go through various bureaucratic procedures in order 
to attain the definitions they need to go about their daily lives. For example, 
Barguzinskaya Pravda reminds Barguzin’s private businessmen that in 
accordance with a federal law passed in 2003 they must re-register themselves at 
                                                 
21An academic friend of mine in Moscow was emphatic in her agreement with this 
suggestion. In particular, she explained the bureaucratic hurdles that she believes have 
been deliberately designed to make the privatisation of housing more difficult. 
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their local tax offices before the end of 2004, or they will lose the official status 
of ‘individual businessman’ (individual’niy predprinimatel’) which allows them 
legally to conduct their business (Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 10, 2004: p. 2). 
Businesses and government organizations have an advantage over individuals, 
since they have legally established rights and responsibilities by virtue of having 
attained the official definition that ensures their existence. Federal and to a 
lesser extent republican legislative assemblies gain much of their power from 
this reliance on definition and procedure, since their role is to set the terms. 
Inform Polis' stories show how the government’s control over legal definitions 
combines with the conflicting interests of various elite groups to create a 
situation where citizens are supplicants, even when trying to obtain what they 
are legally entitled to. Citizens have to spend large amounts of time and energy 
maintaining their positions with regard to the state's legal obligations, such as 
the payment of pensions. For example, one Inform Polis article describes how 
an elderly couple managed to legalise their ownership of their Soviet-built house 
(dacha) after four years (Inform Polis June 9, 2004: p. 6). During this time they 
were without the registered address (podpiska) required to secure various state 
services, such as medical treatment and pension payments. According to the 
article, legalising property ownership involves getting one kind of permission or 
another from five different organisations. 
Not surprisingly, Pyatnitsa Plyus devotes large amounts of space to 
providing advice on bureaucratic and legal processes, in either its articles or the 
section Pyatnitsa – Konsul'tant. This section presents readers' questions next to 
answers provided by the relevant lawyers or officials. The questions asked show 
the extent to which citizens' lives are affected by complex and unfamiliar 
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bureaucratic practices – while the answers themselves exhibit these processes. 
The following quote is an example:  
 
Headline: A soldier’s place of residence is kept, but not the subsidy.  
 
Question: Last year my grandson was conscripted, and since then they’ve started to take 
money from my daughter because of her superfluous living space. In fact my grandson isn’t 
discharged, he’s honourably doing his duty to his Motherland, but why should they take 
payment for superfluous living space? Or do they do that to everyone who has a son serving 
in the army? … 
 
Answer: The Vice-Minister of building, architecture and housing and communal services of 
the Republic of Buryatia Vladimir Kirillovich Badashkeyev answers:  
The place of residence is kept for your grandson from the time of his exit to the army. But 
since you get a subsidy, which is granted according to the social norm of the general space of 
accommodation, in this case it has to be counted according to the social norm for two people, 
which is in your case 42 square metres instead of 54 square metres. (Pyatnitsa Plyus June 23, 
2004: p. 2.) 
 
Inform Polis published a list of Buryatia’s most powerful people, based 
on federation-wide research done by the Institute for Situational Analysis and 
New Technology, which showed that the Republic’s political and economic 
elites overlap to the extent that they form a single group of powerful individuals 
(Inform Polis June 9, 2004: p. 5). Inform Polis’ stories about the Republic’s 
business organisations in relation to the government reveal the state's lack of 
control over its economy – as might be expected in a situation where politicians 
and businessmen have overlapping interests, which are subject to interference 
from powerful actors outside the Republic.  
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An extremely important item in the news agenda of both Inform Polis 
and Pyatnitsa Plyus was Ulan Ude's 2004 summer energy crisis. At the end of 
May the energy company Buryatenergo ceased supplying hot water and 
electricity to various parts of Ulan Ude, in order to force the municipal company 
(Munitsipal'noye Unitarnoye Predpriyatiye, or MUP) in charge of collecting 
electricity payment to discharge a longstanding debt (Inform Polis September 1, 
2004: p. 4). The municipal administration of Ulan Ude responded in June by 
leasing the town's energy network to the Moscow-based company 
Mezhregional'niy Energeticheskiy Soyuz, or MES, which as part of the deal was 
to take over the management of electricity payment. MES did nothing about the 
debt, apart from suggesting that the MUPs file for bankruptcy to avoid paying it, 
and its contract was dissolved after six weeks. MES’ inability or unwillingness 
to cope with the problem it had taken on could have been predicted from the 
start: according to Inform Polis, Ulan Ude’s Mayor agreed to MES’ proposal 
even though it did not provide clear information about its financial backers. The 
Mayor’s lack of rigour raises the suspicion that MES had made a previous 
arrangement with Ulan Ude’s municipality – although Inform Polis does not 
refer directly to this possibility – in a collaboration between Moscow-based 
private businessmen and republican public officials.  
The Mayor refused to give Buryatenergo control over Ulan Ude's MUPs, 
until President Potapov intervened at the end of August. The Mayor’s reluctance 
to divest himself of this problem again raises suspicions: he could perhaps have 
been hoping to make another profitable leasing arrangement with a private 
company. Ulan Ude's MUPs were eventually leased to Buryatenergo. 
Buryatenergo meanwhile agreed to be put under the control of the federal 
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energy monopoly YeES Rossii, in return for its restructuring of the debt 
payments. This would give Buryatenergo direct control over the handling of 
revenues received from the public, effectively privatising what had been a state 
activity under the aegis of a powerful federal energy organization (Inform Polis 
September 1, 2004: p. 4).  
Meanwhile, large parts of Ulan Ude were without hot water and 
sometimes electricity for most of the summer. It is impossible to understand 
from the newspapers why the MUPs were unable to pay their debts. Inform 
Polis emphasises the plight of citizens who had regularly paid for the electricity 
they weren't getting, while an article in Buryatia implies that the problem may 
stem from citizens who do not pay their bills on time (Inform Polis September 8, 
2004: p. 9; Buryatia August 31, 2004: p. 4 ). Humphrey has noted a persistent 
unwillingness on the part of the population to pay for their utilities – 
whether due to poverty, or a Soviet-era understanding that the state should 
provide them (Humphrey, 2007: p. 197). Another Inform Polis article on a 
legal case involving the MUPs mentions in passing that Ulan Ude’s MUPs did 
not know how many homes they were supplying, since an inventory had not 
been carried out for several years (Inform Polis September 15, 2004: p. 6). 
Inform Polis does not refer to the possibility of corruption in relation to this 
chain of events, describing it in neutral language, largely through statements 
made by the actors involved. It is framed by all the newspapers as a crisis 
occurring within and resolved by conventional interactions between businesses 
and government. 
This chain of events implies federal private and state organisations to 
add another invasive layer of interests to those of Buryatia’s elites. Although 
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Inform Polis does not overtly attack federal policies or businesses, federal actors 
can be shown to have a negative effect on the Republic, a view supported by 
comments received during fieldwork. For example, a small news piece states 
that Buryatia is due to receive a subsidy of 30 million rubles from the federal 
government, while the neighbouring Irkutsk Oblast' will receive 60 million 
rubles – even though Irkutsk Oblast' has had much more industrial development 
than Buryatia. Irkutsk Oblast's power stations provide the electricity that 
Buryatia has to buy, since it lacks adequate power facilities of its own (Inform 
Polis, 25 August, 2004; p. 4). Both the academics and journalists I spoke to 
in Irkutsk described this arrangement as a major source of resentment in 
Buryatia: the Republic has to pay high electricity tariffs to an already rich 
and powerful neighbour.   
 
Conclusion:  
The Republic of Buryatia’s newspapers indicate that the republican 
government’s capacity to govern its territory effectively is limited. As Buryatia 
and Barguzinskaya Pravda show, the republican government tries to 
compensate through a combination of mass media coverage and public events, 
which allows politicians and government officials to act out the idealised roles 
and personalities they claim to embody.  
The federal government appears to be taking advantage of the republican 
government’s weak position. Potapov was replaced in 2007 by the Russian 
Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn, who spent most of his career in Tomsk Region 
(Oblast’), and therefore does not have the personal ties with Buryatia or its 
citizens that might encourage him to sympathise with regionalist or Buryat 
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nationalist aspirations. The instatement of a pro-federal President could be a 
precursor to the disappearance of Buryatia itself, into a giant administrative 
region around Lake Baikal. Russians and Buryats in both Irkutsk and Ulan Ude 
spoke about this reorganisation, a prospect which the Buryat in particular dislike 






























The contemporary versions of the Soviet-era notions of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic 
culture’ appearing in the Republic of Buryatia’s newspaper samples are 
quantified and interpreted in this chapter, in order to draw out their meaning and 
significance for the Republic’s Buryat population and politicians. The first 
section presents the quantitative stage of this analysis, exploring the occurrence 
and influence of the ideas connected to ethnicity, Buryat ethnic identity and 
culture in the four newspapers subjected to content analysis (Buryatia, 
Barguzinskaya Pravda, Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa Plyus). The second section 
discusses the role that the Buryat nationalist articles in Buryatia play in the 
republican government’s self-legitimisation, while the third section presents the 
evidence from Barguzinskaya Pravda and Inform Polis to show that a distinct 
Buryat culture continues to develop in both urban and rural settings. This section 
ends with a discussion of the interrelationship between contemporary Buryat 
cultural development and the political communication narratives described in 





Section 4.1: The significance of popular Buryat ethnicity 
The current understanding of ethnicity, nationality and statehood in the Russian 
Federation bears a Soviet influence: the task of this investigation is to identify 
and analyse contemporary versions of the Soviet-era notions associated with 
ethnic culture. In the Soviet Union the general term ‘ethnic culture’ referred to 
the culture associated with the various ethnic groups living on its territory. 
‘Ethnic groups’ consisted of individuals who identified themselves with a 
particular pre-Soviet cultural tradition, such as the Buryat or Sakha. An ethnic 
identity was understood to be distinct from the various other identities an 
individual could hold, such as civic identity. As the initial reading of the 
newspapers showed, references to ‘ethnicity’ as an abstract concept are common 
in the Russian Federation, particularly in academic or high quality journalistic 
discourse.  
The codes used to mark references to notions of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic 
culture’ were determined by the variation between the commercial and 
government-sponsored newspapers in both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), clear 
even at the first reading. The government newspaper articles consistently 
referred to abstracted concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic culture’, which did not 
appear as distinctly in the commercial newspapers. ‘Ethnicity’ was used in the 
government newspapers to mark references to what the newspapers themselves 
would designate as ‘ethnic’ culture, while the code ‘Super Ethnicity’ was used 
for this purpose in the commercial newspapers. The codes ‘Buryat Cultural 
Practice’ and ‘Russian Cultural Practice’ were used for all the newspapers, to 
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mark instances of and references to specifically Russian or Buryat cultural 
practice. 
‘Super Ethnicity’ was attached to articles that did not necessarily 
concern the concept of ethnic culture, but which nevertheless referred to cultural 
phenomena regarded in Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) as ‘ethnic’. The clearest 
example can be found in the commercial newspaper Yakutsk Vecherniy’s 
satirical illustrations of Sakha (Yakutia)’s constitution, which, as the example 
printed in Figure 4.1 on the opposite side of this page shows, used a small group 
of individuals, each with a set of specifically ethnic characteristics, to represent 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s general population (Yakutsk Vecherniy, September 3, 2004: p. 
14). The hooded reindeer-skin suit and skis are associated with traditional Eveny 
and Evenky reindeer-herding cultures, while the dagger and bushy moustache 
are regarded as traditional to Caucasian ethnic cultures; the other figures’ 
attributes also connect them to a specific ethnic group. As this chapter will show, 
the quantitative and qualitative analyses brought out and explained the 
difference in emphasis between government and commercial newspapers, 
revealing the relationship between the government and commercial discourses.  
Table 4.1 shows the percentage of headlines given the codes ‘Ethnicity’, 
‘Super Ethnicity’, or ‘Buryat Cultural Practice’, in all four newspapers. It also 
shows the number of articles these percentages refer to, and hence the number of 
times a regular reader would have encountered a reference to these themes over 
the sample periods. For example, a Buryatia reader would have come across an 




Newspaper: Ethnicity  






only, N = 371) 
 
9.7 (36) n/a 8.4 (31) 3.5 (13) 
Barguzinskaya 
Pravda 
(N = 218) 
0.5 (1)  n/a 6.0 (13) 3.7 (8) 
Inform Polis      
(N = 298) 
 
n/a 5.4 (16) 6.0 (18) 3.7 (11) 
Pyatnitsa 
Plyus (N = 75) 
 
n/a 3.0 (2) 0 (0) 5.3 (4) 
 
Table 4.1: Percentages of articles marked with codes related to ethnic 
culture (the figures in brackets are the number of articles to which the 
codes were attached; N = the number of articles in the sample; n/a = not 
applicable) 
 
As Table 4.1 shows, the republican government newspaper Buryatia contains 
the largest number of references to 'Buryat Cultural Practice' and 'Ethnicity' (31 
and 36, or 8.4 and 9.7 per cent of the sampled material). Buryatia’s references to 
ethnicity concerned a specific notion that took its clearest form in Buryatia’s 
high quality articles on history, culture, religion and distinguished members of 
the intelligentsia. 17 of these were published over the month of June, as the 
pleasurable 'cultural creativity' (kul'turnoye tvorchestvo) pieces described in 
Chapter Three. They display a self-conscious concern with what they demarcate 
as 'ethnic' themes, by referring either to a recognisable ethnic group (principally 
Russian, Buryat or Evenk), or to 'ethnicity' as an abstract concept.   
Presenting ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic culture’ as abstract concepts makes it 
easier for Buryatia to demonstrate an even-handed approach to Buryatia’s 
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various peoples, since it allows Buryatia to represent different cultures as 
manifestations of a generalised abstract phenomenon. Buryatia’s use of this 
concept enabled it to balance articles on 'Russian' ethnic culture with 'Buryat' 
pieces, which mirrored the style and content of the ‘Russian’ articles. For 
example, a series of celebratory features about a visit to Poland was published 
with an equivalent series on the Republic of Kalmykia, another Siberian non-
Russian Republic. Like the Buryat the Kalmyk have a Buddhist tradition, and 
are regarded as being of Mongolian descent; they and the Buryat are seen to be 
part of the ‘Mongol’ family of peoples, in the same way that Russians and Poles 
are Slavic. Thus, the Russian and Buryat populations of Buryatia are given an 
equal opportunity to celebrate their ‘brother’ peoples, taken as equivalent ‘ethnic 
groups’. The high proportion of articles marked ‘ethnicity’ in Buryatia could 
therefore reflect an attempt to foster a pan-ethnic loyalty to the republican state.   
Buryatia made more references to ‘Buryat Cultural Practice’ than 
‘Russian Cultural Practice’ (31, as opposed to 13, or 8.4 and 3.5 per cent of the 
sample). This variation is likely to have been affected by the particular events 
taking place in June: Buryatia’s Buddhist church organised several occasions, 
and the traditional Buryat Surkharban sports tournament took place on June 12 
(Buryatia, June 17, 2004: p. 1). In addition, the discourse analysis showed that 
Buryatia’s large number of references to ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘Buryat Cultural 
Practice’ arises in part from the importance Buryat nationalist discourse has in 
the republican government’s political communication strategies, as the 
following section describes. However, the importance of celebrating Russian as 
well as Buryat culture is shown by the August and September sample, which 
contains a larger number of references to Russian cultural practice: Buryatia 
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devoted much space to the head of the Old Believer Church’s visit to the 
Republic, among other subjects connected to the Russian Orthodox Church.  
The sub-regional government newspaper Barguzinskaya Pravda also 
showed awareness of a need to give equal attention to each ethnic group. For 
example, a winning Buryat ‘My Family’ essay was published next to a reader’s 
letter about her Russian grandmother (Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 17, 2004; p. 
5). However in contrast to Buryatia, Barguzinskaya Pravda contained only one 
reference to ethnicity – although Buryat or Russian cultural practice occurred in 
the same proportion of articles as Inform Polis (6.0 and 3.7 percent respectively). 
‘Ethnicity’ was attached to the coverage of a republican government-sponsored 
conference on the restoration of cultural monuments, whose delegates visited 
Barguzin region to see Lake Baikal; it belongs to the category of the republican-
level public ceremonial occasions discussed in Chapter Three (Barguzinskaya 
Pravda, June 10, 2004: p. 4). The articles mentioning Russian and Buryat 
‘cultural practice’ were either descriptions of holidays that involved Buryat or 
Russian folk culture as part of the celebration, or were themselves 
unselfconscious manifestations of a Russian or Buryat cultural mindset. The 
discourse analysis revealed that the articles marked 'Buryat Cultural Practice' in 
Barguzinskaya Pravda indicate the presence of a distinct Buryat mindset in 
Barguzin region – despite the homogenisation occurring over the twentieth 
century – as Section 3.1 of this chapter will describe. The meaning of ethnicity 
in Barguzinskaya Pravda’s discursive space refers to observable differences in 
belief between the sub-region’s ethnic groups, rather than to issues involving 
politics or personal identification.  
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Ethnicity has a different relevance for each of the commercial 
newspapers, all of which contrast with Barguzinskaya Pravda. Pyatnitsa Plyus 
is striking in that it contains no references to Buryat cultural practices, although 
5.3 percent of its articles mention Russian cultural practice, as Table 4.1 shows. 
This is unsurprising, since it was described as a ‘Russian newspaper’, produced 
by Russians for a largely Russian audience, by a Buryat friend who had been 
offered the job of ‘Buryat expert’ at another popular ‘Russian’ newspaper, 
Nomer Odin. (Nomer Odin’s Russian journalists had wanted to ensure that they 
did not completely ignore a Buryat audience.) Similarly, the proportions of 
Inform Polis articles marked as ‘Buryat’ or ‘Russian’ cultural practice (6.0 per 
cent and 3.7 per cent respectively, in Table 4.1) indicate that Inform Polis is a 
‘Buryat’ newspaper which is also unwilling to exclude a Russian audience.  
The Russian emphasis in Pyatnitsa Plyus can be seen in its exclusive 
coverage of Orthodox or Old Believer events. It reported a visit of the leader of 
the Old Believer Church to Ulan Ude, but not the anniversary of Catherine the 
Great’s acceptance of the Buddhist church in Russia, unlike Buryatia and Inform 
Polis. Meanwhile, some of the Inform Polis pieces on Buddhism are 
communications made on behalf of Buryatia's Buddhist organisations, rather 
than reports of their activities, as are its articles on the Orthodox Church. For 
example, Inform Polis published the Khambo Lama's official invitation for the 
participants of a Buddhist festival involving traditional Buryat sports, followed 
two weeks later by a Buddhist text in Buryat in honour of the occasion, and 
finally by a feature covering the festival itself (Inform Polis, August 25, 2004: p. 
3; September 8, 2004: p. 13; September 22, 2004: p. 11). This suggests that 
Inform Polis has a specific arrangement to publicise the Buddhist church. The 
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way these newspapers' handling of religion falls along ethnic lines is striking 
confirmation of their sensitivity to issues of ethnic balance. The Buryat 
orientation of Inform Polis can also be seen in the unusually high proportion of 
Buryats who appear in its narratives. The extent to which Inform Polis presents 
Buryats as the ordinary population, rather than as a distinct ethnic group, is 
illustrated by the Buryat appearance of the generalised person in a feature 
showing the various illnesses and dangers that can occur during Buryatia's 
summer, shown in Figure 4.2 on the opposite page (Inform Polis, June 25, 2004: 
p. 14).  
Inform Polis is sold as a high-quality commercial newspaper, which 
would want to avoid alienating potential readers, and at the same time 
compromising its reputation and relationship with the political elites by 
becoming involved in arguments. Like Buryatia, Inform Polis balances pieces 
on Buryat tradition with 'Russian' articles, although the sample contained almost 
twice as many articles marked 'Buryat Cultural Practice' as 'Russian Cultural 
Practice', as Table 4.1 shows. Eight out of the 18 'Buryat Cultural Practice' 
articles in Inform Polis were news stories involving Buryat culture, history or 
tradition. For example, one article describes the discovery that the American 
actress Uma Thurman is descended from the Buryat lama Agvan Dorzhiyev 
(Inform Polis, June 30, 2004: p. 5). Two 'Buryat Cultural Practice' features were 
on themes that did not directly concern Buryat cultural practice, such as the 
obituary of a Buryat teacher who was killed in the Beslan siege. Seven out of the 
11 'Russian cultural practice' pieces were similar news stories, while the rest of 
both Buryat and Russian 'Cultural Practice' articles were page-long features 
involving aspects of Russian or Buryat culture, such as the Orthodox or 
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Buddhist religions. These figures show that both Russian and Buryat cultural 
phenomena have a consistent place within Inform Polis' news agenda. (In fact, 
an Inform Polis journalist I interviewed in 2009 confirmed that the editorial 
team try to include at least one article on ethnic culture per issue.) However, 
the greater number of 'Buryat' feature articles (eight, as opposed to four out of a 
sample of 10 newspapers) indicates that Inform Polis' journalists have, or 
perceive their audience to have, a deeper interest in Buryat culture.  
The existence of ‘Russian’ and ‘Buryat’ newspapers reveals a perception 
among journalists that two ethnic audiences exist in Buryatia. The commercial 
newspapers behave on the assumption that these two audiences are distinct 
enough to require adaptation in the newspapers they buy, although they may 
have overlapping interests and characteristics in most areas. The government 
newspapers Buryatia and Barguzinskaya Pravda also tailor their content to 
accommodate Buryat and Russian affiliations, displaying a similar concern for 
ethnic identity on the part of the republican government. 
 
 
Section 4.2: Buryat nationalist ideology and government legitimisation  
However, Buryatia’s June sample contained no fewer than 12 articles that 
expressed ideas closely related to Buryat nationalist ideology. For example, 
Buryatia published an article on the American Mongolianist Robert Rupen's 
visit, despite the unwillingness of many other republican mass media organs to 
cover it. Members of the Association of Young Academics told me that they had 
experienced an “information blockade”, when they had tried to publicise 
Rupen's arrival, although they did manage to organise a live interview on a 
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republican television channel. Rupen took this opportunity to criticise the 
federal government over its move to merge the Buryat Ust-Ordynsk 
Autonomous Okrug with Irkutsk Oblast. He thus potentially put President 
Potapov's government in an awkward position with regard to the federal 
government, for having allowed public criticism of a controversial federal policy. 
The Buryat author of Buryatia's article not only quoted the negative comments 
Rupen made about the federal government, but also extended and praised them, 
expressing some of the most direct criticism of the federal and republican 
governments encountered in Buryatia during this study:  
 
The fact that certain Russian state [Rossiyskiye] politicians are absolutely indifferent to the 
general state of the Buryat people in contemporary Russia is demonstrated by the attempt to 
abolish the Ust-Ordynsk Buryat autonomous territory. 
The resolving of national problems lies in the area of the development of national 
cultures; they understood that in the 1990s, when they started to create laws in the national 
republics directed towards the defence of national cultures. For the Buryat people it was also 
important to build up a general programme for the development of national culture in the 
Republic and territories. However, the absence of a policy on nationalities, and a fear of the 
politicization of inter-ethnic [mezhnatsional’nykh] relationships in Russia lead to the 
substitution of laws on national cultures for featureless laws on the norms of cultural 
preservation, and the regulation of cultural institutions’ activities. (Buryatia, June 12, 2004: p. 
4) 
 
Inform Polis, the only other newspaper in the sample to cover Rupen's visit, 
instead concentrated not on what Rupen said but on his encounter with the 
Buryat academics Garmazhap Sanzhiyev and Bimba Tsibikov. It went no further 
than a brief mention of Rupen's television interview, where "he answered many 
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questions, most of which related to the forthcoming enlargement of the regions 
and the liquidation of autonomy" (Inform Polis, June 2, 2004: p. 6.).  
Buryatia’s Buryat nationalist ideology appeared more often within 
celebrations of Buryat culture or personalities than as direct demands. The 
Buryat nationalist arguments of the late 1980s were conditioned by ideas 
promoted during the Soviet period. Chapter One explained how a hierarchical 
conception of the Soviet Union's ethnic makeup was promoted after the Second 
World War, according to which some ethnic cultures (principally Russian or 
European) were regarded as more 'civilised' than others. Post-Soviet Buryat 
nationalist claims revolve around the contention that the Buryat have a highly 
developed cultural and spiritual tradition which the Soviets tried to stifle. The 
Buryat nationalist revival began with public celebrations of Buryat culture, 
which challenged the official Soviet preference for Russian culture (Stroganova, 
2001; Khamutayev, 2005). The Buryat people’s Buddhist heritage is regarded 
by nationalists to be an especially valuable aspect of their culture, since it allows 
Buryats to claim participation in a widely recognised international cultural 
tradition, as does the Buryat's status as a 'Mongol' people. Buddhist and 
Mongolian history and culture are thus prominent themes in Buryatia's 
nationalist articles. 
Since the activities of Buryat nationalists have been confined by the 
present republican administration to the cultural rather than the political domain, 
a carefully nuanced public celebration of Buryat religion and culture can still be 
understood as a nationalist statement.22 The following paragraphs illustrate the 
                                                 
22 As Elena Stroganova and Vladimir Khamutayev describe, President Potapov and his 
supporters stood against the Buryat nationalist candidate Vladimir Saganov in the Republic of 
Buryatia’s first presidential election (Stroganova, 2001; Khamutayev, 2005). President 
Potapov’s administration has discouraged the political objectives of Buryat nationalists, in order 
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muted nationalist arguments that result; they are from an article celebrating the 
Buryat composer Yuriy Irdyneyev:  
 
In 1991 the ballet “Face of the Goddess” became the laureate for the State Prize of the 
Republic of Buryatia in the literature and art section. By means of this work, the composer 
wanted to say that the Mongols, like any other people, have a right to their own fate, on their 
particular psychological, physical and everyday way of being.  
A true nationalism, a pride in one’s people, in tandem with the feeling of pain and 
shame at the fall of collective initiative [passionarnost’, a term coined by Lev Nikolayevich 
Gumilev to mean ‘the capacity and the urge to break the aggregate setting of the 
surroundings’] was equated by the great thinkers of the past with a spiritual fire, burning to 
ashes within. One can say that in the contemporary omnipresent vulgarity Yuriy 
Irdyneyevich is trying to warm himself with the heat from that fire. With his works he tries 
to reach the heart of the unsophisticated Buryat, and, searching out the place of his people 
among the ranks of others, turns to his people’s past, its deep and distinctive logic, to 
genuine heroes. For it gives a real account, in the sense that, under the conditions of 
increasing globalisation, only the nations that retain their individual uniqueness in the face of 
history can survive. (Buryatia, June 10, 2004: p. 5) 
 
The consistency with which Buryat authors from the same academic 
background, some of whom participated in the post-Soviet Buryat revival, make 
recognisably nationalist statements indicates that the Buryat nationalist 
movement still has significance within Buryatia's discursive space. Buryatia’s 
other republican-level government-sponsored newspaper, Buryaad Unen, is 
published in Buryat, and has an extremely small readership – in part because 
few Buryats can read literary Buryat easily, although they may be fluent in their 
                                                                                                                                   
to maintain a good relationship with the federal government: Buryatia’s economy depends on 
federal subsidies (Stroganova, 2001; Khamutayev, 2005). 
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regional dialect. Translations of Buryaad Unen’s headlines, together with its 
Russian articles, indicate that many of its articles are either translations of 
Buryatia's nationalist pieces on Buryat culture and history, or are based on the 
same paradigms. In addition, major political figures are reported to have 
attended or sponsored occasions that promote Buryat culture. For example, 
President Potapov himself has helped the Agvan Dorzhiyev memorial fund, 
which is devoted to preserving the memory of a leading Buryat Buddhist lama 
killed by the Soviets during the 1930s (Buryatia, August 25, 2004: p. 4: 
Tubchinov, 2003: p. 29). These differing forms of official public patronage 
indicate that Buryat nationalist intellectuals are being allowed to continue their 
activities as part of the political establishment, despite the risk of this tolerance 
causing strains in the Potapov administration’s relationship with the federal 
government.  
There are likely to be several reasons for this apparent contradiction. 
Firstly, both politicians and businessmen regard the Republic's Buryat heritage 
to be a potential draw for tourists, as several friends mentioned. The spread of 
this conviction is also demonstrated by the stalls selling Mongolian 
souvenirs that line Ulan Ude’s main street, and the elaborate shows of 
traditional Buryat song and dance put on by the Opera Theatre. Then there 
are historical reasons. Buryat ethnic nationalism arose out of the same cultural 
context as the present political elite. Many of the actors involved in both would 
have known each other personally. Nationalist-democratic concepts must still 
have a relevance to Buryatia’s self-legitimisation as an independently existing 
state, since it was created as the result of a nationalist-democratic initiative. It is 
therefore important that the government is seen to support both the continued 
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Buryat cultural revival, and ethnic cultural expression in general, in contrast to 
the repressive Soviet government. Finally, the republican government may take 
the view that allowing the Buryat nationalists to continue their activities 
channels nationalist discourse, decreasing the likelihood of new and unfamiliar 
nationalist movements developing. However, none of these factors is sufficient 
to explain the startling extent to which the republican government allows 
Buryatia to express Buryat nationalist views that are in effect a form of dissent.  
Buryatia's Buryat nationalist articles have sufficiently distinct 
characteristics to stand out as a separate strand of discourse within the 
newspaper. However, they also repeat or adapt ideas that occur consistently 
throughout the rest of the newspaper, particularly in the articles connected to 
ethnicity. Both the non-nationalist and nationalist articles in Buryatia on 
traditional culture are based on the conception of ethnicity adapted from the 
Soviet Union, described at the beginning of this chapter. The subjects of 
Buryatia's formulation of ethnicity are the ‘ethnic groups’, principally Russian 
and Buryat, and their cultural and historical traits. Buryatia’s articles celebrate 
the culture, history and intellectuals of the Buryat and Russian ‘people’ (narod) 
in the abstract, as is illustrated when these pieces are compared with the 
commercial newspapers’ treatment of ethnic culture.  
In the commercial newspapers, the narratives on ‘ethnicity’, ‘Buryat 
culture’ or ‘Russian culture’ concern primarily the experience of the narod’s 
individual members. The articles in Inform Polis are characterised by simple 
language and are clearly not intended to be literary creations in themselves. The 
themes and subjects are more sharply drawn than in Buryatia’s features, and 
there are more direct quotations from the individuals these articles concern 
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alongside a greater variety of character and event. This difference in focus is 
illustrated in the comparison of two articles on the Buryat Khambo lama Agvan 
Dorzhiyev, appearing in Buryatia and Inform Polis.23 The headlines and 
introductory paragraphs are presented in Textbox 4.1.  
 
Buryatia Inform Polis 
Headline: Agvan Dorzhiyev – the 
founder and maintainer of a great 
tradition 
Headline; sub-headline: The secret 
letters of the eighth Dalai-lama; His 
personal correspondence with Agvan 
Dorzhiyev has been found. The ruler 
of Tibet prepared to ask for asylum in 
Soviet Russia 
Our newspaper has already informed on 
the ceremonies for the 150th anniversary 
of Agvan Dorzhiyev’s birthday, in the 
villages of Khara-Shibir’ and Atsagat in 
Zaigrayevskiy region.  
         Now, when the jubilee commotion 
has quieted, one wants to cast a glance at 
the personality of this man from the 
position of the present day: what shoots 
sprout from the tradition he has left; the 
lessons he has bequeathed. (Buryatia, 
August 25, 2004: p. 4.) 
A unique discovery was made in 
Buryatia’s History Museum during the 
planned processing of archived 
documents – the personal 
correspondence of the eighth Dalai-
Lama with his representative in Soviet 
Russia, Agvan Dorzhiyev (Inform 
Polis September 1, 2004: p. 11.) 
 
                                                 
23 The word ‘Khambo’ refers to a high position in the Buddhist hierarchy of lamas, or Buddhist 
monks. 
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Textbox 4.1. The headlines and introductory paragraphs of two articles 
published in Buryatia and Inform Polis on Agvan Dorzhiyev 
 
The Inform Polis article describes and celebrates how a museum worker 
found the letters, Dorzhiyev’s experiences at the Dalai-Lama’s palace in Tibet, 
his great contribution to world history, and his close relationship with the Dalai-
Lama. It offers the reader personal information about a great historical figure, an 
exciting human interest story about an unexpected discovery, and it provides an 
opportunity for Inform Polis' Buryat readership to take pride in the talents and 
personality of a fellow Buryat. The Buryatia article treats the subject in a more 
general way, going on to celebrate Dorzhiyev and his colleagues' achievements, 
describe the occasion, and to argue for more resources to be devoted to 
celebrating his memory. 
In Buryatia ethnicity is usually mentioned in connection with past 
tradition: 28 out of the 36 articles marked ‘ethnicity’ also carried the code 
‘history or tradition’. Buryatia's article celebrates Dorzhiyev and his fellow 
intellectuals as the upholders of the great Buryat Buddhist tradition rather than 
as the personalities described by Inform Polis. In Buryatia these figures, and by 
implication also the nationalists devoted to maintaining their memory, have 
succeeded in conserving this Buryat tradition, despite the Soviet repression. 
Buryatia ends by celebrating his legacy:  
 
Agvan Dorzhiyev was at one and the same time the founder and maintainer of a great 
tradition. We are obliged to his exploits, along with the efforts of other outstanding actors, 
for the continued existence, true, not without significant losses, of this inheritance to the 
present day. We, the inhabitants of contemporary Buryatia, independent of our ethnic groups, 
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but the Buryat in particular, must remember which traditions we inherit, and the owners of 
which incalculable riches, spiritual above all, we are, and must be proud of this. This, from 
our point of view, is the most important lesson of the Tsanid-Khambo [Dorzhiyev] to us, who 
now live. [Buryatia’s italics.] (Buryatia, August 25, 2004: p. 4.)  
 
However, the different ethnic cultures, traditions and religions themselves are 
not discussed in great detail. The differences between them are thus reduced to 
differences in traditional practice, rather than in values or mindset. The 
following quotation from the Buryat nationalist article on Agvan Dorzhiyev 
illustrates this tendency:  
 
Using the lively activities of A. Dorzhiyev as an example, Zhalsan Batuyevich [Sanzhiyev, 
the director of the Buryat National Lycée no. 1] appealed for the culture of our birth to be 
preserved and valued, for Buryat language to be developed, and most importantly, to love 
and speak it. As if answering this call, the elderly inhabitant of Zaigrayev Tsyrendulma 
Namsarayeva sang a song about the treasures of human birth, the temporality and emptiness 
of the Universe, put together, as the story has it, by Agvan Dorzhiyev. She read Dambayev’s 
verses on the imperishable body of Khambo Etigelo [a Buryat Khambo Lama] in Buryat, and 
“The Preserver Lkhamo” by Dugarov in Russian, in which occurs these lines: “And battle 
won’t save the world, but the battle of calming prayers.” Talents like those of Tsyrendulma 
Sanditovna’s … would turn a tourist’s presence into an unforgettable occasion… (Buryatia, 
August 25, 2004: p. 4.)  
 
The Buddhist religious values expressed in Tsyrendulma Namsarayeva's 
performance are not being celebrated for their own sake: the author would not 
be expressing such concern about the need to preserve Buryat culture and 
language if they were committed to transcending the empty temporal Universe. 
Instead, Namsarayeva and Dorzhiyev's spiritual and artistic talents are being 
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used to argue for the preservation of Buryat culture, itself represented as a 
treasury of spiritual and cultural knowledge developed by past generations.  
The association made by Buryatia’s Dorzhiyev article between 
abstracted spiritual values and Buryat cultural tradition exemplifies one of 
Buryatia’s typical narrative elements, based around a notion of a transcending, 
universal spiritual dimension, the knowledge of which lies in past ‘ethnic’ 
tradition. The articles marked 'ethnicity', along with the other 'cultural creativity' 
pieces, imply that history, culture, religion and tradition have an intrinsic value. 
The artists, musicians, academics, religious actors, writers, ethnic groups and 
journalists who appear in these articles are implied to have a particular access to 
this transcendent spiritual dimension, linked to their artistic or intellectual talent, 
and their personal commitment to morality, spirituality and ‘ethnic’ cultural 
tradition. The introductory paragraph from the article about Yuriy Irdyneyev 
illustrates this connection between culture, religion, ethnicity and universal 
value:  
 
Composer and spiritual figure – how closely do these understandings stand together? Each 
using their own means, the one and the other call to the inner world of the person, working 
on the delicate resonators of the soul. … 
 The composer, honoured worker of the arts of the Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Buryatia, winner of the Republic of Buryatia’s state prize Yuriy (Tsybikzhap) Irdyneyev 
has perfect social pitch perception, and instinctively reacts to the breathing of the times. To 
him fell the lucky possibility of feeding off the unclouded streams of folk memory, which are 
still preserved in the precious corners of the Buryat hinterland. These truly priceless 
treasuries of human knowledge, which contain the experience and wisdom of centuries, 
became the guiding star of his life, being the source of serious thought about the past and 
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present of his people, and the themes and ideas for his creativity. (Buryatia, June 10, 2004: p. 
5.) 
 
Both individuals, such as Yuriy Irdyneyev, and ethnic groups are celebrated for 
having maintained their connection with their ethnic cultures. Mongols for 
example are praised through a description of their traditional summer festival, 
Bayar Naadam, the only event in the world to "compress past, present and 
future into one whole" (Buryatia, June 25, 2004: p. 21). 
The exact nature of Buryatia’s universal spiritual value is not clear. It 
remains implicit, as an evocation of both the universally moral, powerful and 
good that has somehow been lost or hidden, and the striving of humanity 
towards it. It can appear as an uncorrupted life force from the primordial past, or 
from the wild landscape – as the following quotation, from a series describing a 
visit to Mongolia, shows:   
 
The Mongolian steppes and hills are that special, still untouched by grasping human action. 
From them blows an undisclosed mystery. They breathe an inexplicable energy. This energy, 
this power lifts huge golden eagles into the heavenly heights, the size of whose wings can 
exceed two metres.  
And that feeling somehow brought my high understanding of power, of God, to Earth, 
closer to the person. Yes, powers change, even gods come and go, but the yearning of the 
soul towards the beautiful, the mysterious, the good remains throughout the ages, making 
one pass manfully through misfortune and sorrow...  (Buryatia, June 25, 2004: p. 21) 
 
The previous two quotations also illustrate the idealised personality that appears 
in tandem with the references to universal value. This personality's defining 
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characteristics seem to contradict the negative qualities of everyday politics: the 
articles' subjects and writers are presented as emotional, moral and sensitive, 
while their commitment to their quest for universal good overrides any personal 
interests. These articles in fact help to delineate the idealised status quo, which 
Buryatia represents as reality.  
The universal good of the 'cultural creativity' pieces is translated into the 
articles about politics as a contention that culture, religion and tradition are 
together an important resource for society. Buryatia shows the republic's 
politicians to have a deep commitment towards developing this cultural sphere, 
firstly in order to stimulate its positive social effects, and secondly because of 
their own moral beliefs. Politicians demonstrate this commitment through their 
public participation in cultural, religious or traditional occasions, in addition to 
direct statements of belief made during interviews, as in the following example. 
This quotation is from an interview with the Vice-Chairman of the Khural's 
Committee for Social Policy, Konstantin Sobolev:  
 
 And, finally, thirdly, the more people of culture there are in power, the faster Russia will 
rise. Without spirituality, national consciousness, traditions, ideas (and art and culture in 
particular accumulate these, keeping them for the next generations), the people is just a 
crowd, and therefore in the future both government and society are doomed to enter an epoch 
of muddle and disintegration, since without a spiritual foundation the house of governance is 
doomed to fall.  
 I am convinced that, now, when the social-economic situation of the country is better, 
when the signs of stability are evident, when the "top" clearly perceive the goals standing 
before the country, it's time to invest in the national soul! For Russian citizens (it's 
traditional), ideas of fairness, goodness, togetherness were always more important than 
mercantile interests. (Buryatia, June 10, 2004: p. 3) 
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As Chapter Three described, Buryatia's political communication revolves 
around the demonstration that the ideals it presents correspond to Buryatia's 
reality. This demonstration extends beyond the newspaper's discursive space in 
the form of public ceremonial occasions, accompanied by personal initiatives on 
the part of individual politicians. Accordingly, Sobolev personifies the "people 
of culture" (lyudi kul'tury) he contends should have authority: he is also a 
published poet. President Leonid Potapov meanwhile was given an honorary 
doctorate by Buryatia's State University in 2004, establishing his credentials as 
an academic, and therefore also kul'turniy, politician.  
The repeated location of universal values and spiritual power in ethnic 
culture affords the Buryat nationalist intellectuals a specific role within the 
government self-legitimisation rituals carried out by Buryatia, and the 
ceremonial occasions it covers. It gives republican politicians a strong 
imperative to work with prominent promoters of ethnic culture, in order to 
demonstrate their commitment to universal ideals via their involvement with and 
support for ethnic cultural tradition. An example of collaboration between the 
republican executive and Buryat intellectuals is the June 2004 conference 
organised by the republican executive (pravitel'stvo) and Ulan-Ude's Institute 
for Mongolian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, celebrating the tenth anniversary 
of the founding of the Russian Federation's Humanitarian Fund (Buryatia, June 
24, 2004: p. 1). Many of those involved in the Buryat nationalist revival were 
and continue to be employed by this Institute – such as Garmazhap Sanzhiyev, 
who helped prepare Buryatia's declaration of autonomy in 1994. Buryatia in fact 
published a eulogising article about Sanzhiyev to celebrate his eightieth birthday, 
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indicating his continuing presence in the Republic’s political establishment 
(Buryatia, September 16, 2004: p. 4).  However, other political decisions that 
are not officially publicised demonstrate that the politicians' devotion to the 
cultural sphere has its limits. For example, the republican government refused to 




Section 4.3: Contemporary Buryat culture 
 
Section 4.3.1: Traditional Buryat spirituality in Buryatia’s sub-regions 
Barguzinskaya Pravda contained evidence that pre-Soviet Buryat beliefs still 
exist in Buryatia’s rural sub-regions, corroborating Altanhuu Hürelbaatar’s 
contention that Buryats practiced religion in secret throughout the Soviet 
period (Hürelbaatar, 2007: p. 138). A rich source of this evidence was a 
competition for children and teenagers, run as part of the celebrations of 
International Family Day.  Barguzinskaya Pravda published the winning pieces 
and poems, which had to have the title ‘My Family’ (Barguzinskaya Pravda, 
June 14, 2004: pp. 4–5; June 17, 2004: p. 6). Among the nine pieces are three 
that, judging by the surnames, have Buryat authors (Tugutova, Radnayeva and 
Emedeyeva). Their authors celebrate their individual families, but also make 
general statements on the value of respecting one’s family, clan and ancestors. 
They do this by referring to pre-Soviet Buryat practices, such as ancestor 
worship, as the following quotes show:  
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Every person should know their genealogy [rodoslovnaya]. Because your genealogy is your 
roots, which can be compared to the roots of a tree. The deeper a tree's roots are, the more 
beautiful and fruitful it will be. In the same way, a person's genealogy should be rich. It isn't 
an accident that there's a proverb about Ivan who didn't know his parentage, and there are 
quite a few proverbs and sayings among us Buryat, teaching us to know our clan, and respect 
our family.  
 For a very long time the Buryat have known their genealogies to the seventh generation, 
from their early years. The old people came up to the children, unexpectedly for all asked 
questions about their ancestors, and saw how their kids reacted. If they answered confidently, 
without stumbling, then they were praised and given treats.  
We talked about all this at our festival ‘My Family’, which united the many clans of 
Khilgan. My clan is called Sengeldur. There are quite a few famous and talented people in 
our clan. For example, Soodoy-lama is famous not only in Barguzin valley, but also beyond 
its borders. We have a habit of worshiping the place (Suburgan) where our forefather is 
buried. I think that we should have these festivals, because we learn there about our 
forefathers.  
 I would like to finish this essay with the proverb, ‘The roots of a man are over the 





In a difficult moment the whole family will come round to help; everyone does what they 
can and doesn't expect a reward. If something bad happens to one of our relatives, all the 
other members of the family gather round and use their combined efforts to help him. No one 
suggests that he didn't get ill by accident, that he's ruining the plans of others, that he's 
already got enough problems, that he's weak and useless, if he can't get out of that situation 
himself. We don't have that in my family, and I'm very proud of it. (Barguzinskaya Pravda, 





The family is our trusted bulwark in any deprivations and sorrow … In our hard and restless 
time every person needs to display love and goodness to all people. And all that depends on 
his family, on how families bring up their children, which moral orientation his parents gave 
him. If we gradually improve how children are brought up in their families, our 
contemporary society will become morally healthy. We, the contemporary generation, must 
remember the practices and traditions of our clan, not forgetting that families are sacred. 
(Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 17, 2004: p. 6.) 
 
A fourth piece emphasizes the importance of families in the bringing up of 
children, and of knowing and respecting one’s rodoslovnaya. The other winning 
contributions celebrate individual members of the authors’ immediate families, 
and the love and friendship within which they live. The Buryat authors were in 
the eighth or ninth school year, making them 14 or 15 years of age. They would 
have been writing what they expected would please the competition judges. This, 
in combination with the similarity of the values these pieces express, indicates 
these teenagers were reproducing what their elder relatives had been telling 
them. These pieces therefore show that pre-Soviet Buryat conceptions of clan, 
tradition and family co-exist with the more widespread ideas these pieces also 
contain – for example, about the importance of a loving family in bringing up 
children. They reflect the many comments I heard during my fieldwork on the 
strength and importance of the Buryat extended family.24  
                                                 
24 Caroline Humphrey discusses rural Buryat family networks and genealogy in Marx Went 
Away – But Karl Stayed Behind (Humphrey, 1998). Galina Manzanova also emphasises the 
importance kin and territorial networks have within Buryatia’s urbanisation patterns 
(Manzanova, 2007).  
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The first of the above quotations hints that the appropriate ancestor 
worship will bring prosperity: a ‘tree’ with ‘deep roots’ will be fruitful, unlike 
those who do not know their parentage or genealogy. In doing so, the article 
recalls the traditional Buryat practice of worshiping ancestor spirits in order to 
ensure their beneficial influence over daily life. The quotation below expands on 
this hint, indicating that pre-Soviet Buryat animist beliefs continue to exist, at 
least among adult Buryats in rural regions. These beliefs were incorporated into 
the Buddhism that became widespread among eastern Buryats from the 
seventeenth century. They were traditionally based on the idea that both the 
individual subject and the external world are made up of spirits, with varying 
capacities for good and bad activity. These spirits can inhabit or own particular 
sites, such as trees, rocks or mountains, which are regarded as sacred. This 
article’s author is a youth policy expert (spetsialist po delam molodyozhi), who 
is reporting on a seminar she attended on Zakamensk region’s youth facilities. 
Her central point is that Barguzin needs to follow Zakamensk’s example. She 
describes the various successful initiatives the Zakamensk administration has 
organized, such as introducing paid youth leaders in every village, but her article 
finishes with the following statements:  
 
During the excursion around the sacred places the guide described how the tradition of 
‘sprinkling’, i.e. drinking vodka at sacred places, is successfully dying down – since the 
lamas explained to everyone: ‘Imagine people came to your house, got drunk, left rubbish 
behind and went. Would you like it?!’ 
 The road to the village of Ulekchin goes through the Under-Baobai pass. According to 
the legend, Under-Baobai was a pretty good warrior, who once spent the night in the pass 
with his soldiers and pregnant wife. Suddenly many enemies attacked, and the warrior, his 
soldiers and wife all died. But the spirit of Under-Baobai walks in the pass. From this comes 
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the local belief [pover'ye] that you can’t cross the pass, without asking the spirit’s permission. 
And it’s not recommended for pregnant women to travel through here at all, but if it’s 
absolutely necessary, then the women wear belts to look like men.  
The inhabitants of Zakamensk often say that things go well for them because they 
ask permission from the local spirits before every journey, and in general they try to preserve 
everything good, especially tradition.  
There's something to learn from them, isn't there? (Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 14, 
2004: p. 3.)   
 
Another article celebrating a Buryat veteran from the Second World War has the 
headline, ‘He prayed to the gods of Barguzin valley for salvation’ 
(Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 11, 2004: p. 3). The piece focuses on the veteran’s 
courage and suffering as a prisoner of war. One small paragraph out of the page-
long article describes how his prayers were answered, when the Germans were 
about to execute him: at the last minute they decided not to shoot, and he 
survived to return home.  
 A significant point is that none of these articles display a concern with 
Buryat culture or tradition in the abstract, unlike the nationalist articles in 
Buryatia. Their authors instead use Buryat frames of reference to make their 
points, whether they are celebrating their families, describing Zakamensk’s 
youth organisations, or writing a war veteran’s biography. A possible 
explanation is that the Buryats living in Barguzin sub-region have not developed 
the conscious interest in Buryat culture that might arise if their ethnic identity 
generated difficult questions. The authors of these pieces make no effort to 
frame or justify their espousal of what they know are ethnic-specific beliefs, as 
they might if they were concerned about potentially hostile audience members 
(whether Russian or Buryat), or if they themselves were not entirely comfortable 
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with the beliefs they were expressing. The teenage authors were too young to 
have developed a mature sense of self or of the nuances in the relationship 
between Barguzin’s Buryats and Russians. They were however old enough to be 
aware of any major issues caused by ethnic cultural difference in the region. If 
there is an ethnic nationalism movement in Barguzin, then it is not significant 
enough to require Barguzin's regional government publicly to engage with it in 
Barguzinskaya Pravda, as the republican government does by allowing Buryat 
nationalist intellectuals to publish in Buryatia. All this indicates that these 
specifically Buryat beliefs are not in general a cause of controversy, either 
within Buryat groups or in the region as a whole.  
 
4.3.2: Buryat cultural development  
The difficulty of newspaper distribution in Buryatia means that the majority of 
commercial newspaper audiences live in Ulan Ude. Another reason for this is 
that rural populations, and especially agricultural workers, are less likely to be 
able to afford commercial newspapers after the collapse of Buryatia’s 
agricultural industries. Buryatia’s large territory, small population and poor 
roads isolate rural communities, so that daily life in the country is very different 
from that in Ulan Ude. Ulan Ude’s greater connection with the rest of the 
Russian Federation exposes its Buryat inhabitants to strong Russifying 
influences, while their urban setting hinders them from continuing the traditional 
Buryat practices predicated on a close relationship with a specific territory and 
its spirits. Several Buryat inhabitants of Ulan Ude remarked to me during my 
fieldwork that the only difference between them and the Russians is their Asian 
appearance. A sign of this Russification is the extent to which the Buryat 
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language is falling out of use among urban Buryats: in a study by Irina Yelayeva, 
published in 2004, 37 per cent of the rural sample said they mainly spoke Buryat 
at home, compared to 12 per cent of the urban respondents (Yelayeva, 2004: p. 
582). It is possible to wonder whether Buryatia's depiction of ethnic culture as 
referring to different past traditions represents the real significance of ethnicity 
to the Republic's urban Buryat populations. The impossibility of identifying 
with what is, in the wake of the Soviet nationalities policy, generally regarded 
to be an important part of one's personhood must therefore be a common 
problem for contemporary Buryats. The section that follows explores this 
possibility. It presents evidence from Buryatia's commercial newspapers, 
indicating that a Buryat culture and identity do continue to exist in the towns.  
Inform Polis' features and longer news articles crystallize the ideas it 
projects about Buryat ethnic culture itself, which remain implicit in the shorter 
pieces. These pieces indicate the emotional significance a Buryat identity is 
perceived to have for Inform Polis' readers. These articles are all coded 'human 
interest', with the exception of the Buryat Buddhist text mentioned in the 
previous section. Human interest articles offer their readers an enjoyable 
emotional engagement with the article's theme. As the following paragraphs 
suggest, the particular emotional engagement the journalists evoke in these 
pieces implies an assumption that their audience has a specific interest in Buryat 
religion and ethnic tradition. 
Unlike Buryatia’s ‘creative writing’ pieces, Inform Polis’ articles on 
ethnic religion or culture describe their subjects’ experience sympathetically, 
either by quoting them directly, or by adapting the journalists’ writing style into 
what might be their ‘voice’. The subjects themselves are usually Buryats 
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participating in a Buryat religious or cultural ritual, such as a traditional Buryat 
Buddhist sports competition (Inform Polis, September 22, 2004: p. 11). They 
appear wholeheartedly and unselfconsciously to accept what they are doing and 
experiencing, even though the journalists must know that a Russian or a 
Russianised Buryat could have difficulty in adopting the beliefs that underpin 
the actions and responses described. For example, the Buryat sumo-wrestler 
Anatoliy (Tolya) Mikhakhanov describes his interaction with the Khambo Lama 
Itigelov's incorruptible body:25 
 
‘At first it was cold, then it got warmer, my hands became hot and my temples felt as if they 
were being squeezed’, said Tolya later about his first sensations in the temple. ‘But there 
wasn’t any pain, instead such a pleasant feeling…’ 
They prevented other visitors from approaching the body with a small red ribbon. Tolya 
laid a khadak [Buryat/Mongolian cloth, given to communicate respect] on the knees of the 
great lama and touched his dry, but still soft hands. From the body came the aroma of 
incense. ‘It was a little frightening when I touched him’, said the wrestler. ‘But I felt the 
persistent smell of incense from his body for a long time afterwards – in the monastery, and 
in the evening at the hotel, when I was sitting on my own in front of the television. A lama 
told me it was a blessing.’ (Inform Polis, June 9, 2004: p. 11.) 
 
This article presents both Tolya's experience and the Buryat beliefs that have 
conditioned it as unquestionable facets of contemporary everyday life. It offers 
its Buryat audience the satisfaction of seeing a subjective experience of their 
ethnic beliefs both expressed and celebrated in the mass media – rather than 
these beliefs making rare appearances as an 'exotic' contrast with the dominant 
                                                 
25 Itigelov, or Etigelov, is understood by Buddhists to have reached an advanced stage of 
Enlightenment, revealed by the intact state – the incorruptibility – of his corporeal remains. 
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Russian worldview, as in the federal mass media, or being adapted into a 
political communication process, as in Buryatia.  
The subjects performing the Buryat rituals are always portrayed as 
positive characters, whose values accord with those generally connected to the 
rituals themselves. This representation in turn reflects common understandings 
about traditional Buryat culture. In the example just quoted, Tolya comes across 
as humble and pious, despite his great strength and achievements, with a strong 
attachment to his homeland and people (narod); his people are the Buryat rather 
than the inhabitants of the Republic in general, as the following quotation shows:  
 
‘Remember, Tolya, you were born, live and will die a Buryat,’ [the Khambo Lama] said. 
‘You will never become a Japanese. You wrestlers symbolize the body and strength of our 
people. If you think like a Japanese, you will never overcome a Japanese. You need to think 
and act like a Buryat.’ 
 In order to do this, the Khambo Lama advised the athlete to come home more often, to 
regain his strength. He should eat borgoiskiy mutton in Dzhida, go to Zakamniy to collect 
spirit, to Aga to find out the cultural practices, and to Oloy, the motherland of his ancestors 
in Ust’ Orda, to thank the earth for the strength she awarded the Mikhakhanov clan.  
‘If you lose, we all lose. You aren’t just your parents’ son, but the son of your 
people.’ (Inform Polis, June 9, 2004: p. 11.) 
 
Tolya listens respectfully to the advice given by the Khambo Lama, who in turn 
is represented as wise and authoritative. Together they act out an idealised 
relationship between Buddhist teacher and pupil, which corresponds to the 
traditional Buryat respect for teachers and scholars that was often referred to in 
my presence. In this way, the Buryat and their culture are celebrated by their 
portrayal according to a specifically Buryat value system. In contrast to 
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Buryatia's articles, this celebration happens for its own sake: Buryat culture and 
values are being given an intrinsic worth, instead of being celebrated as the 
manifestation of an overarching concept of ethnicity and culture.  
Other characteristics of Inform Polis' features on Buryat culture suggest 
that they are orientated towards a target audience that has been prevented both 
from feeling they understand Buryat culture, and from reconciling it with their 
Russianised way of life. Inform Polis extends its representation of Buryat 
culture by combining its public expression with informative details about the 
rituals themselves, which are incorporated into the text as brief asides to those 
who may not be in the know, as in the following example: “The sportsmen were 
trying to knock out skittles and lasti (a target in the shape of a tassel –  auth.), 
lying on the square 40 metres away from the line of shooting.” (Inform Polis, 
September 22, 2004: p. 11). Such details may be a way of helping the Russian 
audience understand the piece, but they also tactfully inform Buryats who may 
be ignorant of their traditions.  
Indeed, many examples in the sample showed the ways Inform Polis 
helps its audience with elements of Buryat culture of which they may have no 
experience, such as a feature on a traditional sports tournament held in Inner 
Mongolia, celebrating the festival of Sevden, or the coming of summer (Inform 
Polis, June 30, 2004: p. 19). The piece both celebrates and romanticises the 
Buryats, Evenk and Mongols who take part in the games. The Buryats and 
Evenk are taken to be those who emigrated to Mongolia and China at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, to escape both the Tsarist and Soviet 
governments. These communities have managed to continue their pre-
revolutionary cultures and ways of life to a much greater extent than the Buryats 
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and Evenk who remained on Russian territory. The following quotation 
describes part of the games:  
 
The horse games started. Young men took part, under the guidance of a strong grey-bearded 
man in a cowboy hat – popular headwear here. First, the horsemen spiritedly showed off 
their horse-riding skills [dzhigitovali]: at a full gallop they threw themselves flat onto their 
horses, and turned around the saddle. They were all ordinary shepherds, not circus 
performers or jockeys. After the warm-up, the “cowboy” threw a weight into the circle. A 
reckless circling began. Neighing of horses, clouds of dust, cries from the horsemen and 
roaring from the crowd. Eventually, the most dashing tore himself from the medley and, 
holding his trophy aloft, galloped away at will. But they didn’t let him go far, and soon they 
were again lifting the weight from the ground, frenziedly tearing it away from each other… 
At last the whooping cavalcade took itself off into the distance. (Inform Polis, June 30, 2004: 
p. 19.)  
 
The Buryat in this festival clearly have a different culture and way of life from 
Inform Polis' urban Buryat readers. This article, along with others, offers an 
imaginative strategy to cope with this contradiction by incorporating its 
idealised representations of Buryat traits into the reportage of a real occasion, 
which itself is framed as an event Inform Polis' readership would recognise. The 
Sevden festival is presented as a non-Russian version of a typical post-Soviet 
holiday-cum-sports tournament: the article's form corresponds closely to the 
reportage of a Buddhist sports tournament in Buryatia, and is in fact written by 
the same author (Inform Polis, September 22, 2004: p. 11). 
This mixture of common ideals with events or experiences the audience 
can relate to puts Inform Polis' representations of Buryat culture and life into an 
imaginative realm, blurring the boundaries between ideals and reality, as well as 
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past and present. The reader is given the opportunity to conflate their own 
Buryat identity with the article’s idealised subjects. This article finishes with a 
quotation that reconciles the contemporary urban Buryat experience with 
traditional culture: “‘How similar and at the same time dissimilar are the two 
holidays – Sevden and Surkharban [a traditional Buryat sports tournament]’, 
said a citizen of Ulan Ude, Mariya Badmayeva” (Inform Polis, June 30, 2004: p. 
19). Inform Polis thus offers its readership a way of imagining their Buryat 
identity that sidesteps its dissonance with modern life. 
 
Inform Polis' content has other distinctive characteristics, which contain 
implications about both its Buryat influence, and the set of attitudes that 
produces it. They suggest that this influence creates a predisposition for Inform 
Polis to espouse a particular combination of ideas, which must be acceptable to 
both Inform Polis' journalists and the audience that pays for their articles. These 
ideas are expressed in other parts of the Russian Federation's public sphere, in 
various forms. However, their specific combination in Inform Polis indicates 
that Inform Polis' journalists and readers entertain conceptions of the Russian 
Federation and the world that contrast with those commonly expressed in the 
Federation’s mainstream mass media. 
Inform Polis' references to federal actors, or to the Federation itself, tend 
to distance federal structures from the Republic, in contrast to Pyatnitsa Plyus, 
which does not present such a clear distinction between republican and federal 
actors. For example, Inform Polis refers to federal-level, Moscow-based 
companies as the 'Muscovites' (moskvichi) in its headlines, presenting them as a 
separate group (Inform Polis, June 9, 2004: p. 5; 22 September, 2004: p. 11). 
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Inform Polis' distinction between Republic and Federation reflects that made by 
the commercial newspapers in Sakha (Yakutia). However, this detached 
relationship with the federal government is combined with an unusually positive 
attitude towards foreigners. Inform Polis regularly publishes articles from 
foreign news sources that criticise aspects of Vladimir Putin's administration, 
such as its policy in Chechnya. The other newspapers in the study ignored these 
pieces – while the Moscow-based publications Moskovskiy Komsomolets and 
Argumenti i Fakty cited them as evidence of Western hostility towards Russia, 
suggesting the Beslan hostage taking had been organised by a Western coalition.  
The comments about the Beslan hostage taking in Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets and Argumenti i Fakty are typical of these newspapers’ strikingly 
negative treatment of foreigners, and in particular Americans and Western 
Europeans. Their stories highlight the threat apparently posed by a rich, hostile 
West, repeating ideas likely to have been circulating in the public sphere during 
the Cold War, while conflating the Russian Federation with the Russian ethnic 
group. For example, Argumenty i Fakty consistently associated the Russian 
Federation’s population, and Vladimir Putin himself, with the Russian Orthodox 
Church, repeating a narrative about the successful repatriation of Russian 
Orthodox holy objects from the West. The photograph accompanying one such 
article exemplifies the link Argumenty i Fakty makes between the repatriation, 
the icon itself and the Russian people's ancient, tragic past. The picture of Pope 
John Paul II showing Putin the icon (see Figure 4.3 on the opposite page) allows 
Putin to represent both the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church. In 
this way, the article ascribes a contemporary relevance to the classic Slavophile 
conception of Russia as a unique, sacred nation, held at bay by its Western 
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European enemies.26 Argumenty i Fakty's image of the Russian Federation and 
its people thus places them firmly within the European Russian cultural tradition. 
Inform Polis’ contrasting representation of the Russian Federation and its 
international relations suggests that those who read and write it accept a 
different way of thinking about both the Russian Federation and the outside 
world, which is more focused on the conception of Buryatia among potentially 
friendly foreign others than on that of the Russian Federation and its enemies. 
This in turn implies that even the heavily Russianised urban Buryats have a 
more direct identification with the Republic than the Federation.  
Inform Polis' handling of the spiritual realm also seems to respond to a 
distinctive interest in spiritual forces on the part of its target audience. The 
following quotation epitomises Inform Polis' representation of supernatural 
forces. It consists of the first two paragraphs from an article published between 
the two sample periods, on Alar' Region, which is part of the former Ust-
Ordysnk Buryat Autonomous Okrug in Irkutsk Oblast':  
 
But it seems that soon the unhindered wanderings of various spirits and apparitions, which 
frighten the peaceful population, will come to an end. In any case, precisely this blessing is 
expected by many of this land's inhabitants from the appearance, or more exactly the 
resurrection, of Alar's Buddhist temple, built in 1811, and destroyed in the 30s of the last 
century by the Bolsheviks. Today on the piece of land, re-sanctified this summer by a lama 
especially invited for the occasion, the place has been marked out for the building of a small 
suburgan [a sacred Buddhist sculpture]. The dugan [single prayer-hall] will be here. And in a 
new place in the regional centre Kutulik, a datsan [a temple complex]. The idea of the 
"return of Buddha" belongs to the inhabitants of Alar' region, now living in Buryatia. In this 
way they want to show their filial appreciation to their motherland.  
                                                 
26 Alexander Agadjanian’s study reveals a similar tendency for mainstream federal newspapers 
to associate the Russian Orthodox Church with Russian national identity (Agadjanian, 2001).  
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And meanwhile the inhabitants of this most black-earthed and fertile, strawberry-
filled, roadless, dependent on wells, superstitious and mystical country are restoring the 
houses destroyed in the strongest July hurricane; boiling dozens of litres of jam; keenly 
discussing the Okrug's complex political situation [the author is likely to be referring to the 
merger of Ust-Ordynsk with Irkutsk Oblast']; collecting mushrooms and hay, and recounting 
to visitors the new and old legends, with which this land overflows... (Inform Polis, August 
11, 2004: p. 27) 
 
The following article consists of six small stories about Alar' region and its 
spirits, related from the point of view of different individuals. As a whole, the 
article celebrates the restoration of the region's Buddhist temple (dugan), and its 
capacity to remove the region's unclean spirits – while offering the reader a 
series of pleasantly exciting, rather than shocking, ghost stories.  
In contrast with the Russian federal newspapers, the subjects of this and 
similar articles are presented sympathetically, rather than as superstitious or 
freakish. The article appears under the recurring rubric The People's Week 
(narodnaya nedelya): as this would suggest, the individuals it describes are 
members of the ordinary 'people' (narod). A nice touch is the story told from the 
perspective of a three-year-old girl, who has spent the summer with her 
grandmother in Alar', and is very pleased about all the strawberry jam she and 
her family are going to take back to Ulan Ude. The inhabitants of Ulan Ude 
generally go to the regions for the summer if they can, to avoid the town's heat, 
dust and pollution, so that most of Inform Polis' readership would be able to 
relate Mila and her family's situation to their immediate experience.   
The article’s subjects are all Buryat, with the exception of a Cossack 
who married a Buryat, and who is presented as having thoroughly absorbed 
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himself into the surrounding Buryat community. Their experiences are 
conditioned by what are implied to be specifically Buryat beliefs. For example, 
the journalist specifies that a "house that eats its owner" is called ezedee edideg 
sool in Buryat. However, the colloquial speech of the articles' subjects is 
combined with stylised language forms that sound as if they come from fairy 
tales, such as the following sentence, "When night descends to earth and the 
forces of evil hold undivided sway, rarely does a dare-devil, even while tipsy, 
venture to walk past that house". In doing so, the article blurs the boundary 
between the ordinary and the imagined, in the same way as the account of the 
Sevden festival described above. It places its subjects in an ambiguous but 
attractive imaginative space, between fact and fiction, which the sympathetic 
reader can enter and enjoy. The picturesque but familiar inhabitants of Alar', and 
their unselfconsciously animist Buddhist beliefs, are being presented to the 
reader as a pleasurable way of conceptualising Buryatia's ordinary people 
(narod), including by extension the readers themselves. This implies an 
assumption on the part of the journalist that the audience is able to engage with 
these beliefs in a way that would prevent them from dismissing the article – and 
possibly also Inform Polis itself – as sensationalist nonsense. The spirits and 
ghosts are carefully placed between the real and the imagined, instead of 
appearing as shockingly paranormal. Inform Polis' pieces put into context the 
unquestioning belief in the existence of Zakamensk's area spirits on the part of 
Barguzin's youth policy expert. Together, they suggest a distinctive general 
capacity to accept supernatural forces as part of reality, which suggests that the 
pre-Soviet Buryat beliefs appearing in Barguzinskaya Pravda have been adapted 
into an urban Buryat culture. Both Hürelbaatar and Humphrey note an 
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eagerness among even the poorer Buryat inhabitants of Ulan Ude to donate 
to religious organisations: they contend that many Buryats are more willing 
to spend money on their spiritual lives than to pay their public utility bills 
(Hürelbaatar, 2007: p. 138; Humphrey, 2007: p. 197).   
However, the 'unclean spirits' described in this article differ from the 
area spirits mentioned in Barguzinskaya Pravda. There is thus a qualitative 
difference between Inform Polis' and Barguzinskaya Pravda's representations of 
Buryat culture and spirituality, beyond the difference in focus that might be 
expected between a republican-level and a regional newspaper. The direct 
relationships between individuals, their clans, and their area's spirits, which 
extend backwards into the distant past, and which were traditionally an 
important part of Buryat personhood, appear in Inform Polis' narratives to have 
become scrambled.   
Inform Polis’ article gives the impression that the local population have 
little knowledge about the individual spirits, their stories and personalities, or 
capacity to influence daily life. According to Barguzinskaya Pravda on the other 
hand, the inhabitants of Barguzin and Zakamensk use their detailed historical 
knowledge of their area spirits to find ways of avoiding being harmed by them 
(for example, the account of Zakamensk's pregnant women wearing male belts) 
(Barguzinskaya Pravda, June 14, 2004; p. 3). Barguzinskaya Pravda's spirits are 
presented as being both worthy of respect, and capable of benefiting the local 
population. The spirits in Inform Polis' article, by contrast, appear as mysterious 
and hostile supernatural phenomena, with a greater resemblance to the spiritual 
forces described by mainstream Russian newspapers. For example, the Alar’ 
“house that eats its owner”, is built on a site that gives it an “unfavourable feng-
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shui”. Everyone who has lived in it has died mysteriously; its current owner 
refuses to occupy it, and intends to give it to Alar's future lama, who will be able 
to drive out the "unclean spirit" (nechist'). The lama's role in Inform Polis is to 
cast the spirits out, while Barguzinskaya Pravda's lama behaves as a mediator 
between the spirits and the humans, as when he asks Zakamensk's population to 
stop getting drunk and leaving litter at sacred sites.  
Similarly, in the example cited earlier the Khambo Lama's advice to 
Tolya indicates that he conceives of spiritual influences as having a more 
generalised nature and effect than those of Barguzinskaya Pravda. He tells 
Tolya to thank the “earth” (zemlya), rather than the specific spirits that inhabit 
Oloy, and he identifies Tolya as belonging to the Buryat “people”, rather than to 
his particular clan (Inform Polis, June 9, 2004; p. 11). These differences in 
conception suggest that he, or the journalist who is quoting him, do not perceive 
individual Buryats to have the direct relationships with spirits, ancestors and the 
rest of their clan implied by Barguzinskaya Pravda's articles. His statements 
also present the Buryat ethnic group as a unifying ideal to which loyalty should 
be directed, displaying a concern with Buryat ethnicity in the abstract that does 
not appear in Barguzinskaya Pravda. This abstract concept of the Buryat ethnic 
group has a spiritual dimension, firstly from the spiritual benefits the Buryat 
land and culture can bring, and secondly from its endorsement by a religious 
authority (the Khambo Lama).  
All the Inform Polis features illustrate the association Inform Polis 
consistently makes between spirituality and Russian or Buryat cultural practice, 
in such a way that ethnic culture is presented as a phenomenon within which the 
transcendent is encountered. In particular, Inform Polis ascribes a primordial 
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spiritual power to the Buryat land and people, as the Khambo Lama’s speech to 
Tolya exemplifies. Meanwhile, the report of the Sevden tournament suggests 
that its Buryat, Evenk and Mongol participants are in some way 'pure', without 
having been 'polluted' by civilisation – and by extension, the civilising Soviet 
Russians. It describes the women's faces as “dark and weather-beaten, never 
having known the artifices of makeup”; the tournament participants have 
retained the “irrepressible spirit of the wild nomads” (neukrotimaya dukha 
dikikh kochevnikov) (Inform Polis, June 30, 2004; p. 19). This purity is 
connected to their having retained their close relationship with the earth and its 
spiritual power, implying that this relationship is a primordial characteristic of 
non-Russian culture. These articles imply a close relationship between the 
Republic's territory and the Buryats, which the Russians cannot share. This idea 
also occurs in other articles, in various forms. For example, the Buryat teacher 
who was killed during the Beslan siege is described as having a "steppe" 
character: she is "a person of few words, restrained, very attentive to the elderly" 
(Inform Polis, September 15, 2004; p. 5). 
Meanwhile, the idealised wild, primordial Mongolian and Buryat 'spirit', 
closely connected to the land, can appear in other parts of Buryatia's public 
sphere. A highly publicised and popular display of Buryat folk music and 
dancing I attended, called "Spirit of our Forefathers" (Ugaym Sulde, Bur.), urged 
its audience to reconnect with the ancient Buryat spirit. The Inform Polis pieces 
do not however express any kind of Buryat nationalist agenda; the specifically 
Buryat relationship with the Republic's territory they describe does not carry the 
implication that the Buryat have a greater right to occupy it.  
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The different understanding of the relationship between spirits and the 
human world that exists within Inform Polis' discursive space could correspond 
to a difference in attitude between Barguzinskaya Pravda’s rural audience, and 
Inform Polis’ largely urban one. The spiritual beliefs that appear in 
Barguzinskaya Pravda’s pages come through incidentally, in articles that have 
other political or administrative functions. Inform Polis’ presentation of the 
spiritual sphere meanwhile is a response to its conception of what will please its 
target audience. The generalised ideas about the spiritual and religious sphere 
that result would be likely to correlate with attitudes widely held among Inform 
Polis' urban Buryat audience, who would have ruptured, or at least heavily 
complicated, their connections with their clans and area spirits when they moved 
to the towns.  
Contemporary urbanisation seems to be changing Buryat beliefs, as 
individuals are exposed to the new ideas and demands that accompany their 
change of lifestyle. However, this process of change seems to incorporate and 
adapt older ideas, rather than replace them completely, as the continuing 
influence of the traditional Buryat animist mindset over Inform Polis shows. In 
addition, the articles quoted from all three newspapers evince a deep respect for 
past tradition. Barguzinskaya Pravda’s youth worker applauds Zakamensk’s use 
of traditional practice; Buryatia depicts traditional culture as the source of 
profound spiritual knowledge, while Inform Polis presents attractive, idealised 
accounts of traditional cultural events. This continuity implies an interchange of 
ideas between different regions and communities. Manzanova contends that 
urbanisation is increasing the distinction between Russian and Buryat 
cultures, and generating ‘ruralised’ urban lifestyles (Manzanova, 2007). 
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Large numbers of rural migrants in Ulan Ude, with a relatively low 
exposure to Russianised attitudes, are swamping the urban population. 
However, Anna Buyanova’s study of the way young rural Buryats adapt to 
studying at Ulan Ude’s higher education establishments shows that rural 
incomers have to change their language and habits to some extent, to avoid 
becoming marginalised (Buyanova, 2009). The evidence in the newspapers 
of an interaction between rural and urban attitudes supports Buyanova’s 
findings.  
The linking of ethnic culture with the spiritual realm correlates with the 
ideas occurring in Buryatia, suggesting that there may have been some 
communication of these ideas between popular and elite discursive spheres. 
Inform Polis adapts the Buryat nationalist promotion of a Buryat spiritual 
tradition into a representation of Buryat ethnic culture that connects the 
individual to the spiritual by virtue of their commitment to their Buryat identity. 
In this way, a Buryat identity is implied to carry a transcending spiritual and 
moral significance. Inform Polis must be creating or reproducing attractive ideas 
about what it means to be Buryat, because its product is commercially viable. 
This raises the possibility that a conception of a pan-Buryat identity with a 
spiritual significance may be becoming increasingly important to the Republic’s 
Buryat population, corroborating the sociological research on Buryat identity.27 
Hürelbaatar contends that religious practice has become a means for 
Buryats to express their national identity, and thus that the two are 
associated – although he does not suggest that the conceptions of Buryat 
identity themselves are equated with religious belief (Hürelbaatar, 2007). 
                                                 
27 This research provides evidence that a pan-Buryat identity has for the first time acquired an 
importance for individuals (Yelayeva, 2004).   
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Inform Polis does not however repeat Buryatia: the spiritual power ascribed to 
the Buryat land, people and religion has a direct and immediate effect on the 
subjects concerned, rather than being confined to an abstracted aesthetic or 
historical realm. Inform Polis is combining Buryat nationalist ideas with pre-
Soviet spiritual beliefs, in a complicated interaction of pre-Soviet, Soviet and 




The product that Inform Polis is offering implies the existence of a clear 
perception among urban Buryats that they are members of an ethnic group, with 
a history and trajectory of development distinct from that of the Russians, 
despite the ambiguities involved. This leads to the continuing development of 
Buryat identity and culture, as part of an imperative to align this perception with 
the rapid and homogenising changes brought about by the Soviet and post-
Soviet periods. Inform Polis itself could well have a role in this cultural 
reorientation process, by repeating the narratives that attract its target audience 
and thereby encouraging the popular assimilation of these ideas. 
According to Inform Polis' representation, Buryat culture is connected to 
a primordial relationship with a spiritualised landscape more than it is to the 
republican state. Buryat identity and culture could therefore be becoming 
increasingly detached from a specific polity, reflecting the population's 
continuing lack of involvement with the political sphere. The abstracted, 
transcendental significance of Buryat identity would be likely to increase, if the 
merging of Buryatia into its surrounding regions were to remove the Buryat 
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titular state structure altogether. The possibility of this development in turn 
raises questions about the long-term effects of the federal government’s 
centralisation policies on Buryat culture and identity. Inform Polis’ content 
suggests that many Buryats will not develop a clear identification with the 
Federal state – especially considering the strong association often made in the 
public sphere between the Russian Federation and specifically Russian or Soviet 
culture. As an Ust-Ordynsk farm worker is reported to have said in a 2002 
edition of Inform Polis,  
 
We, the Alar' Buryats, are between Heaven and Earth. Regions [oblasti] and territories 
[okrugi] aren't necessary. Let them merge them. (Inform Polis, September 4, 2002: p. 9)  
 
The republican government's attempts publicly to establish its connection with 
the spirituality supposedly inherent in ethnic cultural tradition could be 
reproducing, and thus reinforcing, the tendency to connect ethnicity with the 
spiritually transcendent. In this way, the government’s self-publicity has the 
effect of reinforcing the importance of a spiritualised Buryat identity, despite the 
republican government’s concern with managing its population’s affiliation with 
their ethnic group. If the post-Republican government were to have equal 
difficulty in creating a positive relationship with its Buryat citizens, it would risk 
the increasing emotional and spiritual significance of Buryat culture acquiring 









Regional newspapers and political elites in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 
 
 
Introduction:   
In a similar way to Chapter Three, this chapter is concerned with explaining 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers and context, in preparation for the discussion of 
Sakha culture and identity in Chapter Six. It builds on Chapter Three’s 
discussion of the difference between government-sponsored and commercial 
newspapers, which applies to both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), to present 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s complex political situation. The first section is concerned 
with the quantitative analysis, and the differences it revealed between the 
government-owned daily Yakutia, which belongs to the republican executive, 
and the commercial weeklies Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy. The second 
part of the first section compares Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspaper material with the 
newspapers Buryatia, Inform Polis and Pyatnitsa Plyus, in order to elucidate 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s distinctive political and economic context. Section Two uses 
the qualitative interpretation of Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspaper discourse to build 
up a more detailed picture of political practice in Sakha (Yakutia), and of the 




Section 5.1: The characteristics of Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers and 
politics 
 
Section 5.1.1: Introduction to Sakha (Yakutia)’s regional newspapers 
The analysis of Sakha (Yakutia)'s newspapers shows that their ownership exerts 
a decisive influence over their function and content, as in Buryatia. A similar 
broad distinction can be made between government-owned newspapers, and the 
newspapers produced by those primarily seeking to run a profitable business.  
Table 5.1 shows the frequencies with which different functions occurred 
in all three fully coded newspapers – the government-owned daily Yakutia, and 
the commercial newspapers Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy. The names 
of the codes used to mark these functions refer to what the article offers the 
reader, for example, 'Useful Information', 'Information', 'Celebration' or 'Human 
Interest'. The code ‘Ceremonial Occasion’ was used to mark articles publicising 




N = 491 
 
Nashe Vremya  
N = 187 
Yakutsk 
Vecherniy 
N = 302 
Information 
 
64.6 (317) 60 (112) 71.5  (216) 
Celebration 
 
53.8 (264) 21.4 (40) 10.6 (32) 
Human Interest 
 
35.2  (173) 38.5 (72) 56.3 (170) 
Political Aktsiya 
 
24.6 (121) 17.6  (33) 12.6 (38) 
Ceremonial 
Occasion 
36.0 (177) 25.7  (48) 13.9 (42) 
Satire 
 
n/a 19.8  (37) 11.3 (34) 
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Table 5.1: The percentages of articles coded with ‘Information’, 
‘Celebration’, ‘Human Interest’, ‘Political Aktsiya’, ‘Ceremonial Occasion’ 
and ‘Satire’ (the figures in brackets are the number of articles to which the 
codes were attached; N = the number of articles in the sample; n/a = not 
applicable) 
 
As the table shows, a much higher proportion of articles had a 'celebration' 
function in Yakutia than in the commercial newspapers (53.8 per cent in Yakutia, 
as against 21.4 and 10.6 per cent in Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy 
respectively). This difference is due to the large number of articles in Yakutia 
devoted to praising individuals, government initiatives or public events. 
Government initiatives in particular are emphasised in Yakutia, as is shown by 
the higher occurrence of the code 'Political Aktsiya' in Yakutia (aktsiya is the 
Russian word for an action or initiative). This code was used on 24.6 per cent of 
Yakutia's articles, compared to 17.6 and 12.6 per cent of those in Nashe Vremya 
and Yakutsk Vecherniy respectively. State-sponsored ceremonial occasions also 
feature more often in Yakutia: 36.0 per cent of its articles were marked 
'Ceremonial Occasion', compared to 25.7 and 13.9 per cent in Nashe Vremya 
and Yakutsk Vecherniy respectively.  
Both samples of Yakutia contained series of articles on the major state 
occasions occurring during the sample period. For example, Sakha (Yakutia)'s 
child sports festival, The Children of Asia (Deti Azii), was mentioned 27 times 
over the month of June in a variety of pieces, many of which specifically 
concerned the preparations for this event. The second sample contained 
extensive coverage of the Vilyuisk hydroelectric power station's opening on 
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September 8, including a day-by-day countdown from August 28. This set of 
tendencies implies that Yakutia was being used to showcase the activities that 
the republican government wished to bring before the public, in a similar way to 
Buryatia's government-owned newspaper Buryatia.  
 
Code: Yakutia 
N = 491 
 
Nashe Vremya 
N = 187  
Yakutsk Vecherniy 
N = 302 
Negative for Elites 3.1 (15) 18.7 (35) 26.8 (81) 
Environment 
Crisis 
17.5 (86) 10.2 (19) 6.3 (19) 
Economic Crisis 12.6 (62) 17.6 (33) 14.2 (43) 
Crime Crisis 6.1 (30) 10.2 (19) 16.2 (49) 
 
Table 5.2: The percentages of articles coded as ‘Environment Crisis’, 
‘Negative for Elites’, ‘Economic Crisis’ and ‘Crime Crisis’ (the figures in 
brackets are the number of articles to which the codes were attached; N = 
the number of articles in the sample) 
 
Yakutia's mention of problems is at a comparable level to that of the 
commercial newspapers, as Table 5.2 shows. Yakutia’s most frequently used 
negative code was ‘Environment Crisis’, which was attached to 17.5 per cent of 
Yakutia’s articles. The negative code that was used most often in the analysis of 
Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya was ‘Negative for Elites’, marking 
uncomplimentary references to prominent individuals or organisations: it was 
attached to 26.8 and 18.7 per cent of these newspapers’ articles respectively. In 
general, Yakutia has explanations for Sakha (Yakutia)'s problems that differ 
from the commercial newspapers, softening the negative impressions they create 
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about the Republic's government. Difficulties were less likely to be presented as 
inadequacies on the part of elite groups. The code 'Negative for Elites', was 
applied to 3.1 per cent of Yakutia's articles; any criticism in Yakutia tended to be 
directed towards municipal administrations, corporations, or federal-level actors, 
rather than the Republic's legislative and executive bodies (Il Tumen and the 
Pravitel'stvo), or the President, Vyacheslav Shtyrov. For example, one article 
finds fault with the republican electricity company Yakutenergo for cutting off 
70 small settlements, when only two in the sub-region concerned owed them 
money (Yakutia June 16, 2004: p. 5).  
Certain issues were often presented within the framework of a proposed 
solution. For example, 44.2 per cent of the articles marked 'Environmental 
Crisis' were also marked 'Political Aktsiya', meaning that they referred to 
accounts of the government's measures to deal with Sakha (Yakutia)'s difficult 
terrain and climate – such as the annual drive to ferry essential supplies up to the 
far north during the summer. 27 of the 38 articles coded as 'Environmental 
Crisis' and 'Political Aktsiya' were reports on the progress of this activity. At 
least one such report usually appeared on the front page of every broadsheet 
edition, constantly reminding the regular reader of the republican government's 
efforts.  
This emphasis on government initiative presents the Republic as having 
a concerned and active administration, aware that Sakha (Yakutia) is a 
challenging place to inhabit and govern. It also indicates that Yakutia is designed 
to project a consistent impression of the Republic and its government, in 
addition to providing a space for informative articles and political discussion.  
Buryatia and Yakutia are essentially extensions of their Republics' 
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executive organs of government. They both act simultaneously as channels of 
communication between the government's different organisations, and as 
positive publicity for their respective administrations. They facilitate the 
controlled discussion of various political and economic issues as part of their 
functioning, in addition to publishing what they present as appeals, criticism or 
praise from their Republics' citizens. 
The government-owned sub-regional newspaper Erkeeyi resembles 
Buryatia's sub-regional newspaper Barguzinskaya Pravda (also described in 
Chapter Three). Erkeeyi is Sakha-language, and is owned and published by the 
administration of Megino-Kangalass Region (ulus, Sakha).28 It contained a 
similar mix of local government news, occasional criticism, and input from its 
readership, and reveals an even more marked difference in the lifestyles of ulus 
and Yakutsk populations than Buryatia's equivalent contrast, as might be 
expected from Sakha (Yakutia)'s enormous territory. 
The commercial newspapers' representations of Sakha (Yakutia)'s 
everyday life differ greatly from the overall impression produced by Yakutia, 
creating a similar contrast between commercial and government-owned 
newspapers to that in Buryatia. They also present Sakha (Yakutia) within the 
specific genres, narratives and themes that constitute their product. Both Yakutsk 
Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya base their claims for the readers' attention to a 
large extent on the offer of an unofficial, alternative perspective on Sakha 
(Yakutia)'s politics. 
As Table 5.1 shows, 11.3 and 19.8 per cent of the articles in Yakutsk 
Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya respectively were coded with 'Satire'. These 
                                                 
28 Most sub-regions in Sakha (Yakutia) use the Sakha word ulus in their official names, rather 
than the Russian word raion. I will therefore refer to Sakha (Yakutia)'s sub-regions as ulusy. 
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figures translate into a regular reader encountering satire 34 times over Yakutsk 
Vecherniy's two-month sample period, which contained eight weekly 
newspapers, and 37 times over Nashe Vremya's. Both newspapers contained 
pages or columns specifically devoted to satirical stories about Sakha 
(Yakutia)'s politicians, such as Nashe Vremya's Itar-Kha-Tass page. Itar-Kha-
Tass' author uses a smokescreen by presenting damaging allegations within 
'news stories' about the fictional VseYelensko-Khindigirskiy Region (Krai), 
which is clearly intended to represent Sakha (Yakutia). VseYelensko-
Khindigirskiy Krai has a Governor called Vyacheslav Shtykov, who as the word 
shtyk (bayonet) in his name implies retains the aggressive techniques he 
assimilated during his "delinquent youth" (Nashe Vremya June 18, 2004: p. 34). 
Yakutsk Vecherniy's satire varied greatly in the extent to which it attacked the 
republican government. The column "A Week with Mikhail Zastenko" 
portrayed Sakha (Yakutia)'s politicians as simple and ridiculous rather than 
immoral – while Zastenko's "Ministers' Stories" (Deputatskiye Istorii) 
juxtaposed articles from the Republic's official code of conduct for ministers 
with humorous accounts of the code being broken, which showed the ministers 
concerned to be thoroughly corrupt and incompetent. 
The code 'Satire' also marked the frequent appearance of satirical, or 
sarcastic, comments in both these newspapers' news articles. For example, the 
introductory paragraph to Nashe Vremya's report of a press conference on how 
the Ministry of Emergency Situations had coped with Sakha (Yakutia)'s spring 
flooding contained the following:  
 
After a short, but inspiring film, colourfully describing the heroic feat of the rescuers in the 
spirit of ‘days and nights at open hearths, the Motherland never closed her eyes’ [a line from 
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a popular song from the Second World War, 'Victory Day' (Den Pobedy)], the 
‘extraordinary’ minister informed us that far from everything in the process of ice-drifting 
had gone smoothly, and that the absence of sensational news from riverside expanses was 
simply the result of his department's good work. (Nashe Vremya, June 11, 2004: p. 6.) 
 
As their production of satire suggests, both Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe 
Vremya are predicated on the existence of populations who are interested in 
politics, although they regard politicians with suspicion. These populations are 
likely to be based around Yakutsk, since the Republic's huge size makes 
transporting newspapers to the more distant ulusy prohibitively expensive. 
Yakutsk Vecherniy's target audience seems less concerned with high-
quality analysis and professional journalism than that of Nashe Vremya, as is 
indicated by Yakutsk Vecherniy's greater use of 'human interest': this code was 
attached to 56.3 per cent of Yakutsk Vecherniy's articles, as against 38.5 per cent 
of Nashe Vremya's. 'Human Interest' articles offer readers an attractive 
emotional experience, rather than an intellectually convincing account of current 
affairs. 
The high proportion (71.5 per cent) of Yakutsk Vecherniy's articles coded 
as 'Information' shows its emphasis on supplying news, even if the quality of 
this information was extremely variable. Indeed, Yakutsk Vecherniy contained 
evidence of an unusually relaxed attitude on the part of its journalists towards 
maintaining their professional standards, which corroborated the complaints I 
heard in Yakutsk about its capacity to misinform. It could report statistical 
information incorrectly – for example, its account of the republican 
government's quarterly report on Sakha (Yakutia)'s budget claimed the budget 
deficit to be 1.9 billion rubles, while Yakutia and Nashe Vremya described it as 
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"more than two billion" and 2.1 billion rubles respectively (Yakutsk Vecherniy, 
June 25, 2004: p. 8; Yakutia June 12, 2004: p. 2; Nashe Vremya June 11, 2004: p. 
3). The sample from Yakutsk Vecherniy produced the highest number of basic 
editorial errors out of all the newspapers, such as omitting to put an article's 
page number next to the headline, cartoon and introductory paragraph that 
advertised it on the front page of the edition, as the illustration in Figure 5.1 on 
the opposite page shows (Yakutsk Vecherniy, September 17, 2004: p. 1). 
Nashe Vremya was described to me by its journalists as 'the newspaper 
government officials and professionals enjoy reading', in contrast with Yakutia, 
the newspaper they 'have to read'. Its language and arguments corroborate this 
claim, in that they are of a high enough quality to satisfy a well-educated 
individual with a genuine interest in politics, while retaining an attractive level 
of accessibility and humour. An example is its account of the budget meeting, 
which described in detail Sakha (Yakutia)'s budget deficit and state debt, and the 
republican government's attempts to address the issue. However, the journalist 
also mentioned his personal impression of the meeting:  
 
Sometimes – please can those respected people's representatives forgive NV's reviewer! – a 
strange feeling arose: it was as if third-year schoolchildren [aged about 10] were giving an 
instructor of higher mathematics trick questions, and then were trying to catch him out for 
not knowing the subject. (Nashe Vremya, June 11, 2004: p. 3.) 
 
The comparison between Yakutsk Vecherniy's and Nashe Vremya's 
handling of Sakha (Yakutia)'s problematic budget exemplifies clearly the 
difference between them. While Nashe Vremya published a report of the 
discussion between Sakha (Yakutia)'s executive and legislative on the 
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Republic's budget two days after the meeting took place, on June 11, Yakutsk 
Vecherniy’s feature on the Republic's budget came out on June 25, a fortnight 
later. This suggests that Yakutsk Vecherniy’s editorial team did not expect their 
readers to have the awareness of the meeting or problem that would make 
Yakutsk Vecherniy's article seem unacceptably late. Yakutsk Vecherniy’s piece 
contains several damaging allegations, claiming for example that the executive 
had introduced additional outgoings after the budget had been agreed (Yakutsk 
Vecherniy June 25, 2004: p. 8). It provided basic evidence for these allegations 
in the form of what looked like officially produced figures, without specifying 
their source, or drawing out their implications. As a whole, the article 
communicated a general impression that various state actors had been using 
budget funds for their own interests, as the cartoon illustrating the piece shows; 
this cartoon can be found in Figure 5.2 on the opposite page. The article 
contained several unsupported statements, and occasionally also colloquial 
language. The difference between Yakutsk Vecherniy's and Nashe Vremya's 










Yakutsk Vecherniy Nashe Vremya 
An unstable economic situation has arisen in 
the Republic. Less and less tax is coming into 
the treasury (by 3.3 million rubles), but 
unplanned outgoings are getting bigger and 
bigger. The budget's credits aren't being 
returned, and the percentages on them aren't 
being paid back. And where can you get 
money from, if the cupboard's empty? In 
general, in comparison to 2002 the budget 
deficit has increased 834.1 million rubles and 
was 1.9 billion rubles. We are living in debt. 
And how that's going to turn out for the 
[Republic's] inhabitants is clear. There's no 
need to wait for anything good. For example, 
the big debts in the distribution of "Social 
policy" [sic] have today given rise to the threat 
that invalids can't get money for their journeys 
to their places of cure. This requires an 
operative correction to the state budget of 188 
million rubles. And where to get them from, 
if...? (Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 25, 2004: p. 8.) 
 
At the next meeting the Minister of Finance 
Ernst Beryezkin, reporting on the execution of 
the 2003 budget to the deputies, brought in 
much more large-scale and impressive figures: 
the income of the budget, which had been 
‘defined’ four times, was realised at 103.5 per 
cent, and the outgoings at 104 per cent. As a 
result the income was 33.4 billion rubles, and 
the outgoings were 35.5 billion rubles, leaving 
a deficit of 2.1 billion rubles, which was 
financed by the residues of accounts, credits, 
loans, securities, and also from the revenues of 
the sale of state property. (Nashe Vremya, 
June 11, 2004: p. 3.) 
 
 
Textbox 5.1: A comparison of Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy 
 
In sum, the content analysis of these three newspapers shows a wide variation in 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspaper discourse, which creates the opportunity of 
 212 
building up a picture of Sakha (Yakutia)’s context through comparing and 
contrasting the newspaper material.  
 
Section 5.1.2: The differences between Sakha (Yakutia)’s and Buryatia’s 
political spheres, as shown by their regional newspapers 
The official publicity reports in Yakutia show that its politicians are much more 
capable of attempting to make real changes than those of Buryatia. The 
repetitive series of worker's holidays, meetings, presidential visits and reports 
published by Buryatia was varied in Yakutia by large-scale independent 
enterprises, such as the Deti Azii children's sports festival, and the building of 
the hydroelectric power station described above. Table 5.3 illustrates this 
difference by presenting the proportions of articles marked with the codes 
‘Celebration’ and ‘Worker’s Holiday’.  
 
Code: Buryatia  
N = 371 
Yakutia 
N = 491 
Celebration 52.3 (194) 53.8 (264) 
Worker’s Holiday 9.4 (35) 2.2 (11) 
 
Table 5.3: A comparison of the percentages of articles coded as ‘Worker’s 
Holiday’ and ‘Celebration’ in the government-sponsored newspapers 
Buryatia and Yakutia (the figures in brackets are the number of articles to 
which the codes were attached; N = the number of articles in the sample) 
 
The code 'Worker's Holiday', marking a reference to the professional holidays 
supposedly celebrated by the entire Russian Federation, was used on 2.2 and 9.4 
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per cent of Yakutia's and Buryatia's articles respectively, even though roughly 
equal proportions of these newspapers' articles carried the 'Celebration' code 
(53.8 and 52.3 per cent respectively). These percentages translate into 11 
references to a workers' holiday in Yakutia in June 2004, compared with 35 in 
Buryatia. The celebration of federal workers' holidays was replaced to some 
extent in Yakutia by that of ceremonial occasions organised by the republican 
government.  
The language Yakutia used in its official articles was more lively, as the 
following Textbox shows. It contains the headlines and first paragraphs of two 
accounts of Buryatia's and Sakha (Yakutia)'s responses to Vladimir Putin's 
presidential message for 2004.   
 
Buryatia Yakutia 
Headline: The President's message is the 
orientator of action 
 
Headline: We will resolve all the questions 
together 
First two paragraphs: Another important 
question was touched upon. The vertical of 
power is built, and it is necessary to demarcate 
clearly the functions and powers of all the 
levels of authority, and increase the 
responsibility of all the organs of authority.  
 Having heard and discussed the report 
of the chief federal inspector, the board 
decided to ensure the working out and 
acceptance of a plan of measures to fulfil the 
Message of the President of the RF, to 
First paragraph: But first the Co-chairman of 
the OKS Council, the Vice-President of the 
Republic A. K. Akimov, stepped up before the 
assembled, and spoke at length on certain of 
the most important questions and exercises 
that stand before the Social Consultation 
Council this year. He noted that the beginning 
of the twenty-first century will go down in 
history as the time of the development of a 
multi-party system in Russia. Parliamentary 
parties are not just a part of the politico-
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establish control over the realisation of these 
plans and to analyse the course of the fulfilling 
of the main statutes of the Message. (Buryatia, 
June 9, 2004: p. 5) 
governing machine, but are also part of civil 
society, and furthermore the most influential, 
which means also responsible. In his Message 
to the Federal Assembly V. Putin marked out 
in particular the development of a genuine 
multi-party system and institutions of civil 
society among the most important exercises, 
underlining that parties with a federal 
significance should have a genuine influence 
in the regions, so as to have an effect on 
Russia as a whole. The government should 
create the appropriate conditions for the 
formation of civil society. And in particular 
the consolidation of power, social and political 
forces is the founding condition for the social 
and economic well being of the country. 
(Yakutia, June 4, 2004: p. 2.) 
 
  
Textbox 5.2: Textbox comparing official language in Buryatia and Yakutia 
 
Yakutia’s commitment towards the efficient communication of 
information and discussion goes hand in hand with its intention to supply its 
audience with up-to-date material, as shown by the rapidity with which it 
responded to the Beslan hostage taking in comparison with Buryatia. Yakutia's 
first article about Beslan was published on September 3, two days after the crisis 
started, while Buryatia's first article appeared on September 7. The two 
quotations in Textbox 5.2 also illustrate the different attitudes Buryatia and 
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Yakutia displayed towards the relationship between federal and republican 
governments. Yakutia showed Sakha (Yakutia)'s politicians to have a much 
stronger sense of themselves as independent actors within the Russian 
Federation than those working in Buryatia.  
The high level of satire in Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya 
suggests that these newspapers operate within a complex political hierarchy 
containing several ambitious and confident competitors. The risk these 
newspapers take in producing this satire increases their need of elite protection, 
or a 'roof' (krysha). Journalism can be as dangerous a profession in Sakha 
(Yakutia) as anywhere else in the Russian Federation. A journalist acquaintance 
of mine was badly beaten up as he left his office; he assumes this was because 
of something he published, since the motive for the attack was not robbery. I 
noticed that Yakutsk Vecherniy's office has a security guard and bars over its 
windows, installed after an armed man threatened to storm their building. The 
presence of satire in Sakha (Yakutia)'s newspapers implies the existence of 
several elite actors who are powerful enough to stand in opposition to each other. 
In contrast, the lack of satire in Buryatia's newspapers indicates the high level of 
control President Potapov and his circle had over Buryatia's political 
establishment during his presidency.  
Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya contained significant proportions 
of pre-ordered (zakaznoy) material. The code 'Zakaz?' refers to pieces that were 
likely to have been ordered from the newspapers by a politician, in contrast to 
the advertisements written to look like newspaper articles placed by commercial 
organisations in both the commercial newspapers. Articles published to order 
are referred to in Russia as articles published 'na zakaz' (Koltsova, 2001: p. 318). 
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Certain articles awakened the suspicion that they were zakaznyye when they 
contrasted with the contentions the newspaper usually made, while containing 
statements that were obviously useful for their subjects. For example, Yakutsk 
Vecherniy published a double-page interview with Yakutsk's Mayor, Il'ya 
Mikhal'chuk, which allowed him to express his profound love and concern for 
Yakutsk, its inhabitants and the Republic in general; this gave a context for his 
explanation as to why the drive to improve Yakutsk's sewage system had only 
produced some unpleasant concrete ditches, and for an outline of his plans for 
the betterment of Yakutsk (Yakutsk Vecherniy, September 9, 2004: pp. 14–15). 
The journalist also thanks the Mayor's press service for their "help in preparing 
the material". The other editions of Yakutsk Vecherniy contained several serious 
allegations about Mikhal'chuk, however. For example, an issue in early June 
claimed that his newly raised electricity and heating tariffs contravened federal 
law, that he was forcing the State University's students to spend the summer in 
their home ulusy, to prevent their disturbing the Deti Azii games, and that the 
town administration's property allocation department was corrupt (Yakutsk 
Vecherniy, June 4, 2004: pp. 9, 12–13). In all, 19 and 25 potentially zakaznyye 
pieces appeared in Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya respectively, out of the 
eight editions each sample contained. In contrast, Inform Polis' two-month 
sample contained only two articles that were likely to have been ordered by their 
subjects, and it had clearly come to some arrangement with Buryatia's main 
Buddhist organisation, as Chapter Four described. Pyatnitsa Plyus also 
published two articles that could possibly have been ordered.  
There seems to be a contradiction between the greater critical 
detachment of Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers and the high occurrence of ‘pre-
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ordered’ articles. ‘Pre-ordered’ articles may simply be a way of making extra 
money, or of maintaining reasonable relationships with the powerful figures 
around them, by conferring favours on behalf of their owners and their owners' 
friends. The higher percentage of pre-ordered articles in Nashe Vremya is one 
indication that its financial and political backing is less secure than that of 
Yakutsk Vecherniy. Pre-ordered articles may also be evidence of a greater 
readiness by the Republic’s political elites to co-opt the press into their political 
endeavours.  
One conclusion is that these newspapers and their owners are relatively 
weak but nevertheless autonomous participants within Sakha (Yakutia)'s 
political hierarchy. Other articles they published show that they exist alongside 
other secondary political actors, who are also competing for their personal 
interests as individual agents. For example, Nashe Vremya described the 
Members of Parliament (deputaty) "flinging thunder and lightning" over a plan 
to build rural schools at a parliamentary committee meeting (Nashe Vremya 
June 4, 2004: p. 3). Aleksandr Uarov at one point "scolded the capital's DSK and 
KSMK [two organisations in charge of building and reconstruction] for being 
'monopolists, who quadruple prices', and promised to deal with them, just as he 
was going to deal with those (is this throwing a stone at the Minister of Building, 
Derepovskiy?) who work with greedy contractors". However, the committee 
eventually passed the plan they had criticised so vehemently on to the main 
parliament meeting as it stood, raising the possibility that they were using the 
meeting primarily as an opportunity to attack each other, thus establishing their 
positions within a competitive elite group.  
Yakutsk Vecherniy is also frank in reporting conflicts at higher political 
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levels, between President Shtyrov and Mikhal’chuk. The newspaper claimed 
that the Executive had demanded a review of the legal foundations of Yakutsk's 
general construction plan, in order to undermine Mikhal'chuk's control over the 
new building on Yakutsk's territory (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 4, 2004: p. 2). 
Similarly, Nashe Vremya repeatedly alludes to the political battles between 
Shtyrov and Mikhal'chuk in both news articles, and the satire page Itar-Kha-
Tass. For example, Nashe Vremya's announcement that Mikhal'chuk had 
cancelled some of the celebrations of Yakutsk's anniversary, out of respect for 
the victims of the Beslan hostage-taking, pointed out that the opening of the 
Svetlinsk power station had been celebrated in Yakutsk the day after Russia's 
official day of mourning, with "the resounding of songs and dances" (Nashe 
Vremya, September 10, 2004: p. 6). The author wondered whether "the town 
hall and the executive aren't walking in step again".  
The impression given by these pieces is that several conflicts are 
occurring simultaneously, among the various groupings and individuals 
operating within the Republic's elite sphere. The groupings themselves appear to 
overlap the Republic's political and business spheres, as these newspapers show. 
All the newspapers contain stories that describe either representatives of the 
Republic's state organs acting as private businessmen, or private businesses 
taking the state's functions upon themselves. For example, Yakutia described 
how the General Director of an open shareholders' organisation used his 
company's money to open a school in his home village (Yakutia, June 10, 2004: 
p. 2). President Shtyrov's own career also exemplifies the ease with which 
politicians and businessmen can change their positioning: he was the Director of 
Sakha (Yakutia)'s state diamond company ALROSA, until he became the 
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Republic's President in 2001. 
 
 
Section 5.2: Sakha (Yakutia)’s political elites, and their relationship with 
the Russian Federation  
 
5.2.1 Political practice in Sakha (Yakutia) 
 All three newspapers contain evidence that elite figures can behave as if they 
believed they were placed beyond the moral, social and economic conventions 
these newspapers themselves acknowledge as central to Sakha (Yakutia)'s social 
life. They report actions and statements made by politicians, businessmen and 
high-level government officials (chinovniki), which indicate a general tendency 
for elite figures to regard themselves as entitled to make use of whatever 
resources they can commandeer, without reference to the practices and 
relationships formally recognised by republican legislation. For example, 
Yakutia described how Gennadiy Savochkin, the head of Gazovikov settlement's 
municipal administration, allowed one of his employees to move into a hostel's 
(obschezhitiye) communal kitchen, thus depriving the hostel's inhabitants of 
their access to running water (Yakutia June 4, 2004: p. 8). Nashe Vremya 
published an interview with Andrey Vysokikh, a private businessman who in 
2002 organised the reconstruction of a wooden tower that had been part of 
Yakutsk's original fortress (Nashe Vremya September 10, 2004: p. 3). He 
claimed that Mikhal'chuk had asked him to finish the reconstruction in time for 
the celebration of Yakutsk's anniversary, promising that he would be Vysokikh's 
"debtor". The new tower would therefore have been associated with 
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Mikhal'chuk's major public display, even though the fact that Vysokikh created 
a civic organisation to raise the necessary money indicates that Yakutsk's 
municipal administration did not primarily fund the reconstruction. It was 
reported afterwards that Mikhal'chuk's chinovniki did not feel obliged to do 
anything but "shrug their shoulders" at Vysokikh's request that his favour be 
returned (Nashe Vremya September 10, 2004: p. 3).   
Both government and commercial newspapers constantly refer to the 
capacity of money in Sakha (Yakutia) to appear or disappear in unexpected 
places. Articles range from Yakutsk Vecherniy's allegation that President 
Shtyrov had allocated three million rubles from the state budget to buy the 
singer A. Adamovaya a flat, through to Nashe Vremya's account of the 
charitable project that was to be partially funded by Yakutsk's municipality, but 
which was not mentioned at all in the municipal budget and was "happily 
forgotten" (Yakutsk Vecherniy, 25 June, 2004: p. 8; Nashe Vremya, 18 June, 
2004: p. 6). The absence of government money is also a constant theme: for 
example, Yakutia reported that Yakutsk municipality's health budget had a 
deficit of 40.4 per cent (Yakutia, 12 June, 2004: p. 1). 
Both Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya mention kampaneyschina, 
which according to them means the republican politicians' habit of trying to 
force the population to 'volunteer' their labour or money for a government 
project, such as preparing Yakutsk for the Deti Azii festival. Kampaneyschina is 
often organised in the form of subbotniki, or specific days when particular 
collectives undertake mutually beneficial and supposedly voluntary work; 
subbotniki were a regular part of life during the Soviet era. Yakutsk Vecherniy 
mentions kampaneyschina in a variety of articles published during the run up to 
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the Deti Azii tournament. The claims behind these references were fully set out 
in an unsigned personal column devoted entirely to this theme, which claimed 
the following dialogue to be a quotation from a meeting of the “Commission for 
the Co-operation of the Forces of State Control”: 
 
 - They're not taking part in the subbotniki? 
 -  No.  
 -  Something needs to be done. The pressure needs to be put on. What leverage do you have 
over them? Use everything! Close them down entirely! 
 -  For doing what? 
 -  For doing whatever. (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 4, 2004: p. 13.)  
 
The article describes kampaneyschina as resulting from government workers' 
eagerness to please their bosses. In the case of the Deti Azii tournament, the 
politician personally in charge of the preparations, Vice President Aleksandr 
Akimov, allegedly gave a "push" (nakachka) to the heads of Yakutsk's various 
policing organisations, who in turn 'pushed' their inferiors; the 'push' ultimately 
unleashed swarms of police inspectors on Yakutsk's small businesses and shops, 
to pressure their owners into attending the subbotniki. This chain of events 
implies Sakha (Yakutia)'s state institutions to exist as strong vertical hierarchies 
of government officials (chinovniki) and politicians, who regard themselves as 
having the power to co-opt private citizens into their initiatives. The article 
quotes the Vice-Mayor of Yakutsk Nikolai Lepchikov as saying, "You need to 
know that the town [Yakutsk] doesn't exist for you, but you exist for the town! ... 
You were given the possibility of working in the town – look yourselves to see 
the benefit you can bring it."  
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Nashe Vremya occasionally made passing references to kampaneyschina 
and the power relationships it implies in its news articles, while the stories in 
Itar-Kha-Tass consistently incorporated it into their representation of 
VseYelensko-Khindigirskiy Krai’, or Sakha (Yakutia). For example, one story 
describes the Mayor of Shtykutsk's (Yakutsk) attempts to make the suburbs look 
like rural villages: he orders 80 tons of the freshest dung to be brought in, for the 
"cultural department" to dress the local population in sarafans and peasant 
headdresses (kokoshniki), and for each family to be given a scythe, sickle and 
rake (Nashe Vremya June 4, 2004: p. 38). Nothing resembling kampaneyschina 
was mentioned by Buryatia's newspapers.  
 Yakutia reported that citizens and students came to celebrate the Day of 
the Surrounding Environment by organising subbotniki to clean up their local 
towns, showing that subbotniki do occur in connection with state-sponsored 
holidays, whether or not their participants are genuine volunteers (Yakutia June 
5, 2004: p. 4). Yakutia also published an appeal for Sakha (Yakutia)'s citizens 
and businesses to provide extra funding for Deti Azii on June 5, seven weeks 
before the games were due to start, indicating that the politicians in charge 
unexpectedly found themselves short of money during their final preparations 
(Yakutia June 5, 2004: p. 2). The resort to a public appeal at such short notice 
shows that the republican government has reason to regard its population as a 
resource that can be called upon. Whether or not the government's confidence in 
its citizenry results from its use of the direct pressure described in Yakutsk 
Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya, Yakutia's appeal corroborates the commercial 
newspapers’ claim that the government can attempt to mobilise the Republic's 
population for its own purposes.  
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As in Buryatia, legislation in Sakha (Yakutia) sets its citizens the task of 
defining their positions within complex and inefficient bureaucratic procedures, 
which give the state considerable power to set its desired status quo. For 
instance, Yakutia shows that citizens have to produce at least nine different 
official proofs of their status if they wish to assert their right to a lower payment 
for public services; this number can increase dramatically for certain individuals, 
such as divorced women (Yakutia June 10, 2004: p. 3). Bureaucratic hurdles can 
be allowed to remain, even if they reduce economic growth. As Yakutsk 
Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya described, Sakha (Yakutia) had still not created a 
way to implement its population's constitutional right to own land in Yakutsk, 
over ten years after the Russian Constitution was signed (Yakutsk Vecherniy 
June 4, 2004: p. 13; Nashe Vremya, August 27, 2004: p. 10–11). Citizens were 
thus continuously forced to negotiate leasing agreements with Yakutsk's 
Municipal Administration. Yakutsk Vecherniy contended that this hinders the 
development of small businesses in particular, since entrepreneurs have to go 
through long and difficult procedures in order to lease the land their premises 
occupy. Yakutsk Vecherniy also alleged that these arrangements were engineered 
in order to maintain Yakutsk municipality's control over the town (Yakutsk 
Vecherniy June 4, 2004: p. 13).  
This example tends to confirm that an essential point made during 
Chapter Three's discussion of legal processes in Buryatia also applies to Sakha 
(Yakutia): the creation of a legislation that governs the Republic efficiently, 
while safeguarding its citizens' interests, is not necessarily the government's 
primary concern. Law can instead be used to maintain a particular actor's 
economic position, or in some cases can be incorporated into the conflicts that 
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occur between elite groups. For example, one of Yakutsk Vecherniy’s satirical 
pieces reported how the Minister Kliment Ivanov tried to remove the Speaker 
Vasiliy Filippov by starting an impeachment process, adding the comment that 
this was perhaps in order to attain the position of Speaker for himself (Yakutsk 
Vecherniy, June 25, 2004: p. 6). Ivanov did in fact lead an attempt to impeach 
Filippov in 2002, as both Yakutia and the republican news agency Sakha News 
describe (Yakutia, January 30, 2002).29 
Sakha (Yakutia)'s legal processes are subject to inexplicable hiatuses. 
Yakutsk Vecherniy had apparently caused the Procurator to rule that the Mayor 
of Yakutsk Mikhal’chuk had raised the public service tariffs illegally, but as the 
newspaper itself had to admit, there was some uncertainty as to whether 
Mikhal'chuk would actually change the tariffs (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 25, 2004: 
p. 5). Mikhal'chuk's unwillingness to respond implies that he must have had 
some grounds to hope that he would find some way of avoiding reducing the 
tariffs, despite the Procurator's ruling. His confidence is likely to have been 
bolstered by the precedent set by the Speaker of Sakha (Yakutia)'s Parliament, 
Nikolai Solomov. Solomov occupied his position until 2005, despite having 
been accused by the Republic's Procurator in March 2004 of beating his wife to 
death on October 26, 2003 (Izvestiya March 5, 2004: p. 5; Yakutsk Vecherniy 
June 25, 2004: p. 6). A high status, and the corresponding social and economic 
resources it commands, seem to be able to override the dictates of Sakha 
(Yakutia)'s legal institutions.   
The contrast between the discourses in Buryatia’s commercial and 
government-sponsored newspapers was discussed in Chapter Three, as were the 
                                                 
29 www.1sn.ru/print/php?id=518: “Krapleniya karta yakutskogo parlamenta”; August 10, 2007. 
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close relationships between commercial newspapers and their audiences. The 
commercial newspapers in Sakha (Yakutia), like those in Buryatia, have to 
represent the Republic's context in a way that resonates with their audiences' 
perceptions to a reasonable degree, in order for them to create the relationships 
and interactions that sell.  
Yakutsk Vecherniy's high proportion of articles marked 'Human Interest' 
reflects the way it presents a convivial relationship with the distinct personality 
of its journalists as its main attraction. The fundamental characteristic of this 
personality is a 'cool' (krutoy) and savvy pragmatism, which is supposedly the 
secret of the journalist’s success in providing the 'honest' information their 
readers need to orientate themselves within a challenging social environment. 
An example is Yakutsk Vecherniy's Wild Field (Dikoye Polye) page, which 
epitomises the personal relationship that apparently exists between its readers 
and journalists. Dikoye Polye offers small businessmen essential information 
about the legal and political systems within which they work, through a 
combination of news articles and personal columns. Its colloquial style gives the 
impression that its journalists and their readers are united in the struggle for 
financial gain, within an unstable context dominated by powerful and 
unscrupulous individuals bent on maintaining their superior wealth. As one 
personal column put it, "We travel further down our tangled and uneven way – 
through the thorns of the wild field [dikoye polye] to starry business success!" 
(Yakutsk Vecherniy June 25, 2004: p. 15). The journalists demonstrate their 
‘cool’ understanding of Sakha (Yakutia)'s business environment through their 
emphatically unsentimental and cynical outlook, which is implied to be essential 
for survival. One of Dikoye Polye's weekly aphorisms, published under the 
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rubric 'cool ideas' (krutyye mysli), sums up their contention: "Nothing hinders 
creeping so much as wings" (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 4, 2004: p. 13). The 
articles surrounding this aphorism tell their readers what to do if they are 
harassed by the police, or recount Yakutsk Municipality's efforts to maintain 
their control over land ownership in Yakutsk. The chatty, informative style is 
noteworthy:   
 
And as well as that, the length of time plots of land can be leased out is artificially lowered to 
one year. It is very unprofitable for the town hall of Yakutsk to allot land for longer periods – 
a notorious bit of land might be needed for the next building of the century, or it might catch 
the eye of someone close to the Mayor's circles. (Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 4, 2004: p. 13.) 
 
These articles describe a status quo whereby Yakutsk's small businessmen have 
to negotiate their way through complex and changing legislation, ‘creeping’ 
forward by means of their wits, determination, and the knowledge provided by 
Dikoye Polye. The threat presented by the powerful makes any aspirations about 
using ‘wings’ naïve. Meanwhile, the journalists' insouciant language emphasises 
their intuitive understanding of Sakha (Yakutia)'s political elites, which allows 
them to be careless about the finer points of editorial convention. 
The journalists also write with the assumption that they understand their 
readership well enough to be able to speak on their behalf without alienating 
them. For example, one columnist mentions that if any government official 
(chinovnik) were to ask Yakutsk's small businessmen what they thought about 
the Deti Azii tournament, they would "learn many new and interesting words" 
(Yakutsk Vecherniy June 4, 2004: p. 13). They are likely to be correct in this 
assumption, since their articles attract a sufficient readership to make Yakutsk 
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Vecherniy one of the most popular newspapers in Yakutsk, according to the 
journalists interviewed and Yakutia’s audience research. Dikoye Polye's 
allegations must therefore correlate with some citizens' experiences of Yakutsk 
life.  
The journalists' display of intimacy with their readership projects an 
imagined reader who shares the journalists' ‘cool’ outlook. Readers are thereby 
invited to imagine themselves as krutyye, savvy, and as having the potential to 
overcome the various problems that beset them. Yakutsk Vecherniy also contains 
representations of weak individuals, whose personal characteristics contrast with 
those of the journalists, and by implication also of the readers. For example, a 
story about a woman who lost her flat through a confidence trick carried the 
headline, "You'll pay for naïveté!"; the first paragraph ends with the sentence, 
"In wild times naïveté is a vice, and a vice that's punished" (Yakutsk Vecherniy 
June 18, 2004: p. 9). Yakutsk Vecherniy thus implies that its journalists' and 
readers' krutoy pragmatism sets them apart from the foolish and corrupt people 
around them, as a privileged group within the Republic. 
Yakutsk Vecherniy persists in its commitment to this relationship 
between its journalists and readers, despite the fact that, as the newspaper itself 
admits, the skilful exploitation of the law is not necessarily going to attain the 
desired results – as might be expected in a context where elites have the capacity 
to influence legal processes. For example, a feature on how employees can force 
their employers to pay them the correct salary mentions a group of medical 
workers who attempted the legal action the article describes, but who "now 
assiduously avoid conversations on this theme" (Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 4, 
2004: p. 7). Yakutsk Vecherniy's journalists understand this repetitive narrative 
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about a plucky underdog to have an attraction for their readers that enables them 
to publish their numerous mistakes and inconsistencies, in addition to zakaz 
articles.  
As with Yakutsk Vecherniy, the personality of Nashe Vremya's 
journalists appears to exert a direct influence on its content. Nashe Vremya's 
journalists come across as independent-minded observers who are motivated to 
share their personal opinions and knowledge with the reader. The negative 
comments Nashe Vremya makes about Sakha (Yakutia)'s political context are 
criticisms of specific phenomena, rather than repetitive statements that 
maintained a negative representation of the status quo, as in Yakutsk Vecherniy. 
Instead, the tone of Nashe Vremya's articles is more optimistic. For example, 
one journalist asked her interviewee to "wish the citizens of Sakha (Yakutia) 
something in advance of the anniversary of Yakutsk", so that they did not 
"finish their conversation on a pessimistic note" (Nashe Vremya September 10, 
2004: p. 3). Criticism can be sharp, however. For example, Nashe Vremya could 
present state celebrations as outpourings of money and promises, which often 
fail to benefit the supposed recipients. The series of photographs and captions in 
Figure 5.3 on the page opposite was published ten days before the beginning of 
the Deti Azii sports tournament. The introductory text strikes an ironic note:  
 
Yakutsk continues to live off the expectation of a grandiose sporting holiday, the most 
dazzling event of the last four years. But while the main streets are rapidly taking on a quasi-
divine appearance, and huge placards and bunting with the symbols of the forthcoming 
Games are starting to appear on luxurious central buildings, somewhere in the wilds of the 
outlying slums, far from government eyes, other, genuine and the most ordinary children of 
Asia are every day rushing around the gateways, and playing their own, probably, no less 
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cheerful and interesting games. Practically none of them even knows that in a month and a 
half's time hundreds of little boys and girls are arriving from various far-away countries. And 
they also don't know why and for what the grown-ups thought up at some point a Day for the 
Defence of Children, and why they – the grown-ups – mark it on the first day of June. But 
essentially it doesn't have the slightest importance for them, because the long-awaited 
summer without any special holidays always was and will be the most happy time for our 
remarkable native kiddies. (Nashe Vremya June 4, 2004: p. 7.) 
 
The journalist who produced this page did not sign it, in contrast to almost all 
the other newspaper material in this analysis.  
The collection of Sakha (Yakutia)'s newspapers in this sample shows the 
extent to which prominent actors are capable of asserting their wills at the 
expense of the less powerful. This creates a situation where individuals have to 
amass social, economic and political capital, since they cannot rely on protection 
from the state, or its legislation. Sakha (Yakutia)'s elites therefore have a 
proprietorial attitude towards its political and economic resources, and their 
personal access to them – which is likely to be part of the reason why a state that 
produces a quarter of the world's diamonds, and which in 2004 owned 32 per 
cent of the company that extracts these diamonds, had a debt of 11.8 billion 
rubles (over 465 million US dollars) in 2004 (Nashe Vremya, June 11, 2004: p. 
3). 
 
5.2.2 Sakha (Yakutia)’s administration and the federal government 
Yakutsk Vecherniy and Nashe Vremya consistently presented the federal 
government as ultimately having the greater power over the Republic and its 
resources. For example, an article in Nashe Vremya's June sample, with the sub-
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heading "Status Quo", described how a federal-level legislator's 
recommendation that Yakutsk maintain its status as an urban region (gorodskoy 
okrug) was likely to override the Executive's attempts to turn Yakutsk into an 
ordinary municipality (munitsipal'niy raion) (Nashe Vremya June 4, 2004: p. 3). 
Yakutsk Vecherniy's report on the impact recent federal-level legislation was due 
to have on Sakha (Yakutia)'s regional administrations had the headline, “Putin 
sent a message, Yakutia set off” (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 11, 2004: p. 2).  
Although Yakutia contained articles that are likely to be direct 
communications from a federal political source, it was prepared to take an 
independent line from the federal government. On the one hand, it published the 
Federal Minister Mikhail Zubarov's defence of the monetisation of social 
welfare payments, as did several government and private newspapers in Irkutsk 
Oblast' and Buryatia (Yakutia June 5, 2004: p. 3). However, it did not carry a 
presidential statement supporting the federal government's removal of regional 
elections, unlike Buryatia (Buryatia, September 16, 2004: p. 1). Yakutia's 
relative independence from federal input indicates the Republican government's 
desire to act as a self-sufficient political entity, at least in the public arena.  
As all the newspapers show, the argument between the federal and 
republican governments over the federal legislation known in Sakha (Yakutia) 
as the 'super-law' (superzakon) was a decisive moment, demonstrating the 
republican government’s desire to take its own initiatives in the face of the 
federal government's increasing domination. One of these initiatives was what 
became known as the "Governors' mutiny" (bunt gubernatorov), over the 
superzakon (Yakutia September 1, 2004: p. 2). 
All the newspapers contended that the superzakon would have greatly 
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increased the republican government's financial responsibilities towards its 
citizens, while simultaneously reducing the money at its disposal. The law 
required the reorganisation of all the sub-regional units of governance in the 
Russian Federation into 'self-governing' municipalities, which would have 
complete control over the allocation of social welfare payments. As part of this 
restructuring, the financing of social welfare payments would come from the 
individual regions' budgets, rather than that of the federal government. In 
addition, the superzakon removed the federal government's obligation to finance 
the extra subsidies for those living in the northern regions, such as Sakha 
(Yakutia), together with the regions' constitutional right to share the 
management of the natural resources on their territories. It thus had the power 
significantly to undermine Sakha (Yakutia)'s pretensions towards autonomy, by 
removing its financial viability. The Republic was already in debt, as Section 
One described. The disappearance of the considerable income generated by 
Sakha (Yakutia)'s extensive natural resources, in addition to the financial 
burdens the superzakon imposed, could cause it to become entirely dependent 
on federal subsidies, like Buryatia.  
The controversy moved up a gear in July 2004 when a group of regional 
leaders, including the Presidents of Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), signed a 
request for Putin to reassess the law. Most of the signatories withdrew their 
support, among them the President of Buryatia, after "preventives" (profilaktiki) 
had been administered by Putin's regional representatives; President Shtyrov 
was one of the only regional leaders to continue the initiative (Yakutia, 
September 1, 2004: p. 2). Yakutia became one of the arenas in which this 
conflict took place, in that it published both the views against the superzakon 
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and articles supporting the federal position. Putin signed the superzakon into 
effect on August 22, 2004, without having made the changes the regions 
demanded. The passing of the superzakon was followed by Putin's 
announcement on September 13, 2004, that the leaders of the Federation’s 
regions would be approved by the Russian Federation's President, rather than 
being elected by their populations. These legislative changes have further 
institutionalised the federal government's supremacy over regional governments, 
apparently creating a vertical power hierarchy similar to that of the Soviet Union. 
The federal government has since continued to undermine Sakha (Yakutia)'s 
economic position, by acquiring a controlling stake in ALROSA; originally, as 
Chapter One describes, the federal and regional governments were both given 
32 per cent of ALROSA's shares, when it was set up in 1992.   
 However, the sample under review revealed that tensions with the 
federal government could be resolved in other ways. In particular, the 
newspapers revealed details about the career trajectories of certain politicians, 
showing that the federal and republican governments do not necessarily exist as 
two political camps in competition with one another. The variable use of law in 
Sakha (Yakutia) seems to reflect a disaggregation between the legally 
recognised institutional hierarchies, and the truly influential power relationships 
within the Federation as a whole.   
Yakutsk Vecherniy contended in one feature that the federal government 
had effectively replaced Sakha (Yakutia)'s first President, Mikhail Nikolayev, 
with Shtyrov (Yakutsk Vecherniy, September 17, 2004: p. 3). Its evidence 
consisted of what it claimed were several striking coincidences in the run up to 
the election, held in 2001. For example, it stated that Nikolayev had withdrawn 
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his candidature in favour of Shtyrov, immediately after both Shtyrov and 
Nikolayev had attended meetings at the Kremlin on the same day (Yakutsk 
Vecherniy, September 17, 2004: p. 3). Sakha (Yakutia)'s court ruled against 
Nikolayev's eligibility for a third presidential term the day after his withdrawal, 
despite its previous incapacity to come to a decision: it had examined this 
problem three times without result (Yakutsk Vecherniy, September 17, 2004: p. 
3). The impression the newspapers give of Sakha (Yakutia)'s court makes it easy 
to imagine it coming to an arrangement with a powerful federal actor, after a 
period of negotiation between Nikolayev and his opponents. Nevertheless, 
Yakutia contained several articles by Nikolayev, showing that he continues to 
occupy an elite position in the Russian Federation, despite his promotion of an 
agenda that contradicts the federal government's emphasis on centralisation. He 
is still the Vice-Chairman of the Federation Council (his position was confirmed 
for another term on April 25, 2008) and therefore has a level of direct access to 
high-level federal politicians.30 This suggests that Nikolayev was able to 
demand a degree of protection from the Kremlin in return for stepping down 
from the election. Putin recommended Shtyrov for a second presidential term in 
2007, despite his leading role in the bunt gubernatorov described above, 
indicating that Shtyrov himself can also operate with a degree of independence 
without destroying his relationship with the Kremlin.  
Shtyrov and Nikolayev must have the type of relationship with the 
federal government that enables them to negotiate directly with the Kremlin. 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers contained other evidence that leading politicians 
have the capacity to make exclusive bargains with federal actors, which enables 
                                                 
30 http://ru.wikipedia.org: “Nikolayev, Mikhail Yefimovich”; November 23, 2009. 
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them to extract help from the federal government in pursuing a non-federal 
agenda. Yakutia published an article by Aleksandr Migalkin, the Minister of 
External Relations, in which he celebrated the success of the Deti Azii 
tournament (Yakutia September 2, 2004: p. 3). He mentioned in particular the 
"huge work" the federal Ministry of External Relations had done in arranging 
visa invitations for the tournament's foreign participants. The federal Ministry of 
External Relations had thus contributed to an event that was designed to raise 
the international awareness of Sakha (Yakutia) as a distinct entity, rather than a 
region within the Russian Federation. Migalkin's praise of the federal Ministry 
of External Relations in general could have been a gesture towards repaying the 
favour the Ministry had done him, raising the possibility that there had been a 
specific negotiation between them about this event. Meanwhile Mikhal’chuk 
resigned from his post in September 2007, possibly in connection with the 20 
formal charges of corruption the municipal administration staff then faced; this 
did not prevent Putin from nominating him as Governor of Arkhangel’sk Region 
(Oblast’) on March 9, 2008.31  
All this evidence suggests that what Nashe Vremya calls the "flattering, 
lobbying discussions" in "large office ante-rooms" are as important in 
determining the chain of events in Sakha (Yakutia) as the activities occurring 
within the parameters of institutionalised practice – and therefore that the power 
hierarchy between the federal and republican governments in fact consists of the 
developing personal relationships between federal and republican politicians 
(Nashe Vremya June 4, 2004: p. 4). The publicly acknowledged configuration of 
federal and republican institutions is thus complemented by a changing network 
                                                 
31 www.rferl.com: bulletin for March 15, 2008. 
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of personal connections, which mediate power relationships that do not 
correspond exactly to the obvious dominance of the federal government over the 
republican.  
Positing the existence of elite groupings that overlap the boundary 
between the federal and republican governments explains why a remote and 
sparsely populated territory can produce such varied and competitive elite actors, 
whose activities are reflected in the controversies aired in Yakutsk Vecherniy and 
Nashe Vremya. It also explains the difference in newspaper discourse between 
Sakha (Yakutia) and Buryatia. A lack of direct interest in Buryatia on the part of 
federal politicians would enable a small group of local politicians to consolidate 
their power, in the process creating a relatively homogeneous and obedient mass 
media. Sakha (Yakutia)'s most obvious attraction for federal actors is the wealth 
it contains, in the form of its natural resources. Buryatia in contrast has very 





The tense relationship between a dominant federal government and a 
subservient but discontented republican government co-exists with the dynamics 
between a group of federal and republican actors, who are all making money out 
of Sakha (Yakutia) in various ways. Certain federal actors must also be 
benefiting from Sakha (Yakutia)'s present status quo, since they have made such 
efforts to increase their control over it. The members of this group – whether 
based in Yakutsk, or elsewhere – have an interest in maintaining the network of 
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relationships that form it (even though many of them are in direct competition) 
because they are also maintaining the possibility of negotiating with individuals 
they know personally. It is much easier for the new federal controllers of 
ALROSA to make a deal with Shtyrov that allows him to continue as President, 
rather than to replace him with someone who has to form new relationships with 
the republic's elites. Sakha (Yakutia)'s natural resources have helped to produce 
a state that apparently has more autonomy than Buryatia, but which is held in 
place by the negotiations that enable the federal and republican actors concerned 
to continue making a profit. However, the republican governments present their 
citizens with similar challenges, both lacking the capacity to govern effectively.   
The relationship between Sakha (Yakutia)’s administration and the 
federal government has implications for the political status quo in the Russian 
Federation as a whole. It suggests that the Federation’s political establishment 
exists as a complex network of overlapping elite groups, rather than a ‘power 
vertical’ of governing institutions headed by the presidential administration. 
Members of the central government therefore sometimes have to compromise 
their interests with those of regional actors. 
  The other reason why it is in the federal government's interest to retain 
the current administration of Sakha (Yakutia) is connected to the strength of 
Sakha ethnic identity, among not only the general Sakha population, but also 
within parts of Sakha (Yakutia)'s political establishment. As Chapter Six will 
describe, Sakha culture and identity have a major influence on both the 







The interaction between Sakha ethnic culture and political legitimisation 




This chapter builds on Chapter Five’s discussion of Sakha (Yakutia)’s political 
context, to show how the contemporary development of Sakha culture and 
identity interacts with the Republic’s political processes. Chapter Five described 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s political hierarchy, and the complex relationship between the 
federal and republican governments. Chapter Six investigates the extent to 
which Sakha culture continues to produce specific values and practices, along 
with their power to influence mainstream public discourse. It examines the 
hypothesis that those in charge of Sakha (Yakutia) have to manage a strong 
desire for the Republic to function as a specifically Sakha autonomous state, 
among both the mass population and the Republic’s politicians and government 
workers. This factor could motivate the federal government to maintain the 
current configuration of high-level republican politicians, despite the difficulties 
they can cause, since they have the capacity to restrain the Sakha desire for 
autonomy without risking a political crisis.  
 The first section of this chapter discusses the results of the quantitative 
analysis, comparing them with an equivalent analysis of Buryatia’s local 
 238 
newspapers. It shows that Sakha culture has a much more significant power to 
influence the Republic’s mainstream public sphere than does Buryat culture. 
The second, third and fourth sections of this chapter build on and explain the 
findings presented in the first section. They show the more detailed impression 
of Sakha culture and identity that can be obtained by the qualitative analysis of 
these newspapers’ discourse. The second and third sections set out what the 
newspapers reveal about the changing perceptions behind contemporary Sakha 
community hierarchies, describing the concern over the world status of the 
Sakha people they stimulate. Section Four discusses the role political 
legitimisation narratives have in this process of cultural development.  
 
 
Section 6.1: The influence of Sakha culture on Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
mainstream discursive spheres 
The quantitative stage of the content analysis indicates the existence of a strong 
Sakha influence over Sakha (Yakutia)’s culture and politics, in tandem with a 
relatively high level of Sakha cultural particularity.  
The code ‘Sakha Cultural Practice’ was used to mark articles referring to 
a specifically Sakha practice or idea, such as the Ysyakh summer solstice ritual. 
‘Buryat Cultural Practice’ and ‘Russian Cultural Practice’ were similarly 
attached to activities or ideas that are acknowledged in the regions concerned to 
be ‘Buryat’ or ‘Russian’ in particular. The codes indicating Buryat and Sakha 
cultural practice were only needed for the analysis of newspapers published in 
these peoples’ respective titular Republics, since there were so few references to 
Buryat culture in Sakha (Yakutia), and vice versa.  
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The first reading of Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers revealed a similar 
variation in the ways the government-sponsored and commercial newspapers 
referred to ethnic culture as that of Buryatia’s newspapers, necessitating the use 
of the prefix ‘Super’ explained in Chapter Four. ‘Ethnicity’ marked Buryatia’s 
and Yakutia’s mentions of ethnic culture in the abstract, while the code ‘Super 
Ethnicity’ indicated the privately owned commercial newspapers’ references to 
ethnic culture. The presence of ‘Super’ in the code name arises from the 
commercial newspapers’ indirect references to ethnic culture, which required a 
degree of interpretation.  
Table 6.1 shows the percentage of articles in each newspaper sample 
coded with ‘Ethnicity’, ‘Super Ethnicity’, ‘Buryat Cultural Practice’, ‘Sakha 





























N = 371) 
9.7 (36)  n/a 8.4 (31)  n/a 3.5 (13) 
Yakutia 
(June only, 
N = 491) 
5.3 (26) n/a n/a 9.2 (45) 2.6 (13) 
Inform 





5.4 (16) 6.0 (18) n/a 3.7 (11)  
Nashe 
Vremya 
(N = 187) 
n/a 4.8 (9) n/a 8.6 (16) 3.2 (6) 
Pyatnitsa 
Plyus 
(N = 75) 
n/a 3.0 (2) 0 (0)  n/a 5.3 (4)  
Yakutsk 
Vecherniy 
(N = 302) 
n/a 5.2 (16) n/a 7.9 (24) 4.0 (12) 
 
Table 6.1: Percentages of articles in newspapers marked with codes related 
to ethnic culture (the figures in brackets are the number of articles to which 
the codes were attached; N = the number of articles in the sample; n/a = not 
applicable) 
 
 As Table 6.1 shows, the newspapers from Sakha (Yakutia) made more 
references to Sakha cultural practice than their equivalents in Buryatia made to 
Buryat cultural practice. 9.2 per cent of Yakutia’s articles referred to Sakha 
cultural practice, compared with the 8.4 per cent of Buryatia’s referring to 
Buryat cultural practice; 8.6 per cent of Nashe Vremya’s, as against 6.0 of 
Inform Polis’, and 7.9 per cent of Yakutsk Vecherniy’s, against a complete 
absence of references to Buryat culture in Pyatnitsa Plyus. Pyatnitsa Plyus is 
also distinctive in that it contains the most references to Russian culture out of 
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all the newspapers. 5.3 per cent of its articles were marked with ‘Russian 
cultural practice’, compared to 4.0 per cent of Yakutsk Vecherniy’s, 3.7 per cent 
of Inform Polis’, 3.2 per cent of Nashe Vremya’s, 3.5 per cent of Buryatia’s, and 
2.6 per cent of Yakutia’s. As the previous figures show, Buryatia’s newspapers 
mentioned Russian culture more often than Sakha (Yakutia)’s. Pyatnitsa Plyus’ 
relatively frequent mentions of Russian culture, along with its lack of reference 
to Buryat culture, show that it is a ‘Russian’ newspaper – i.e., produced by 
Russian journalists for a Russian audience. Inform Polis, meanwhile, is a 
‘Buryat’ newspaper (as noted in Chapter Four). By contrast, all of Sakha 
(Yakutia)’s newspapers made more references to Sakha culture than Russian. 
9.2 per cent of Yakutia’s articles referred to Sakha culture, while 2.6 per cent 
referred to Russian; the equivalent figures for Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk 
Vecherniy are 8.6 and 3.2 per cent, and 7.9 and 4.0 per cent respectively. This 
suggests that none of Sakha (Yakutia)’s most popular newspapers is exclusively 
directed towards Russians. They instead show a bias towards Sakha culture, 
despite being published in Russian rather than Sakha.  
The greater proportion of Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy’s 
audiences are likely to live in Yakutsk, since the costs of distributing 
newspapers over Sakha (Yakutia)’s enormous and poorly connected territories 
are prohibitively high for privately owned commercial newspapers. The 
proportion of Sakha in Yakutsk has increased dramatically since the late 1990s, 
as large numbers of rural Sakha have taken up the increased opportunities 
provided by Sakha (Yakutia)’s first president, Mikhail Nikolayev, to gain a 
higher education in Yakutsk. In addition Sakha (Yakutia)’s agricultural regions, 
which are largely populated by Sakha, continue to suffer from an economic 
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depression, encouraging their inhabitants to migrate to Yakutsk (Ignat’yeva, 
1999: p. 33).32 Nashe Vremya’s and Yakutsk Vecherniy’s biases towards Sakha 
culture are likely to be responses to the presence of large Sakha populations in 
Yakutsk, who have a distinct sense of Sakha identity. They indicate a perception 
among these newspapers’ journalists that sufficient proportions of their target 
audiences have a strong enough regard for their Sakha identity to make ignoring 
it a commercial risk, despite their willingness to buy Russian- rather than Sakha-
language newspapers.  
The large discrepancies between the proportions of articles coded as 
‘Sakha Cultural Practice’ and ‘Russian Cultural Practice’ poses the question as 
to why Sakha (Yakutia)’s journalists do not feel a need to ensure that ‘Sakha’ 
and ‘Russian’ cultural practices receive roughly equal levels of exposure. 
Yakutsk Vecherniy in particular showed a tendency to publish features 
specifically directed towards a Sakha audience, without also producing articles 
aimed at Russians. The two samples of Yakutsk Vecherniy contained nine 
feature articles entirely devoted to various aspects of Sakha life and culture, 
such as an interview with a traditional Sakha dancer (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 25, 
2004: p. 55). And while it did publish three articles on Russian culture, these 
were very likely to have had relevance for Sakha readers. For example, its 
article on two Russian Orthodox chapels in Yakutsk was part of a series it 
published on Yakutsk’s history, and would have interested anyone with a 
curiosity about Yakutsk, whether Sakha or Russian (Yakutsk Vecherniy 
September 3, 2004: p. 55). Nashe Vremya’s news section contained only two 
                                                 
32 As Chapter One describes, Sakha (Yakutia)’s Sakha populations are concentrated in the 
agricultural regions, while the Slavic populations live in the industrial centres. This is due to a 
massive immigration of Slavic industrial workers during the Soviet period. The large Sakha 
population in Yakutsk increases the chances of rural Sakha having family or regional networks 
there, which provide a motivation to settle in Yakutsk rather than the industrial towns.   
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features that explicitly concerned ethnic culture, although the two samples 
together produced 16 references to Sakha cultural practice. These two features 
also demonstrated a greater emphasis on Sakha culture: both would have been 
likely to interest Sakha readers, while only one would have attracted Russians, 
unless they had a particular interest in Sakha history (Nashe Vremya June 25, 
2004: pp. 12–13; August 27, 2004: pp. 1–2). In contrast, Inform Polis balanced 
its eight features on Buryat culture with four features on Russian culture, despite 
being a ‘Buryat’ newspaper.  
Yakutia was the only newspaper that appeared to be making a deliberate 
effort to publish material on all of Sakha (Yakutia)’s prominent ethnic cultures – 
i.e., Sakha, Russian, and the Tungus (Eveny and Evenky) reindeer-herding 
peoples. This effort is likely to be one aspect of the Republican government’s 
self-promotion, intended to show that the Republican government has an equal 
concern for all of Sakha (Yakutia)’s ethnic groups, as would befit the 
government of a multi-ethnic (mnogonatsional’niy) state. But while Yakutia 
published four articles on Russian or Slavic culture, and six on reindeer-herding 
communities over the month of June, it devoted 17 articles to Sakha culture, 
although this large number is likely to have been due to the celebration of the 
Ysyakh towards the end of June. Yakutia did not however surround its coverage 
of the Ysyakh with the celebration of other, non-Sakha festivals, in contrast to 
Buryatia’s treatment of the Buryat summer sports festival, the Surkharban. 
Buryatia contained a single feature on this event, while the preceding edition 
published articles on Ulan Ude’s anniversary, and a preliminary report on a 
Slavic and Buryat folk-dancing festival; this was described in full three editions 
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later (Buryatia, June 17, 2004: p. 1; June 16, 2004: p. 1; June 16, 2004: p. 1; 
June 19, 2004: p. 8).  
Yakutia’s even-handed attitude towards the Republic’s ethnic groups 
therefore did not extend to adjusting its celebration of a major Sakha event, 
which it might have done in order to prevent the Republic’s other ethnic groups 
from perceiving their government to be thoroughly absorbed in a Sakha public 
occasion. This tallies with the commercial newspapers’ lack of concern over 
their Russian audiences’ potential sensitivities, since both show a willingness to 
permit Sakha culture to dominate over Russian. Sakha (Yakutia)’s mainstream 
public spheres are therefore more influenced by exclusively Sakha practices, 
concerns and attitudes than those in Buryatia, which implies that Sakha actors 
have a greater capacity to control their Republic’s context than Buryat.  
Table 6.1 also shows that Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers contained fewer 
mentions of ethnic culture per se than their equivalents from Buryatia, with the 
exception of the ‘low quality’ commercial newspapers. ‘Ethnicity’ was used to 
mark 5.3 per cent of Yakutia’s sample and 9.7 per cent of Buryatia’s; ‘Super 
Ethnicity’ was attached to 4.8 per cent of Nashe Vremya’s articles and 5.4 per 
cent of Inform Polis’, and to 5.2 per cent of Yakutsk Vecherniy’s and 3.0 per 
cent of Pyatnitsa Plyus’. The lower proportions of articles coded as ‘Ethnicity’, 
or ‘Super Ethnicity’, were matched with fewer simultaneous references to 
ethnicity and non-Russian cultures. 45.2 per cent of Buryatia’s articles on 
Buryat cultural practice were marked as ‘Ethnicity’, while 26.7 per cent of 
Yakutia’s articles on Sakha cultural practice also carried this code; the 
equivalent figures for Inform Polis and Nashe Vremya are 38.9 and 25.0 per cent 
respectively, while 20.8 per cent of Yakutsk Vecherny’s articles on Sakha culture 
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also mentioned ethnicity. These figures reflect a greater tendency for the 
newspapers in Sakha (Yakutia) to present specifically Sakha behaviours and 
attitudes without also implying them to be part of the phenomenon known in 
Russia as ‘ethnic culture’. The codes ‘Ethnicity’ and ‘Super Ethnicity’ were 
attached to articles that presented the behaviour they concerned as the 
manifestation of a particular ethnic culture, whether it be Russian, Sakha or 
Buryat.  
A closer look at the writing to which these codes were attached reveals 
the differing representations of Buryat and Sakha culture that result. Textbox 6.1 
contains examples of Inform Polis’ and Nashe Vremya’s presentations of their 
respective Republics’ non-Russian cultural behaviours. The quotation from 
Inform Polis consists of the headline, sub-headline and introductory paragraph 
from a page-long feature describing a sports tournament held at Buryatia’s 
largest Buddhist monastery, Ivolginskiy Datsan. The quotation from Nashe 
Vremya is the businessman Vasiliy Filippov’s response to Nashe Vremya’s 
weekly readers’ poll, which in this edition asked its participants where they were 
going for their summer holidays.  
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Inform Polis Nashe Vremya 
Headline; sub-headline: Sportsmen fought 
for a VAZ-2106 [a type of car]; “The Empress 
Catherine’s” games raised a stir and returned 
the era of the first Khambo Lamas 
Headline: And where are you going? 
 
On September 18 at Ivolginskiy Datsan a 
ceremonial occasion took place, dedicated to 
the 240th anniversary of Empress Catherine the 
Great’s decree, establishing the institution of 
the Khambo-Lamas of East Siberia and 
Zabaykal’ya. Public prayers were said from 
the early morning, and the culmination of the 
holiday was a tournament of archery, horse-
racing and national wrestling (Inform Polis 
September 22, 2004: p. 11) 
 
Vasiliy Filippov, Director of the Tuymaada-
Agrosnab company: 
Of course, I’m going to make hay in my small 
motherland, in Churapcha. [An agricultural 
sub-region in Sakha (Yakutia); Nashe 
Vremya’s underline] I go there to make hay 
every year. What do you mean, why? I have 
cows, poultry and a horse-herd. I’ll be there 
for about a month. Is that a long time? Of 
course not, a month is hardly enough. Time off 
for me is only the haymaking in Churapcha. 
(Nashe Vremya, June 4, 2004: p. 3.) 
Textbox 6.1: A comparison of Inform Polis and Nashe Vremya  
 
Inform Polis’ quotation is part of an article entirely devoted to describing 
a Buryat cultural event. As Chapter Four described, Buddhism is associated in 
Buryatia with Buryat culture, while the games listed are all part of a specific 
Buryat-Mongol sporting tradition. The author uses colourful, emotive language, 
and incorporates descriptive techniques often used in creative writing. For 
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example, one sub-section begins:  
 
Brightly coloured archers’ robes, old-fashioned horn bows in their hands and singing wooden 
arrows against the background of the temples’ roofs. Everything reminded one of the epoch 
of the first Khambo-Lamas. 78 mergenov [a Buryat-Mongol word for archer] and mergensch 
[archeress], aged from 13 to 78, took their positions. (Inform Polis September 22, 2004: p. 
11.) 
 
The author thereby combines imaginative representation with a straightforward 
description of the occasion, blurring the boundary between reality and literary 
creation. As all the previous quotations show, the author also emphasises the 
continuity between pre-revolutionary Buryat Buddhist practice, and the event 
described. This exhibition of contemporary Buryat culture is thus presented 
within a set of imagined parameters, enabling the reader to regard it as the 
expression of an idealised notion of Buryat culture, which transcends the chain 
of events initiated by the Bolshevik revolution. The adjective ‘ethnic’ is 
generally applied in the Russian Federation to cultures and identities distinct 
from the state cultures and identities generated during the Soviet era – therefore 
the explicit connection between pre-revolutionary Buryat life and contemporary 
Buryat culture contained within this notion identifies it as concerning ‘ethnic’ 
culture in particular. Inform Polis published similar articles: they all reflect the 
abstracted, idealised conception of ethnic culture promoted by Buryatia, which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter Four. Conversely, the absence of articles on 
Buryat culture in Pyatnitsa Plyus can explain the low number of articles marked 
‘Super Ethnicity’ it contained. 
 In contrast, Nashe Vremya’s mention of a typical contemporary Sakha 
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practice appeared without any effort to position it within an imaginary 
perspective, as part of an article on an entirely different topic – i.e., how hard it 
is for Sakha (Yakutia)’s citizens to take time off over the summer. Filippov’s 
plan to spend his summer making hay in his “small motherland” exemplifies a 
widespread practice among the Sakha who have moved to Yakutsk from the 
sub-regions. There is a strong imperative for urban Sakha to help their country 
relatives, since those who continue to herd livestock have a very short summer 
in which to prepare enough feed for the rest of the year, in addition to growing 
and harvesting wheat, fruit and vegetables for themselves. Filippov is referring 
to a traditional Sakha method of cattle and horse herding, as his reference to his 
“horse herd” (tabun) shows. His herd will consist of the specific breed of semi-
wild horse the Sakha brought to the Republic’s territory, since no other type of 
horse in Sakha (Yakutia) can live out in the open in herds. Nashe Vremya’s lack 
of explanation or contextualisation implies that it does not expect this statement, 
which all its readers are likely to recognise as typically Sakha, to create 
problems – whether caused by a lack of comprehension, or a sense of unease 
when confronted with traditional Sakha practice. Nashe Vremya, in particular, 
contained several references to Sakha cultural practices in articles that were not 
primarily concerned with Sakha ethnic culture: the other newspapers also made 
such references to a lesser extent. For example, Yakutsk Vecherniy mentioned 
the Ysyakh, commenting adversely on drunkenness among its participants, in the 
course of its regular crime section (Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 25, 2004: p. 12).  
These statements and articles present Sakha culture as consisting of a set 
of practices and ideas specific to the Sakha people and their contemporary way 
of life, without idealising it in any way. They co-existed in all three newspapers 
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with more romanticised representations of Sakha culture, as the appearance of 
articles marked with both ‘Sakha Cultural Practice’ and ‘Ethnicity’ or ‘Super 
Ethnicity’ in these newspapers shows: Yakutia contained 12 articles coded as 
both ‘Sakha Cultural Practice’ and ‘Ethnicity’, while Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk 
Vecherniy contained four and five articles coded as ‘Sakha Cultural Practice’ 
and ‘Super Ethnicity’ respectively. However, the tendency for Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
newspapers to incorporate direct manifestations of Sakha culture into their 
articles, without explaining them, indicates that their journalists assume their 
readers to regard certain Sakha cultural practices as familiar elements of the 
Republic’s social life. Both Russians and Sakha therefore are likely to be living 
with the sense that Sakha cultural practice can have a direct effect on the daily 
running of Sakha (Yakutia) as a whole, rather than being relevant only to the 
Sakha themselves. The Sakha also have a greater capacity to base their notions 




Section 6.2: Sakha cultural characteristics, and their relevance for Sakha 
(Yakutia)’s politicians 
 
Section 6.2.1: The relationship between Sakha communities and their elites 
A detailed analysis of the newspapers revealed a tendency for the Republic’s 
communities to exist as strong authoritarian hierarchies. Chapter Five 
introduced the phenomenon referred to in Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers as 
kampaneyschina – i.e., the use of a high status to pressure subordinates into 
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donating their time, money and effort towards carrying out their superior’s 
projects. The newspaper discourse presented in Chapter Five showed that 
higher-level politicians and government workers regularly draw on the resources 
kampaneyschina provides, as part of a general tendency for elite figures to exert 
their wills as if they were not aware of any legal or conventional boundaries 
other than the hindrances posed by a conflict of interests with other powerful 
actors. This behaviour entails the presence of several competing elite actors, 
each of whom has a specific area or community over which they can exert their 
influence. This section explains how government-sponsored newspapers in 
particular contained further evidence of discrete, authoritarian hierarchies, 
consisting of articles that venerated powerful individuals, or their families. The 
analysis of these articles shows that the specifically Sakha culture discussed in 
the previous section has a strong influence over practices and attitudes within 
these hierarchies, particularly when they occur in Sakha communities. The 
articles concerning elite actors and kampaneyschina together suggest that the 
Sakha understanding of power relationships has the capacity to influence 
political practice in the Republic as a whole.  
Megino-Kangalasskiy Ulus has a Sakha-dominated population, as is 
demonstrated by the publication of its local newspaper, Erkeeyi, in Sakha. 
Erkeeyi displayed the influence of Megino-Kangalass’ elites through its 
elaborate celebrations of prominent individuals, and in doing so revealed the 
hierarchies within the regional community. The entire sample of Erkeeyi 
contained fourteen bi-weekly tabloid editions, ranging in size from four to nine 
pages, of which half were fully or partially translated. The translated editions 
produced eleven articles primarily designed to eulogise a specific high-status 
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Sakha man or woman. These articles can be identified as a distinctive sub-genre 
within the range of personal celebrations that formed a large part of the 
government newspaper content in both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia). Unlike 
the other personal celebration pieces, they did not incorporate either their 
respective republican governments’ legitimising narratives, or tropes common 
throughout the Russian Federation – such as the idealised accounts of World 
War Two veterans. Erkeeyi’s celebration sometimes took the form of public 
events held in honour of a specific individual: four of the eleven articles 
reported on or advertised such occasions.   
Erkeeyi’s coverage of the Ysyakh held to mark the centenary of Gavril 
Desyatkin’s birth consisted of two articles published in consecutive June 
editions, which together provide representative examples of both the eulogising 
pieces themselves, and the public events they describe (Erkeeyi, June 18, 2004: 
p. 3; June 25, 2004: p. 1). Desyatkin was born and spent most of his life in 
Megino-Kangalass. He was the head of Megino-Kangalass’ police force, and 
later became the chief of the Republic’s passport service. His family was 
influential enough to ensure that Yakutia also published a report on this event: 
his son was then a director of the Republic’s gold-mining company Yakutzoloto 
(Yakutia, June 24, 2004: p. 6).  
Desyatkin comes across as the incarnation of all the virtues Yakutia and 
Erkeeyi consistently promote: he was kind, and entirely committed to his work. 
Both Yakutia’s and Erkeeyi’s articles emphasise his talent and physical strength, 
which Yakutia implies to have been almost super-human, describing him as an 
“epic hero” (bogatyr). The Ysyakh organisers regarded Desyatkin’s 
achievements as valuable enough for them to overlook the probability that, as a 
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high-ranking police officer in the 1930s, he helped administer the Stalinist 
repressions. Both articles offered their readers a positive way to imagine 
Desyatkin’s career, when they mentioned that he had helped to solve “difficult 
and convoluted” crimes – revealing their authors’ awareness that he was 
involved in problematic events. These newspapers are according Desyatkin a 
status that overrides everyday social norms, including those that might be used 
to evaluate his past.  
Dedicating the Ysyakh to Desyatkin conferred a great honour on both the 
man and his family, as Yakutia’s report of the occasion exemplified. The Ysyakh 
is the most important Sakha holiday: Megino-Kangalass’ Ysyakh would have 
been a major event for the region’s population, rather than an elite-driven show 
intended to generate newspaper coverage. Megino-Kangalass had a population 
of 31,400 in 1989, dispersed over a territory of 11,700 square kilometres 
(Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 129). There was very little industrialisation in the region 
during the Soviet period, so that it lacks the technologically developed urban 
centres that can be found in other sub-regions. The Ysyakh organisers 
nevertheless succeeded in putting on an Ysyakh that included “concerts, a show 
for the youth, sports tournaments, competitions, market stalls, and horse-racing”. 
The organisers had so much enthusiasm for their task that they “pleasantly 
surprised” the Desyatkins, by unexpectedly adding two more games to the sports 
tournament (Yakutia, June 24, 2004: p. 6). Whether their efforts were motivated 
by the “love and respect” Yakutia and Erkeeyi describe, or a fear of the 
Desyatkin family’s influence, they show that the Desyatkins would be justified 
in assuming that any call they made on the personal resources of Megino-
Kangalass’ inhabitants would be answered. The Desyatkins have the kind of 
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status in Megino-Kangalass that would enable them to employ kampaneyschina, 
if the need arose. The power-relationships that give rise to kampaneyschina can 
therefore occur in Sakha-dominated rural communities, rather than being 
confined to republican-level elite hierarchies.  
Gavril Desyatkin’s Ysyakh can be taken as an example of a general 
tendency for Sakha communities to “deify” their leading citizens, as Nashe 
Vremya describes the phenomenon (Nashe Vremya, June 25, 2004: pp. 12–13). 
The editions of Yakutia published in June contained ten other displays of a 
particular Sakha individual’s eminent status within their home sub-region, 
consisting in part of the publication of the celebratory articles themselves in a 
republican-level newspaper. Like Erkeeyi’s celebration pieces, these articles are 
all distinguished by a clear desire on the part of the author to praise the high-
status individuals concerned for the sake of the honour their praise conferred, 
rather than for any other reason. The commercial newspapers, on the other hand, 
consistently published celebrations of elite individuals, which had been written 
‘to order’ (na zakaz), as Chapter Five describes. The style of these celebrations 
could sometimes resemble the Sakha veneration in Yakutia, although their 
common zakaz function made it impossible to distinguish accurately a 
specifically Sakha celebration practice from the generalised use of commercial 
newspaper space to promote ambitious and influential figures.  
Some of Yakutia’s eulogies were specifically dedicated to their subjects, 
such as the account of Desyatkin’s Ysyakh – while other authors incorporated 
their celebration into pieces that superficially had a variety of different functions. 
For example, a journalist from Abyyskiy Ulus devoted almost a quarter of his 
piece on the region’s administrative difficulties to describing and celebrating the 
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clan history of one of Abyyskiy Ulus’ prominent families, the Yefimovs 
(Yakutia, June 1, 2004: p. 2). He pays particular attention to Il’ya Yefimov, 
regarded as a “legendary individual” in the Ulus, who “‘pushed through’ in the 
higher echelons [of political power] the building of the new regional centre”, 
during the 1970s. Yefimov and his forebears appear from this article to have 
been talented, powerful achievers, whose field of endeavour was most often the 
community they lived in. Abyy’s population values the Yefimovs enough to 
have dedicated a monument to them in Abyy’s regional centre, demonstrating 
the Yefimov family’s aristocratic status. As the author describes, Yefimov’s 
“initiative” and “energy” enabled him to overcome the difficulties presented by 
his aristocratic Sakha origin: a Sakha “prince” (knyaz), born in 1785, founded 
the Yefimov clan.  
Both Gavril Desyatkin and Il’ya Yefimov apparently belong to families 
with long-standing high statuses, maintained through the continuing public 
celebration of their individual members. The veneration of these powerful 
dynasties entails a high regard for family networks in general among the Sakha 
– while the continuing influence of the pre-Soviet aristocratic Yefimov clan 
suggests that the importance attached to family and genealogy has its roots in 
pre-Soviet Sakha social organisation. Sakha Sire made a passing reference to the 
“authority of kin and family clans” that “continues until now”, in an analytical 
piece about the federal government’s legislation on local administration (Sakha 
Sire, June 29, 2004: p. 3). One of Nashe Vremya’s journalists referred to the 
rural Sakha habit of asking a stranger “where … [he is] from: which ulus is his 
clan from?” (Nashe Vremya, June 25, 2004: pp. 12–13). These articles indicate 
that pre-Soviet Sakha clan hierarchies remain in some areas, while pre-Soviet 
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notions of family and hierarchy continue to influence contemporary Sakha 
power relationships – despite the changes in social and economic organisation 
that have occurred during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. They reflect the 
influence Sakha family or territorial networks have over contemporary 
urbanisation processes. According to Tatiana Argounova-Low, rural Sakha 
make use of traditional kinship systems to obtain jobs and accommodation in 
Yakutsk (Argounova-Low, 2007b: p. 54). 
Further evidence of Sakha clan hierarchies appeared in Yakutia, 
corroborating Sakha Sire’s and Nashe Vremya’s claims, and revealing the 
capacity of Sakha clans to act as patronage networks. An analysis piece in 
Yakutia on the federal government’s local administration legislation raised the 
problem of how to ensure sub-regional administrations had adequately qualified 
staff, since, “At the elections leaders can be chosen who are insufficiently 
prepared, but who reflect the interests of their numerous relatives” (Yakutia, 
June 3, 2004: p. 2). Another article in Yakutia on the liquidation of a private 
company in Megino-Kangalass mentioned that the General Director had 
“worked very hard on the building of a school in his home village” (rodnoye 
selo), and “provided places of work for local builders”, but “as a result ‘burnt 
out’ due to untimely payment for work carried out and the following tax 
repercussions” (Yakutia, June 10, 2004: p. 2). The General Director had diverted 
the resources he controlled towards a community that is likely to have included 
members of his family, and which he must have felt had a greater claim on his 
company’s wealth than the shareholders who legally owned it. This article 
reveals an expectation of patronage capable of influencing elite actors to act 
against their own professional interests, in addition to the formal stipulations of 
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republican law. The power and influence of Sakha elites is therefore linked to 
their capacity to benefit their subject communities.  
The emphatic veneration of Desyatkin and Yefimov indicates that the 
power relationships in Sakha communities do not exist simply as an exchange of 
elite patronage for influence over a particular group’s resources. The ‘love and 
respect’ Yakutia and Erkeeyi ascribed to Desyatkin and Yefimov reveals a belief 
that prominent figures should be accorded a public expression of obedience, 
emotional attachment and support, in addition to personal power. This attitude 
was displayed clearly in one of Erkeeyi’s articles, concerning the controversial 
nineteenth-century Sakha robber (razboinik) Vasiliy Manchaary. Manchaary 
came from Megino-Kangalass and is regarded by some as the Sakha equivalent 
of Robin Hood. The article consisted of an attack on another newspaper’s 
disparagement of his worth (Erkeeyi, June 25, 2004: p. 9). Its author called 
Manchaary a “worthy property of the people” (dostoyaniye naroda), and 
asserted that “there is nothing worse than marring the name of a national hero”. 
A quotation from the Sakha writer Nikolai Luginov supported the case: “We 
have a national hero, but other peoples do not. And we should be proud of that!”. 
This author’s statements reveal a general belief that communities should 
celebrate and defend their prominent individuals, while the use of this norm to 
disparage an opponent entails an assumption that readers will find it familiar and 
acceptable. A eulogisation of the Sakha academic Georgiy Basharin in Yakutia 
echoed this author’s statements, claiming that “a people should know their 
heroes”, and therefore that the late Basharin’s contemporaries have a “duty” to 
“immortalise” his name (Yakutia June 8, 2004: p. 4). 
The idea that a community owes its elites public demonstrations of 
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attachment and submission entails the perception of a close relationship between 
elite actor and citizen, involving both a capacity to accept a lower level of power 
and agency on the part of ordinary citizens, and their personal identification with 
their particular group’s leading members. This notion of an intimate, yet overtly 
authoritarian relationship between higher- and lower-status individuals 
facilitates the popular acceptance of a given elite member’s appropriation of 
other peoples’ time, effort and money, creating the social and cultural conditions 
required for the acts of kampaneyschina described in Chapter Five. Its intimacy 
would characterise small, clan-based groups rather than mass societies, 
corroborating the suggestion that pre-Soviet attitudes have been integrated into 
the Sakha people’s developing perception and practice of power relations over 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
Alena Ledeneva, David Lane, and Caroline Humphrey refer to clientalist 
networks existing throughout the Russian Federation, which in some cases are 
descended from the late-Soviet nomenklatura hierarchies (Ledeneva, 2006: p. 1; 
Humphrey, 2002: pp. 180, 181; Lane, 1995; Lane et al 2007: p. 14). However, 
the specific patronage networks that Sakha Sire, Erkeeyi, Yakutia and Nashe 
Vremya indicate, with their strong clan influence, could not exist among Sakha 
(Yakutia)’s Slavic populations. Only the Sakha can claim an association with 
prominent regional clans, since the extensive family histories and connections 
that form the basis of these networks require a longstanding residence in Sakha 
(Yakutia). As Chapter One outlined, the vast majority of the Republic’s Slavic 
population arrived during the twentieth century, and so would not have had the 
time to build up either a localised history of family achievement in the Republic, 
or extended family networks. The attitudes and behaviours within the Sakha 
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hierarchies just discussed have characteristics that distinguish them from other 
hierarchical networks in Sakha (Yakutia) and the Russian Federation, which are 
in part derived from pre-Soviet Sakha practice.  
Pre-Soviet Buryat family networks continue to exist in Buryatia, as 
Chapter Four explained. Celebrations of high-status Buryat individuals appeared 
consistently in the sample editions of Buryatia and Inform Polis, also displaying 
the presence of Buryat hierarchical relationships. However, the Buryat 
celebration narratives differed from the Sakha pieces, putting a greater stress on 
the subject’s close and affectionate relationship with their friends, families and 
colleagues, and their commitment to their clans (rody) and ‘small motherland’ 
(malaya rodina).  
None of Buryatia’s newspapers produced evidence that the elite co-
option of lower-status individuals’ resources is publicly acknowledged as 
common practice. The editions of Inform Polis, Pyatnitsa Plyus, Buryatia and 
Barguzinskaya Pravda contained much evidence of corrupt behaviour on the 
part of Buryatia’s leading politicians and businessmen; however, these 
newspapers did not mention or articulate any direct demands for private 
resources from elite actors. The absence of kampaneyschina in Buryatia’s 
newspapers suggests that a distinctive practice within Sakha hierarchies is 
capable of influencing elite behaviour in the Republic as a whole. The capacity 
for powerful Sakha individuals to exert their influence in the form of 
kampaneyschina generates an environment where such authoritative acts are 
acceptable, creating the possibility for non-Sakha to make use of them – such as 
the Russian President Vyacheslav Shtyrov’s acquisition of a five-metre pine tree 
outside his office window, achieved by means of a ‘hint’ to Yakutsk’s municipal 
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gardening organisation (Yakutsk Vecherniy June 4, 2004: p. 10). 
 
Section 6.2.2: The changing significance of personal talent to Sakha 
hierarchies 
The eulogising articles in Sakha (Yakutia)’s government newspapers showed the 
intimate relationship between prominent Sakha individuals and their home 
communities to involve a high regard for personal talent, and public 
achievement. The role of public achievement revealed by these articles indicates 
continuities in attitude from early- or pre-Soviet Sakha practice, while other 
statements manifest an influence from later Soviet and post-Soviet ideologies. 
The detailed analysis of these articles shows how these differing strands of ideas 
interact, creating a capacity for contemporary Sakha individuals to have a 
preoccupation with the worldwide status of the Sakha people itself.   
Yakutia’s and Erkeeyi’s celebration of Yefimov’s and Desyatkin’s talent 
and strength suggests that they have achieved their high status in part by 
excelling over other members of their communities, in public arenas such as 
sports competitions, or local government (Yakutia, June 24, 2004: p. 6; June 1, 
2004: p. 2; Erkeeyi, June 18, 2004: p. 3). Yakutia’s reportage of the Megino-
Kangalass Ysyakh showed how the enthusiastic proclamation of Desyatkin’s 
outstanding physical strength was incorporated into the event itself, through a 
“theatrical representation” of Desyatkin’s ability to carry a boulder weighing 
387 kilograms, and a horse-tethering post that otherwise had to be “dragged” 
(tashili) by ten men. These celebrations are using the depiction of personal talent, 
manifested in public achievement, as a way of displaying an individual’s leading 
status, indicating that rural Sakha communities place a high value on both public 
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achievement, and the talent it manifests. Yakutia incorporated praise of Megino-
Kangalass’ gifted and energetic population into the celebration of Desyatkin and 
his Ysyakh, creating an association between Desyatkin’s surpassing talent and 
status, and that of Megino-Kangalass as a whole. This account indicated the 
value of publicly recognised achievements to be so high that an individual’s 
attainments can be understood to raise the status of their home communities. For 
example, Tyungyulyu village’s inhabitants tried to claim attachment to the 
overall winner of Desyatkin’s Ysyakh, telling Yakutia’s correspondent, “he’s 
married to a Tyungyulyu girl, that means he’s ours”. Their desire to associate 
themselves with the Ysyakh winner shows that they expect their village, and 
therefore also its individual inhabitants, to receive a greater standing as the 
result of his success.  
The author of Erkeeyi’s defence of Manchaary, presented in the previous 
section, shares Tyungyulyu village’s understanding of individual achievement 
and community standing, as does the writer of Basharin’s celebration. Their 
arguments reveal an assumption that the statuses of Manchaary and Basharin are 
linked to those of the communities with whom they are associated. Their calls 
for prominent figures to be given their due honour echoes Yakutia’s and 
Erkeeyi’s approving descriptions of the ‘love and respect’ evinced by the 
inhabitants of Abyy and Megino-Kangalass towards Desyatkin and the 
Yefimovs, revealing a pattern of behaviour understood to affirm a community 
and its status through the celebration of prominent community members. 
Yakutia’s description of the museum dedicated to the Sakha singer 
Sergey Zveryev reveals similar chains of events and ideas (Yakutia, June 8, 
2004: p. 7). The journalist commends Ygyatte village’s efforts to honour the 
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memory of its famous inhabitant through building his museum, even though 
Ygyatte’s remote situation limits the number of museum visitors to around 300 
per year. This article illustrates the variety of achievements that generate a high 
status: the surpassing value of public success itself within these Sakha 
communities has the effect of fusing prominent individuals into a unitary elite, 
whether they are policemen, politicians, businessmen, aristocrats or cultural 
workers. The link between community and individual status is another 
demonstration of how close-knit these communities are – to the extent that 
community identities, whether related to clan, ethnicity or territory, could have a 
strong influence on Sakha individuals’ perceptions of self-worth. It also suggests 
that the Sakha are likely to have a personal interest in the careers of their 
regional politicians and government workers, since the successes and failures of 
their region’s public figures will be understood to affect their own status.  
The enormous importance publicly recognised achievement has for these 
populations implies individual Sakha to have a constant awareness of their own 
status within their home community – and of the place their home community 
itself occupies among the range of other groups they perceive in the wider social 
environment. Erkeeyi’s permanent front-page strap-line, “The citizens of 
Megino-Kangalass are at the top of the mountain”, both articulates and 
encourages this awareness of community status.  
The Sakha concern with talent and status expressed in these newspapers 
evokes the Sakha folk legends collected by Gavriil Ksenofontov during the 
1920s and 30s – and in particular, the interaction they represent between the 
human and spirit worlds (Ksenofontov, 2004). These stories describe the super-
human feats performed by the teller’s forebears, or prominent Sakha historical 
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figures such as the Sakha king Tygyn. Some of them mention the talents or 
abilities bestowed upon individuals by particular spirits. For example, according 
to one account the goddess Ayyysyt gave Tygyn’s grandson a son “of solid and 
persistent morals”, who became his father’s “favourite”, an “unusually strong 
and powerful person”; Omogoy describes his servant Elley, the exceptionally 
strong and wise forefather of the Sakha, as “a person with a divine protector” 
(Ksenofontov, 2004: pp. 89, 30). The belief that personal attributes are donated 
by spiritual entities, and therefore that an individual’s outstanding ability 
demonstrates their high standing among specific powerful spirits, explains the 
close attention the narrators pay to the physical prowess of their heroes, despite 
the destruction it can cause.  
Yakutia’s celebrations of Desyatkin and Zveryev contained statements 
that revealed an awareness, if not full acceptance, of the notion that unusual 
talent manifests a special relationship with the spirit world. The journalist 
reporting on Desyatkin’s Ysyakh described the event as a “great success”, 
“whether it was because the population of Tyungyulyu pleased the spirits of the 
Earth and nature by dedicating the Ysyakh to a good person, or simply because 
they had made an effort...” (Yakutia, June 24, 2004: p. 6). The account of 
Zveryev’s museum mentioned that the unusually windy weather had 
mysteriously calmed at the exact moment when the public speeches were being 
made to mark the museum’s opening, “as if the otherworldly powers were 
blessing the initiative” (Yakutia, June 8, 2004: p. 7). Its author makes frequent 
reference to the local allegation that Zveryev was a covert shaman, and hence 
had been granted a special capacity to interact with ‘otherworldly powers’ 
(potustoronniye sily) by the spirits themselves, according to the widespread 
 263 
indigenous Siberian belief (Vitebsky, 2001: pp.10, 34, 61). The journalist’s 
claims about Zveryev’s shamanic abilities are intended further to enhance 
Zveryev’s status, creating an impression of Zveryev as a mysterious and truly 
“exceptional” person, rather than simply a famous and accomplished singer. 
Zveryev’s musical talent appears as the additional attribute of an already 
outstanding human being, along with his skill in wood-carving and hunting, 
rather than as the main reason for his fame and status.   
 These two allusions to a pre-Soviet association between human talent 
and spiritual power coincided with indications from Erkeeyi and Yakutia that 
Megino-Kangalass’ “theatrical presentation” of Desyatkin’s greatness was a 
continuation of a 1920s practice, intended to venerate legendary Sakha figures 
through dramatic representations at the Ysyakh (Yakutia, June 24, 2004: p. 6). 
Erkeeyi’s celebration of Desyatkin began with an account of his outstanding 
performance at an Ysyakh tournament in 1927; this Ysyakh had included a 
“dramatised presentation about Tygyn Darkhan” (Erkeeyi, June 18, 2004: p. 3). 
Yakutia’s report of a 2004 Ysyakh at the town of Neryungri in southern Sakha 
(Yakutia) also mentioned a dramatic presentation of Elley’s life story (Yakutia 
June 18, 2004: p. 3). These three passing references suggest that the dramatic 
performances of Desyatkin’s life distinguish him as belonging to a specific class 
of legendary Sakha historical figure, along with Tygyn and Elley. The 
incorporation of a twentieth-century actor into this group, by means of an early 
or possibly pre-Soviet theatrical technique, implies that the pre-Soviet beliefs 
that generated this reverent attitude continue to exist in some shape or form.  
The extremely high value the Sakha currently place on the public 
exhibition of talent suggests that the beliefs expressed in the 1920s folk legends 
 264 
have been adapted into contemporary Sakha culture. The exclusive status 
ascribed to high-achieving individuals or communities correlates with a 
perception that they are not merely lucky, hard working or gifted, but also 
fortunate and powerful in the privileged relationship they have with mysterious 
entities, which act through the forces they control in the material world. This 
attitude may not necessarily continue to exist as a clearly conceptualised and 
generally accepted belief; it could instead remain in the form of a habitual 
motivation to fear and respect the powerful or unusually talented. It could thus 
also be contributing to the strongly hierarchical structure of contemporary Sakha 
communities, in addition to the competitive desire for a higher status they create.  
However, these indications of a pre-Soviet influence on contemporary 
Sakha social practice coincided with the consistent appearance of other ideas 
that strongly resemble a central element within both Soviet and post-Soviet 
political ideologies. The presence of these ideas suggests that contemporary 
Sakha attitudes have developed out of an interaction between pre-Soviet notions 
and the ideas that became prominent during the rapid social and political 
changes of the twentieth century. As Chapter One described, the various 
permutations of government ideology during the Soviet period assumed the 
existence of a universal social goal, which humanity is struggling to attain. 
Different societies can be evaluated according to the extent of their progress 
towards this goal, and the contribution they have made to the development of 
human civilisation in general. The Sakha nationalist movements of the 1980s 
and 90s also constructed their ideologies within this social evolutionist 
worldview. For example, the leading nationalist organisation Sakha Keskile’s 
stated aim was to enable “the Sakha people to enter the circle of developed, 
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civilised countries as a people with their own state” (Ignat'yeva, 1999: p. 105).   
A historical materialist conception of society could often be discerned in 
these articles. For example, the writer of Yakutia’s homage to Basharin 
describes his subject leading him “into the world of science (nauka), the history 
of humanity…” (Yakutia June 8, 2004: p. 4). Nashe Vremya published an 
interview with Luginov, the Sakha writer and historian mentioned in Erkeeyi’s 
celebration of Manchaary, who contends that the Sakha are descended from 
Chinggis Khan’s armies (Nashe Vremya, June 25, 2004: pp. 12–13). He 
described his discovery that the Sakha “are not a peripheral small people, but 
part of a very great nation” as a “new self-definition: national and spiritual”. He 
revealed his historical materialist background most clearly in his remarks about 
“true civilisation”, as opposed to the superficial acquisition of knowledge. This 
article shows that a historical materialist influence exists outside the government 
newspapers’ discursive space.  
The concern about the Sakha people’s ‘inability to develop’ expressed 
by Luginov suggests that a social evolutionist perspective can appear in public 
discourse as a fear that the Sakha people are ‘undeveloped’. This idea fits in 
with the perception of inter-ethnic relationships that life in a social environment 
dominated by public achievement and competition would generate: the world’s 
ethnic groups, or ‘nations’, exist in a hierarchy determined by their social 
achievements, like the individuals that make up Sakha communities. Soviet-era 
allegations that the Sakha are ‘uncivilised’ and ‘undeveloped’ apparently 
continue to excite an apprehension that the Sakha people occupy a low status 
among this community of nations. The late- and post-Soviet Sakha nationalist 
ideology is likely to have reinforced the integration of social evolutionism into 
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the popular Sakha mindset through its emphasis on the Sakha people’s level of 
‘development’. Even the iconoclastic Yakutsk Vecherniy displayed a concern 
with the Republic’s international standing, ending a feature complaining about 
the expense and effort required to stage the Deti Azii tournament with the 
sentence, “But otherwise, God forbid, the Republic falls face first into the 
mud in front of half of Russia and 17 foreign countries! [Yakutsk Vecherniy’s 
bold]” (Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 4, 2004: p. 12).  
The accounts of Yefimov’s and Desyatkin’s careers indicate that 
Yefimov and Desyatkin also raised the statuses of Megino-Kangalass and Abyy 
by enhancing or demonstrating these communities’ level of technological 
‘development’. Yefimov has accorded Abbyy the status of a ‘developed’ region 
by building a regional centre with plumbing, heating and electricity – while 
Desyatkin’s leading position in Sakha (Yakutia)’s police force shows Megino-
Kangalass to be ‘developed’ enough to produce the quality of person and 
education this role requires. The General Director mentioned in the previous 
section sacrificed his company to ‘developing’ his home village, by providing it 
with a school (Yakutia, June 10, 2004: p. 2). Erkeeyi contained other statements 
showing that the imperative for Sakha individuals to work towards ‘developing’ 
their communities is a part of the value system consistently expressed by 
Megino-Kangalass’ public discourse. For example, the report of a ceremonial 
meeting between the head of Megino-Kangalass’ administration, V. I. Ptitsyn, 
and the Megino-Kangalass school-leavers who had won a silver medal for high 
achievement that year, mentioned a speech expressing the hope that “the school-
leavers would make their contribution to the development and prosperity of their 
home [rodnoy] ulus” (Erkeeyi, June 29, 2004: p. 1). Erkeeyi’s statements 
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suggest that the General Director’s decisions were motivated by a popular 
expectation that he would use his elite status to further his home community’s 
‘progress’, in common with the “energetic” Il’ya Yefimov (Yakutia, June 1, 
2004: p. 2). 
All these articles provide evidence that the notions of social evolution 
underlying Soviet- and post-Soviet ideology and policy have been assimilated 
into Sakha attitudes and aspirations. The resulting Sakha concern about their 
level of social ‘development’ has generated a belief that all people, irrespective 
of their social position, have a duty towards ‘developing’ their home 
communities, and thus also improving their status – whether this ‘home 
community’ is perceived as a region, clan, or the Sakha ethnic group itself. 
These ideas have been absorbed into the relationships between prominent Sakha 
individuals and their home communities: the extremely high levels of influence 
they enjoy are understood to repay their active promotion of their peoples’ 
‘progress’. The perceived imperative for all members of a given Sakha 
community to work towards its progress unites certain Sakha politicians with the 
ordinary population in an effort to promote and develop the Sakha people. This 
shared agenda creates a greater possibility for political Sakha nationalist 
movements to gain a mass following, unlike the Buryat intellectual nationalists, 
and in doing so provides a motivation for the newspapers’ bias towards Sakha 
themes and concerns, described in Section One: the emphasis Yakutia placed on 
covering the Sakha Ysyakh could be designed to placate a strong desire for 




Section 6.3: Cultural change and urbanisation: developing perceptions of 
Sakha culture 
Nashe Vremya and Yakutsk Vecherniy in particular showed that Sakha culture 
and identity are changing rapidly, as more and more rural Sakha become 
habituated to Yakutsk. The Sakha living in Yakutsk are inevitably more 
connected to the Russian Federation than those living in remote sub-regions. 
Many of them conduct their working lives in Russian, since the government 
organs and federal-level corporations based in Yakutsk generally use Russian. A 
small urban generation of exclusively Russian-speaking Sakha has appeared, 
who have to a large extent lost contact with ulus life: the 2002 government 
census found that 6.8 per cent of the Russian Federation’s Sakha population no 
longer speak Sakha (www.perepis2002.ru). These fundamental changes in 
lifestyle create difficulties in relating to a Sakha identity, since the individuals 
concerned can no longer participate in contemporary Sakha cultural practice. 
Yakutsk Vecherniy contained indications of an effort to resolve this identity 
crisis that resembles the development in ideas occurring among Ulan Ude’s 
urbanised Buryat population, described in Chapter Four.  
A Sakha identity is a pre-requisite for becoming genuinely integrated 
into rural Sakha-dominated communities, since it entails the cultural attributes 
that enable individuals to participate in hierarchical Sakha social networks – and 
thus also to form close personal relationships with the people around them. It 
exists as a factor that maintains contemporary Sakha social practices, rather than 
as a personal characteristic with a tangential effect on daily life. The rural Sakha 
who move to Yakutsk understandably can be disconcerted at finding young 
Russian-speaking Sakha, who are apparently indifferent towards their people 
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and culture and towards their standing in the world community. These rural 
Sakha incomers are simultaneously faced with an acclimatisation process that 
encourages them to adopt a Russianised way of life, and in doing so complicates 
their identification with their Sakha home communities and cultural practices. 
Argounova-Low’s article, mentioned in Section Two, describes how the 
pressures of maintaining traditional rural kinship networks force some urban 
Sakha to break off their connection with their rural relatives, preferring to live in 
the nuclear families characteristic to Russian incomers (Argounova-Low, 2007b: 
p. 54).  
This experience is likely to encourage young rural Sakha to reflect on 
Sakha culture as a whole, rather than their particular ulus community – and also 
on the prospect of its eventual disappearance, as urbanisation continues. When 
combined with the difficult transition from rural to urban life, these 
apprehensions are powerful enough to have generated aggression on the part of 
some towards the more Russianised Sakha, who in turn can categorise rural 
incomers as ‘thugs’ or ‘oiks’ (mambety, deribasy). Yakutia and Yakutsk 
Vecherniy both contained articles designed to ameliorate a conflict between 
‘extremist nationalist’ rural Sakha, and the ‘supercilious’ urban youth (Yakutia, 
September 3, 2004: p. 26; Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 25, 2004: p. 65). This 
conflict is linked to the street crime and alcohol abuse that have become 
widespread in Yakutsk: gangs of drunken youths have been known to beat up 
Sakha passers-by for not being able to speak Sakha. (This type of occurrence 
has been mentioned to me by a number of Yakutsk friends.) The low 
number of articles Nashe Vremya published about Sakha culture, described in 
Section One, is likely to be another response to a perceived sensitivity about 
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Sakha culture and identity among Yakutsk’s population: one of Nashe Vremya’s 
reporters claimed that Yakutsk’s journalists deliberately avoid topics that could 
aggravate such tensions.  
Yakutsk Vecherniy revealed the clash in attitude and practice between 
rural and Yakutsk-based Sakha populations in several different ways. For 
example, its account of the search for a haunted tree describes a fourteen-year-
old girl acting as a “translator” during a conversation between the article’s 
urbanised Sakha writers, and a group of rural Sakha who could not speak 
Russian (Yakutsk Vecherniy, August 21, 2004: pp. 68–69). Yakutsk Vecherniy’s 
habitually irreverent treatment of prominent politicians and businessmen, 
described in Chapter Five, contrasts with the respect Erkeeyi and Yakutia 
consistently display towards Sakha (Yakutia)’s elites. Yakutsk Vecherniy’s 
urbanised Sakha readers must have a diminished regard for the general Sakha 
belief that elite figures should be publicly honoured, since they find the 
opportunity Yakutsk Vecherniy offers to laugh at prominent individuals 
attractive.   
However, Yakutsk Vecherniy could also publish zakaz articles 
resembling the veneration pieces in Yakutia and Erkeeyi, described in Section 
Two. These articles combine with the frequent appearance of Sakha cultural 
practice in Nashe Vremya to show the lack of clarity in the distinction between 
‘urban’ and ‘rural’ populations and cultures. As Argounova-Low describes, and 
the Nashe Vremya quotation presented in Section One illustrates, the Sakha 
living in Yakutsk often maintain strong connections with their home regions 
(Argounova-Low, 2007: p. 56; Nashe Vremya, June 4, 2004: p. 3). The extent to 
which individual Sakha adopt urbanised attitudes must vary a great deal from 
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person to person, depending in part on the length of time they have lived in 
Yakutsk. The changes in lifestyle and outlook that are accompanying the 
urbanisation of Sakha populations are occurring in interaction with a strong 
influence from rural cultural practice, creating a wide spectrum of ‘rural’ and 
‘urban’ attitudes.   
Another type of article was intended to relax and entertain people with a 
strong interest in Sakha culture, but who do not necessarily have a deep 
knowledge of it. Seven of the nine feature articles on Sakha culture produced by 
the entire Yakutsk Vecherniy sample were of this type – indicating Yakutsk 
Vecherniy’s predominantly urban audience, and its high proportion of Sakha. 
They usually translated any Sakha words, and provided information boxes for 
those with insufficient background knowledge; one article consisted entirely of a 
list of Sakha proverbs and their meanings (Yakutsk Vecherniy, September 3, 
2004: p. 65). These articles contained narratives flattering to those with a Sakha 
identity, offering their readers a pleasant way to imagine the Sakha beliefs, 
practices and ideas that are potentially unfamiliar or embarrassing, in common 
with Inform Polis’ articles. Their imaginative solutions to the problem of Sakha 
cultural change could take very different forms – from a description of the 
‘yakutisation’ (yakutizatsiya) of early Russian settlers, implicitly turning the 
tables on twentieth-century Russification, to the attempt to pacify youth 
“natiOnalism” (natsYonalizm) mentioned above (Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 4, 
2004: p. 3; June 25, 2004: p. 65).  
Two portraits of unusually gifted women, supplemented by the article on 
Sakha proverbs, presented idealised notions about Sakha culture in association 
with a specific depiction of ‘spiritual’ phenomena, like the Inform Polis articles 
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described in Chapter Four (Yakutsk Vecherniy, August 27, 2004: pp. 68–69; 
September 3, 2004: p. 64). These pieces suggest that urban Sakha are 
experiencing a comparable identity crisis to the Russianised Buryat, with the 
accompanying inclination towards more abstracted, idealised conceptions of 
their culture. Their narratives offer imaginary representations that relieve the 
emotional tension caused both by a lack of identification with rural Sakha 
culture and life, and the contradiction between a lingering willingness to believe 
in the reality of spiritual agency, and the desire to view oneself as a ‘developed’, 
rationalist post-industrial town-dweller. They reveal the continuing influence of 
the Sakha shamanic tradition, directly through the assertions of quasi-shamanist 
belief from their subjects and writers, and indirectly through their attraction for 
those who are excited by the thought of spiritual activity, although they do not 
overtly subscribe to a shamanist worldview.  
These two articles subvert the suggestion that the Sakha, along with their 
shamanic beliefs, are ‘uncivilised’ and ‘backward’, by describing the power of 
two implicitly Sakha women to confound their materialist, urban interviewers 
with their spiritual wisdom, and their supernatural abilities to heal and foresee 
future events. The articles identify the women as Sakha through their personal 
attributes and practice, including their reported speech – even though the 
psychic healer in the second piece is in fact Eveny.33 For example, the psychic 
healer uses a Russianised form of the Sakha word for female shaman (udaganka, 
from the Sakha udagan) to describe her shamaness neighbour, instead of the 
                                                 
33 As the article mentions, she is from the Eveny village of Sebyan-Kyuel, the site of Piers 
Vitebsky’s ethnographic study Reindeer People (Vitebsky, 2005). She is also related to an 
Eveny friend of mine. However, her originating from Sebyan-Kyuel would not automatically 
identify her to a Sakha reader in Yakutsk as Eveny, firstly because Sebyan-Kyuel is sufficiently 
remote to be unfamiliar to a member of Yakutsk’s general population, and secondly because the 
village contains a small Sakha community (Vitebsky, 2005).  
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Russian word shamanka. 
These women have psychic gifts that are connected to their intimate 
relationship with their home territory, along with its local spirits and ghosts. The 
first article’s subject emphasises her “solicitous” attitude towards the natural 
environment, claiming to live “at one with nature, and nature doesn’t offend 
me”. Her deep knowledge of and respect for her local environment enables her 
to guide the journalists through their interaction with the haunted trees they have 
come to visit, instructing them on how to avoid falling victim to the area’s 
shamanic spirits. According to their own account, the journalists survive their 
night under the haunted tree by means of the respectful and careful behaviour 
the elderly lady has advised – even though all their other informants, including 
the highly educated Director of Yakutsk’s Yaroslavskiy Regional Museum, have 
assured them they will inevitably come to grief. The journalists’ mission was 
apparently originally motivated by an iconoclastic curiosity and a desire to 
explode popular superstition, however their scepticism is overcome by their 
meeting with the elderly lady, and their experience at the haunted tree.  
The second article’s subject similarly eclipses the capacities of modern 
bio-medicine and its assumptions, through the psychic powers that were first 
manifested in unexpected interactions with her area’s local spirits and shamans. 
Her account suggests that she received her special gifts at the behest of these 
local spirits and shamans. Spirits called to her while she was lost in the forest; 
her shamaness neighbour told her as a child that she would “give her a little”, 
leaving “at least one”. She went on to become a licensed ‘bio-energy therapist’ 
(bioenergoterapeft) and ‘enio-operator’ (eniooperator) famed throughout Russia, 
astonishing conventional doctors, elite politicians, and her sceptical interviewer, 
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by the accuracy of her diagnoses. Like the first article’s heroine, she appreciates 
the powers of her “home earth” (rodnoye zemlya), choosing to respect her son’s 
desire to return to Sakha (Yakutia) from Moscow, and remarking, “it’s still 
easier on one’s home earth”. 
These two stories offer urban Sakha readers the opportunity to idealise 
traditional Sakha culture and shamanism as a profound connection to the land 
and its forces, rather than experiencing it as a set of unfamiliar rural practices 
and beliefs. The respectful and intimate relationship with nature displayed by 
these apparently Sakha women corresponds with their outstanding spiritual gifts, 
which allow them to surpass the knowledge and achievements of modern 
science, and its assumptions. Sakha ‘backwardness’ is transformed into a virtue, 
since it enables the Sakha to engage with primordial, natural spiritual forces 
ignored or misunderstood by ‘civilised’ people. This subversion of modernist 
norms echoes Inform Polis’ description of the Sevden tournament in Inner 
Mongolia, presented in Chapter Four. The notion of a unique Sakha relationship 
with the surrounding environment did not appear in any of the Erkeeyi 
translations, implying it to have a particular relevance for the urban Sakha 
population.  
The first article presents these ideas particularly clearly, juxtaposing the 
superstitious, unhelpful population of Megino-Kangalass with the wise elderly 
lady, whose traditional lifestyle and knowledge implies her to be ‘truly’ Sakha, 
unlike Megino-Kangalass’ other inhabitants. The journalists experience an 
“incomprehensible feeling of unreality”, as they arrive at her little old house in a 
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forest clearing (alas) of “magnificent” beauty, away from the “urban noise”.34 
The narrative places the journalists’ encounter with the woman, her home and 
her beliefs in an ambiguous, dreamlike space, distancing it from daily life and 
thereby introducing the idea of a ‘genuine’ Sakha culture, which does not 
necessarily correspond with the readers’ immediate experience. The article 
echoes Inform Polis’ blurring of ideal and reality in its description of Buryat 
traditional culture, while both Yakutsk Vecherniy articles repeat the association 
Inform Polis makes between spirituality, and non-Russian traditional culture.  
The connection these articles make between a positive relationship with 
local spirits and outstanding personal talent echoes the Sakha shamanic beliefs 
described in Section Two, placing the two women in the Sakha shamanic 
tradition. The articles’ repetition of these ideas, including their approbation of 
these outstanding individuals, entails an assumption on the part of the journalists 
that their urban Sakha readers will find them attractive, even if they do not 
believe them entirely. This assumption in turn reflects the influence of rural 
Sakha ideas on the urban Sakha mindset. The representations of ‘otherworldly 
forces’ in these articles also correspond to the notions of spirituality that 
underlie the narratives discussed in Section Two, in that they depict spiritual 
forces as manifested exclusively through human talent and experience. ‘The 
spiritual’ in these articles refers to forces that act within the realm of human 
health and well-being, having powers both to heal and to harm, rather than to 
abstracted, self-sufficient entities, as in the Buryat newspapers’ representations.     
However, the influence of Yakutsk Vecherniy’s urban, non-traditional 
setting appears in these narratives’ depiction of spirituality. The second article in 
                                                 
34 An alas is the Sakha word for a large clearing in the forest; the Sakha traditionally lived and 
pastured their herds on alasy.  
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particular describes generalised spiritual forces, like the Inform Polis articles on 
spirituality presented in Chapter Four – rather than referring exclusively to 
specific area spirits. The psychic healer’s account moves from the local spirits 
and shamans of her childhood to the “strong energetic field” the scientific 
investigators in Moscow discover her to have, and the famous hypnotist 
Chumak’s “good energy”; when books about the psychic Dzhuna, energies 
(energetiki) and karma began to appear, she “swallowed them with rapture, I 
searched for explanations for all my ‘strangenesses’”. The article presents the 
scientific tests that proved her special abilities, her subsequent training course at 
an institute in Moscow, and the licence she holds, as establishing her veracity – 
revealing an assumption that spiritual forces can be harnessed by the appropriate 
techniques and knowledge, achieved and communicated through modern, 
systematised methods of investigation and education.  
 One of Yakutia’s articles, published in its more populist Friday edition, 
both articulated and magnified this complex interaction between traditional 
Sakha, Soviet and post-Soviet influences (Yakutia, June 4, 2004: p. 11). The 
account of its subject, the Sakha psychic Aleksey Svetliy35, repeated Yakutsk 
Vecherniy’s association of personal talent, spiritual forces and Sakha culture, 
incorporating historical materialist paradigms as the contention that the Sakha 
people’s outstanding spiritual gifts are manifested in their great origins, and 
their future “mission” in human history. The article followed on from a first 
interview published in April 2004, in which Svetliy described his various 
insights and activities – for example, his use of sunbeams to cure illness 
(Yakutia, April 16, 2004: p. 11; Yakutia, June 4, 2004: p. 11). Like Yakutsk 
                                                 
35 The Russian adjective svetliy means light. Svetliy used both the Russian and Sakha 
equivalents (syrdyk, Sakha) as his pseudonym. 
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Vecherniy’s articles, these pieces depict the spiritual as a selection of mysterious, 
generalised forces that can be both controlled and verified by systematic, quasi-
empiricist techniques, whose agency concerns human health, well-being and 
achievement. For example, Svetliy has managed to capture sunbeams with 
magical healing properties in a series of photographs, which “warm” the hands 
of his interviewer; he heals unlucky village communities by cleaning their 
“biosphere”.   
 Svetliy amplifies Yakutsk Vecherniy’s suggestion that the ‘backward’ 
Sakha have a uniquely advantageous relationship with nature’s hidden forces, 
telling his admiring interviewer in both pieces that the Sakha are a unique 
people, “guests on Earth, destined for the creation of the sixth race [the great 
people of the future]. … We are people of the Sun” (Yakutia, June 4, 2004: p. 
11). He claims in the first interview that the Sakha people are descended from 
the lost island of Atlantis:36  
 
A long, long time ago there was one language on Earth – Sanskrit, the language of the fourth 
race, the sole language of the Atlantis peoples. There was a very developed civilisation on the 
continent of Atlantis. Our atomic energy was child’s play for them. That 3-metre high folk called 
itself Sakha, like us. If we take just the names of their islands: Suk khadara (Sanskrit) – 
Khadaara suokh (Yakut) – there isn’t any inconsistency; Azorida – As aryyta – island with food, 
Kanariyya – Khanaryya – vertical cliffs. Even the descriptions of the Atlantis islanders’ holidays 
do not differ at all from the Yakut Ysyakh… (Yakutia, April 16, 2004: p. 11.) [Yakutia’s italic 
script] 
 
Svetliy makes the Sakha people’s close connection to the spiritual world clear in 
                                                 
36 The Russian word for Sakha is yakut. The Sakha usually refer to themselves as yakuty when 
writing or speaking in Russian, however they also use the Sakha word sakha. I have followed 
the author’s or translator’s usage in my translation into English. 
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his explanation of a set of runes in the Sakha-dominated Taatta sub-region, left 
by a nineteenth-century white shaman who “knew the ancient runic script”, and 
is implicitly a precursor to Svetliy. The runes convey a message to the Sakha 
about their destiny as the sixth race, from an individual whose shamanic status 
entails a direct relationship with the mysterious spiritual forces that could enable 
him to see the future. The shaman’s communication expresses the spiritual 
world’s good will towards the Sakha, which is also manifested by their 
outstanding origin, destiny and achievements, and by the amazing talents of 
Sakha individuals, such as the shaman and Svetliy himself. Svetliy’s emphasis 
on the Atlantis islanders’ “very developed civilisation” reveals the historical 
materialism that underlies his contentions. His claim that the revival of the 
planet will start from Sakha (Yakutia), “the most ecologically clean place on 
Earth”, echoes Yakutsk Vecherniy’s assertion of the Sakha people’s unusually 
harmonious relationship with the natural world, which undermines the 
apparently ‘developed’ nations’ superior status.  
The same journalist conducted both interviews. She mentions in her 
introduction to the second that “the publication about Aleksey Svetliy … 
generated quite a few readers’ responses. Some were seeking help… Others 
were indignant, asking why charlatans should be advertised”. However, there 
were clearly enough positive responses for her to believe she could publish a 
second interview without seriously damaging either her own reputation, or 
Yakutia’s. She expresses her admiration for him openly in both articles, and so 
must have been confident from the start that she was attaching her name to 
material that most people would accept, although they might not take it literally. 
Yakutia’s June sample contained three other articles, making less extreme but 
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nevertheless comparable claims about the Sakha people’s spiritual and cultural 
heritage (Yakutia June 25, 2004: pp. 11, 13, 14). The popular Friday editions in 
the August and September sample contained similar pieces, showing that such 
articles are a regular, if relatively unusual, part of Yakutia’s more populist 
content. Yakutia’s journalists must perceive the apparent status of Sakha culture 
to have a profound importance for some individuals, if they are including this 
material in the edition designed to attract readers through providing pleasure. 
The attraction this type of speculation has implies a deeper popular worry both 
about the Sakha people’s current ‘underdevelopment’ and their future, 
corresponding to the disorientation contemporary urbanisation and cultural 
change must be producing. The interaction of traditional Sakha and non-
traditional elements in these narratives shows how the confusion and identity 
crisis generally associated with rapid cultural change have been exacerbated by 
a longstanding Sakha concern with their people’s status, resulting in these 
newspapers’ extreme allegations.  
Svetliy is offering Yakutia’s readers another idealised vision of Sakha 
culture, extending Yakutsk Vecherniy’s narrative to make an acknowledgement 
of Sakha identity entail a specific spiritual belief, like the Inform Polis articles 
described in Chapter Four. He implies the alleged status and achievements of the 
Sakha people to have a spiritual dimension – as does Luginov, when he 
mentions that his discovery of the Sakha people’s illustrious forbears has 
changed his ‘spiritual self-definition’ (Nashe Vremya, June 25, 2004: pp. 12–13). 
The challenges associated with urbanisation are producing narratives that inflate 
the preoccupation with the Sakha people’s world status into a spiritual concern.  
The Republican government’s permission of these articles to appear in 
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its own ‘flagship’ newspaper, despite their potential to irritate Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
non-Sakha citizens, constitutes a public acknowledgement that a strong 
sensitivity about Sakha culture exists among the Sakha population. The decision 
to countenance this sensitivity, rather than attempt to stifle it, implies a 
perception of it as a potentially dangerous phenomenon which has to be 
carefully managed. The current and future state of Sakha culture is a highly 
emotive subject for both rural and urban Sakha. Its development will continue to 
have a deep personal significance for many: it is this personal concern with 




Section 6.4: The republican government’s legitimisation narrative and 
Sakha Nationalist ideology 
The Republican government faces a similar imperative to legitimise its position 
as Buryatia’s administration: the poor quality of government in Sakha (Yakutia), 
as demonstrated by the Republic’s newspaper narratives, is discussed in Chapter 
Five.  
The discourse analysis of Yakutia revealed a tendency to celebrate 
individual members of the Republic’s population, and in doing so to promote a 
repeated narrative about an idealised ‘ordinary citizen’ of Sakha (Yakutia). 
Yakutia’s June sample, consisting of 20 newspapers, contained 23 of these 
articles; they therefore form one of Yakutia’s common regular genres. As 
Chapter Four described, Buryatia's narratives about high-status individuals 
would refer to their enhanced awareness of spirituality, morals and culture – 
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meanwhile its positive accounts of 'ordinary' workers, published to celebrate 
their particular worker's holiday, tended to focus on their own and their 
institution's professional achievements. Yakutia's biographical features instead 
celebrate the values and activities of an idealised 'proletariat', presented via 
descriptions of individual agricultural or industrial workers' lives. These articles’ 
subjects are often middle-aged or elderly lower-status workers, such as street 
cleaners or bus drivers (Yakutia, June 8, 2004: p. 2; June 2, 2004: p. 2.). Their 
stories describe the achievements they made through their unselfish devotion to 
the common cause, hard work and patience, rather than their spirituality and 
artistic talent. 
The narrative these articles repeat projects a notion of Sakha (Yakutia) as 
disadvantaged by its climate but nevertheless as making considerable economic, 
technological and social progress through the committed efforts of its population 
and government, reproducing the historical materialist paradigms appearing in 
the Sakha articles described above. The articles’ subjects present the Republic's 
rapid development by describing the harsh conditions they have experienced 
over the course of their lives. For example, a 75-year-old paediatrician tells of 
how she was given a dormitory bed on her arrival in Sakha (Yakutia) just after 
the war, and had to make a pillow by stuffing a pillow-case with hay (Yakutia, 
June 8, 2004: p. 4): 
The first antibiotics, the first hormones, the first intravenous injections – all that came about 
during our time. We didn’t spare ourselves. Once I became infected with a children’s illness 
– chicken pox. … I went to work, but… on foot, through the whole town. It wasn’t possible 
to go by bus – you’d infect others. (Yakutia, June 8, 2004: p. 4.) 
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The article subjects are optimistic about the future despite the hardships they 
have endured, to which they have often made an additional contribution in the 
form of their promising children and grandchildren.  
 The values and ideas these articles present always correlate with the 
public statements and activities of the republican politicians themselves, as they 
appear in Yakutia. The idea of Sakha (Yakutia) as a difficult northern territory, 
with a political establishment and population bent on making progress, is 
consistently reiterated in the political statements made during public events. An 
example is Shtyrov's congratulation message to the Vilyuisk power-station's 
builders on the day of its opening: 
 
The Vilyuisk power station has no equivalent in the world: it is the first and, for the moment, 
the only hydroelectric power station built on permafrost. Its creation was made possible 
thanks to the professionalism, the selfless work, and the commitment to the project of a 
numerous collective of power station builders, and it demanded the making of many unique 
technical decisions, and the development of new technologies. 
In front of us stands the necessity to do much, in order for the power station to work to 
its full capacity, and we have the strength to do this. …  (Yakutia, September 8, 2004: p. 1.) 
 
The correlation between the attitudes projected by Yakutia’s repetitive 
biographies, and those expressed by the Republic’s politicians, shows that their 
common narrative is part of the republican government’s self-legitimisation 
technique. It creates the possibility for readers to build the contentions made by 
politicians into their imagination of Sakha Yakutia's 'reality'. The similarity in 
character between these 'ordinary members' of Sakha (Yakutia)’s population, 
and the patient, hard-working people described by the politicians, makes it 
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possible to regard these individuals as living proof that the official narrative is 
relevant to Sakha (Yakutia)'s context and history. In addition, the importance 
Yakutia ascribes to the 'ordinary person', implied by its publication of so many 
articles about them, corroborates the politicians' claims to be working for and 
alongside their people. Sakha (Yakutia) is implied to have the type of 
government that values its hard-working citizens as associates in a universal 
mission to develop the Republic, while events such as the opening of the 
Vilyuisk power station are the tangible results of this mission's progress. The 
government initiatives themselves are thereby incorporated into an accessible 
and positive representation of the republican government, its people and their 
relationship. This representation would appear to encourage the formation of a 
non-ethnic republican identity, since it invites Sakha (Yakutia)’s citizens to 
focus on the economic and social development of their difficult, northern 
territory, rather than on its ethnic groups – while having a particular attraction 
for a Sakha population worried about their level of ‘development’.  
However, Yakutia and Sakha Sire also published articles which 
incorporated the historical materialist perspective into Sakha nationalist 
allegations that assumed Sakha (Yakutia) to be a project to further the Sakha 
people’s development, rather than a territorial administrative unit within the 
Russian Federation. These articles superficially appear to contravene the 
republican government’s own interests, since they have the power to anger both 
a federal government with a centralising agenda, and the Republic’s non-Sakha 
population. For example, an article with the headline, “In the name of the Sakha 
Republic’s prosperity” represented contemporary Sakha (Yakutia) as the 
continuation of the early Soviet Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
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(ASSR), with the same aim to promote industrial, economic and social 
development (Sakha Sire, June 18, 2004: p. 3). It displayed a strong historical 
materialist influence, as its emphasis on the Yakut Republic’s ‘development’ 
illustrates. The article presented the Yakut ASSR’s technological and economic 
achievements to be entirely due to the foresight and energy of its Sakha leaders, 
and in particular Maksim Ammosov, before he was purged in 1938 (Sakha Sire, 
June 18, 2004: p. 3). Its claim that Ammosov “intuitively chose the way of 
development for his native people” (rodnoi narod) implies Ammosov was using 
the Yakut ASSR to promote Sakha ‘progress’ in particular, portraying Sakha 
(Yakutia) as a specifically Sakha government institution, rather than the 
component of a multi-ethnic federal state. Sakha Sire is also capable of 
publishing strong criticism about the Putin administration itself, claiming for 
example that the federal government was trying to liquidate the federal budget 
deficit by passing its financial responsibilities on to the regions (Sakha Sire, 
September 1: p. 3). 
Yakutia devoted an entire broadsheet page to the former President 
Mikhail Nikolayev’s inauguration of the federation-wide Association of 
Publications of the Northern Territories (AIST) (Yakutia, June 9, 2004: p. 4). 
Nikolayev led the moderate Sakha nationalist movement behind the Sakha 
‘national revival’, which caused the current Republic to be established. He 
initiated the AIST himself, intending it to "unite creative powers and create a 
common information space for the Russian North". Its creation demonstrates 
that Nikolayev had not given up on his earlier attempts to form an Arctic 
coalition dominated by Sakha (Yakutia), which would defend the interests of 
those living in the North – thus providing a means for northern regions to exert a 
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stronger influence over federal government policy. Another of Yakutia’s 
contributors praised Nikolayev’s initiative, claiming that the Sakha people’s 
“main historical mission” was to unite and lead a northern coalition. This article 
repeats Sakha Sire’s intimation that Sakha (Yakutia) is a specifically Sakha 
polity, using a similar historical materialist paradigm, as the reference to the 
Sakha people’s ‘historical mission’ shows (Yakutia, June 8, 2004: p. 3). 
Four long statements from Nikolayev appeared in the 20 editions of Yakutia 
published over June 2004; equivalent articles were also published during the 
second sample period. He therefore retains enough influence in Sakha (Yakutia) 
to have access to Yakutia’s discursive space, along with the authors of the other 
pro-Sakha articles. Politicians with Sakha nationalist leanings are likely to be 
closely integrated into the non-Sakha political mainstream, since they are able to 
publish their polemic in the republican government’s official mouthpieces. 
Yakutia’s and Sakha Sire’s articles reveal the continuing presence of the 
politicians who organised the Sakha national revival in the Republic’s political 
establishment, despite the federal government’s dominance.  
Sakha nationalists do not have an obvious role in the republican 
government’s legitimating strategy, as do the Buryat nationalist intellectuals. As 
is described in Chapter Four, Buryat nationalist intellectuals help their 
government to organise the public events intended to display its high intellectual 
and cultural level. This is likely to have given nationalist intellectuals the 
political leverage to publish articles in Buryatia, which concentrate on 
promoting Buryat culture and spirituality. They occasionally insinuated that the 
Buryat have a more profound and spiritual relationship with Buryatia’s 
landscape; however, they never went as far as to suggest that the Republic of 
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Buryatia is essentially a Buryat state. Sakha (Yakutia)’s government publicity 
by contrast revolves around its promotion of the Republic’s economic, 
technological and social progress, and so does not depend on Sakha nationalist 
intellectuals. 
The consistent appearance of a historical materialist narrative in Erkeeyi, 
Yakutia and Sakha Sire implies a continuity of attitude between rural Sakha 
communities and their leaders, and republican-level Sakha politicians. 
Nikolayev and his sympathiser appear to be continuing Ammosov’s effort to 
‘develop’ the Sakha, by promoting a powerful Northern coalition headed by 
Sakha politicians – just as Desyatkin and Yefimov have ‘developed’ their home 
ulusy. Sakha politicians influenced by a general imperative to facilitate the 
Sakha people’s progress are likely to be positioned throughout the Republic’s 
levels of government. Some of them will be sub-regional administrators, 
motivated to raise their own standing by promoting that of their local 
community, while others are the Members of Parliament who publish pro-Sakha 
articles in Sakha Sire and Yakutia. Shtyrov’s administration is faced with a 
desire for Sakha prominence that is both deeply rooted in contemporary Sakha 
cultural practice, and held by a significant group within the government itself. It 
has clearly found a way to balance the conflicting interests among its members 
and subject population, which incorporates both the tolerance of Sakha Sire’s 
and Yakutia’s Sakha nationalist authors, and the social evolutionist 
legitimisation narrative described above.  
However, the social evolutionist influence over the republican 
government’s public representation creates the capacity for it to perpetuate the 
Sakha sensitivity about their level of  ‘development’, along with the attraction of 
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historical materialist Sakha nationalist arguments. Sakha Sire’s and Yakutia’s 
nationalist articles claimed the Sakha to have a uniquely harmonious 
relationship with Sakha (Yakutia)’s landscape, like the populist articles 
described in Section Two, suggesting that a Sakha nationalist argument has 
become absorbed into popular discursive spheres, and hence that the 
compromise the republican government has achieved between its various 
factions could ultimately backfire. Nikolayev referred to a generalised ‘northern 
personality’ throughout his AIST article, as might be expected in a statement 
apparently directed towards all of the Federation’s northern territories:  
 
In the North from time immemorial it has been thought that, in the places settled by human 
beings, the earth is ennobled, rather than becoming mean. Even the first Russian settlers 
noted the surprising capacity of Yakuts to render habitable what seemed to be lifeless earth: 
put a Yakut on the top of an icy cliff, they wrote, and soon you will find with surprise a high-
quality dwelling, from the chimney of which winds a warm stream of smoke, and next to it a 
hospitable decorated horse-tether – a serge [Sakha]. (Yakutia, June 9, 2004: p. 4.) 
 
Nikolayev insinuates that the Sakha have a unique understanding of the northern 
environment. Nikolayev’s supporter called for particular efforts to be made on 
behalf of the Sakha communities in the far North, whose “love” for and skill 
with their environment entitled them to lead the North’s future development 
(Yakutia, June 8, 2004: p. 3). The AIST page also contains an article claiming 
that the Arctic is the birthplace of the Aryan, and therefore Indo-European, 
civilisation, echoing Svetliy’s contentions about the Sakha people’s role in the 
origin of human development (Yakutia, June 9, 2004: p. 4).   




The integration of pro-Sakha politicians into the Republic’s entire governing 
system maintains Sakha loyalty towards the Republic’s government, and thus 
prevents the possibility of a radicalised, anti-government Sakha nationalist 
movement. As Chapter Five explained, Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers show a 
much higher level of public interest and engagement with the political sphere 
than in Buryatia. If the federal government were to merge Sakha (Yakutia) with 
its neighbours, as it proposes to merge Buryatia, it would alienate the Sakha 
population from their regional government, by breaking up Sakha political and 
community hierarchies. It would also exacerbate the Sakha’s suspicion and 
dislike of the federal government.  
The present elite in Sakha (Yakutia) are able to manage the Sakha desire 
for autonomy in such a way that the republican government acts as a buffer 
between the Sakha population and its politicians, and the federal government. 
Shtyrov and his administration are capable of compromising the requirements 
imposed by the federal government’s centralising policy on the one hand, and 
pro-Sakha politicians on the other, since for the time being the uneasy 
combination of Sakha or Russian politicians and businessmen that controls 
Sakha (Yakutia) continues to remain in place. The federal government therefore 
has an interest in Shtyrov remaining in power, despite his administration’s 
tolerance of Sakha nationalists. 
The influence of the historical materialist perspective would lead many 
Sakha to view the removal of the ‘Sakha Republic’ as the Federal government’s 
attempt to hinder the development of the Sakha people – while the importance 
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individual Sakha can attach to their people’s progress makes such an attempt a 
powerful reason to regard the federal government as their enemy. The Sakha 
cannot but be aware of their small number, in comparison with the Russian 
populations that surround the Republic, and so are unlikely ever to aspire to 
genuine independence from the Russian Federation. However, they inhabit and 
to a large extent administer a territory with a crucial significance for the Russian 
Federation’s economy; some of them, such as Desyatkin’s son, occupy key 
positions within the natural resource industries that generate so much of 
Russia’s wealth. A powerful feeling of resentment towards the federal 
government could create major problems for Russia as a whole, especially if the 
federal government itself showed signs of instability. These factors have created 
a scenario whereby the federal and republican governments indirectly encourage 
the current Sakha tendency to place an exaggerated value on their people’s 
progress, despite the interest both organs have in minimising the significance of 
Sakha identity.  
 
 























This research project set out to investigate the political significance of non-
Russian identity in the Russian Federation, treating the popular perception of 
non-Russian identity itself as a phenomenon heavily influenced by ideological 
and cultural developments initiated during the Soviet period. The study used 
content and discourse analyses of regional newspapers to identify the 
contemporary formulation and relevance of the Soviet-era notion of ‘ethnicity’. 
This method has been designed around the assumption that mass media help to 
develop the shared networks of ideas integrating mass societies and their 
cultures, by enabling individuals to form relationships with repetitive public 
narratives. Another assumption has been that consistent behaviours and attitudes 
distinguish one cultural community from another, determined by collective 
intellectual and emotional apprehensions. The ideas consistently repeated by 
mass media narratives can thus reflect trends in the cultural development of a 
society. Meanwhile, the presence in Siberia of newspapers that act explicitly as 
mouthpieces for their government owners creates the possibility of comparing 
official discourse with that designed to attract a mass audience. 
The first section of this chapter summarises the appearance and 
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treatment of both abstracted notions of ‘ethnic culture’ and specifically Buryat 
and Sakha cultural traits as they appear in the newspaper material under analysis. 
It explains how the newspaper content reveals distinct cultural developments, 
generated by a mix of economic, demographic and social factors. The second 
section is based on a qualitative analysis of the newspaper discourse on Buryat 
and Sakha culture. It shows how the cultural development presented in the first 
section incorporates strategies of political legitimisation, shedding light on the 
nature of the governance in both Republics. This section also identifies the role 
Buryat and Sakha nationalists have in their respective political contexts. The 
final section discusses this cultural development from a federation-wide 
perspective, in order to interpret its relevance for the republican and federal 
governments.  
The newspaper material used in this investigation shows that non-
Russian ethnic cultures and identities form part of a development of attitudes 
and practices, which is stimulated in part by the problems caused by a lack of 
effective governance at both regional and federal levels. Non-Russian ethnic 
identity is thus closely integrated into the development of the Russian 
Federation, as part of a flow of personal and political strategies that replaces the 
creation of independent, functional state institutions.  
 
 
Section 7.1: Buryat and Sakha Cultural Development  
The Republican-level government-sponsored dailies, Buryatia and Yakutia, 
showed a tendency to posit an abstracted category of ‘ethnic culture’, which 
resembled the Soviet-era notions of ‘ethnic culture’ described in Chapter One. 
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This conception of ‘ethnic culture’ implied the distinctions between Russia’s 
‘ethnic cultures’ to consist mainly of the differences between their traditional 
ways of life. The portrayals of Russian, Buryat, Sakha and Tungus cultures in 
Buryatia and Yakutia usually referred to what are regarded as traditional 
religious practices or cultural production, thus creating a division between these 
‘ethnic cultures’ and modern life. This implicit distinction made it possible for 
Buryatia and Yakutia to represent the relevance of individual ethnic identity as 
confined to cultural production and religious affiliation – which in turn helped 
their promotion of pan-ethnic republican identities, with a direct connection to 
contemporary politics and economics. Standardising the nature of ethnic culture 
in this way also made it easier for the government newspapers to devote 
approximately equal levels of attention to their Republics’ specific ethnic 
cultures, thus emphasising their governments’ commitment to all the different 
ethnic groups living on their territories. These government newspapers were 
therefore continuing the Soviet tendency to ‘flag’ a specific conception of 
ethnicity within their representation and legitimisation of their Republican 
states, in a similar way to the regular ‘flagging’ of Western nationhood 
described by Michael Billig (Billig 1995).  
These newspapers’ representation of ethnic culture implies that both 
governments regard it as having a strong and potentially threatening significance 
for their populations, since their media organs are producing articles apparently 
designed to promote alternative pan-ethnic republican identities, while making a 
conciliatory display of good-will towards their populations’ varying ethnic 
affiliations. This political communication had been developed for audiences 
with strong affiliations to specific Buryat, Sakha, Russian or Tungus cultural 
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traditions, which could be generally understood to fall within an abstract 
category of ‘ethnic culture’. It also reveals a perception that this notion of 
‘ethnic culture’ has the potential to arouse popular feeling. The simultaneous 
assimilation and adaptation of the ideas associated with Soviet nationalities 
ideology described in Chapters One and Two is continuing, as are the political 
attempts to manage the individual perception of non-Russian identity.   
The content analysis of commercial newspaper discourse produced 
results that corroborated the impressions made by the government newspapers’ 
careful representation of ethnic culture. All the commercial newspapers in the 
study contained articles appealing to an attachment to a specific ethnic identity 
and culture. Their journalists therefore regarded their target audiences’ ethnic 
affiliation as a factor that had to be considered in their formulation of an 
attractive, commercially viable newspaper. The commercial newspapers offered 
their readers flattering, informative articles about Russian, Buryat or Sakha 
cultural traditions, in addition to statements that could immediately be identified 
as arising out of a specific Russian, Buryat or Sakha cultural outlook. These 
statements could refer to an activity universally acknowledged to be Russian, 
Buryat or Sakha in particular, such as Sakha horse herding, or display an 
understanding of events that corresponded with recognisably Russian, Buryat or 
Sakha attitudes.  
The commercial newspaper content indicates that the government 
newspapers’ definition of ‘ethnic culture’ is generally familiar and acceptable to 
their populations, since commercial newspapers that consistently present their 
Republics’ ethnic groups in terms of their cultural traditions are able to attain 
mass audiences. However, the occasional manifestations of ethnic-specific ideas 
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in these commercial newspapers show that ethnic identities in these Republics 
are connected to distinct sets of attitudes and practices, as well as to the pre-
Soviet cultural traditions described in government newspapers – whether the 
authors of these statements were consciously reproducing a particular cultural 
habit, or were incidentally revealing their own Russian, Buryat or Sakha 
background. Non-Russian cultures that are capable of influencing personal 
reactions to current events therefore continue to exist in these Republics, 
although they may differ only slightly from the Russian Federation’s 
contemporary mainstream Russian culture.  
The commercial and government newspapers are adjusting their 
communication both to their audiences’ perceived identification with a 
particular ethnic cultural tradition, and to the influence these cultural traditions 
themselves have on contemporary Russian, Buryat and Sakha outlooks. Their 
content reveals that the Soviet idea of ‘ethnic culture’ continues to develop as a 
relevant notion within these Republics’ current ethnic identifications, as do the 
pre-Soviet Buryat and Sakha cultures themselves. The journalists working on all 
these newspapers are behaving as if they understand ethnic culture and identity 
to be integrated into their audiences’ emotional lives, while the government 
newspaper content shows ethnic culture and identity to be the subject of political 
policy. Ethnic culture in its various forms retains the capacity it acquired during 
the Soviet period to engender an interaction between government policy and 
personal identity.    
 
Despite these similarities, there are intriguing and profound differences between 
the Buryat and Sakha cases. The commercial newspaper content showed that 
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Sakha (Yakutia)’s journalists are more concerned about the Sakha population 
than their colleagues in Buryatia are about the Buryat – even to the extent that 
they prioritised Sakha interests over those of their Russian audiences. The 
content analysis data corroborated the evidence from interviews with locals who 
believed that Buryatia’s commercial newspapers are directed towards particular 
ethnic groups. The distinction made by Buryatia’s journalists between a Russian 
or Buryat audience is striking; so too is the fact that they clearly do not fear 
local resentment when publishing a ‘Russian’ newspaper. Buryatia’s journalists 
do not seem to believe that the Buryat commonly have either a sense of 
exclusive ownership over the republican state, or a corresponding capacity to 
involve the Republic’s political establishment in pursuing the interests of their 
ethnic group.   
Neither of Sakha (Yakutia)’s commercial newspapers showed evidence 
of a Russian bias, instead directing the few articles they published on ethnic 
culture towards a Sakha audience. This suggests that obviously ‘Russian’ or 
‘Sakha’ newspapers do not exist in Sakha (Yakutia)’s mainstream Russian-
language public sphere. If Sakha (Yakutia)’s journalists did believe that their 
audiences’ ethnic identities warranted their targeting one ethnic group in 
particular, then it might be expected that either Yakutsk Vecherniy, Nashe 
Vremya, or the regional supplement of Argumenty i Fakty for Sakha (Yakutia) 
would try to gain a larger share of the Russian audience, since these are the 
Republic’s most prominent Russian-language commercial newspapers. The 
Russian-language newspapers would be less likely to aim for a Sakha audience, 
since the Sakha-language commercial newspapers would naturally be more 
likely to attract readers who wanted specifically Sakha newspapers. 
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Neither Nashe Vremya nor Yakutsk Vecherniy were as careful as 
Buryatia’s Inform Polis to maintain impartiality towards both ethnic groups. 
Their editors apparently do not believe that the risk of displeasing their Russian 
audience was important enough to prevent them from devoting more attention to 
Sakha cultural themes, while tending to avoid the discussion of ethnic culture 
per se. Although both newspapers are keen to attract both Russian and Sakha 
readers, there is a subtle bias towards their Sakha audience. This combines with 
the absence of prominent ‘Russian’ newspapers to suggest that Sakha 
(Yakutia)’s journalists place a higher importance on the reactions of their Sakha 
target audiences. The reason for this may well be that Yakutsk’s population, 
which forms the bulk of their target audience, now contains a higher proportion 
of Sakha than Slavs, as Yakutsk Vecherniy mentioned (Yakutsk Vecherniy, 
August 27, 2004: pp. 4–5). It could also reflect the apprehension that an 
apparently ‘Russian’ commercial newspaper might offend a Sakha belief in their 
right to regard Sakha (Yakutia) as their ‘own’ state. ‘Russian’ commercial 
newspapers might be able to exist in Sakha (Yakutia)’s Russian-dominated 
industrial towns, but their provincial location would be likely to limit their 
relevance for the entire Republic.  
The government newspapers in both Republics also showed a variation 
in the amount and quality of nationalist articles they published. This variation 
corroborated the commercial newspapers’ indications of the different levels of 
influence the Buryat and Sakha have over their respective republican states. 
Although both Buryatia and Yakutia attempted to demonstrate impartiality 
towards the different ethnic groups living in their Republics, Yakutia felt able to 
abandon this principle when celebrating specifically Sakha events, such as the 
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Ysyakh. Yakutia also published Sakha nationalist claims that had much wider 
implications for the Russian Federation than the Buryat nationalist articles in 
Buryatia. The most explicit Buryat nationalist article made defensive allegations 
about successive Russian governments’ intentions to dominate the Mongolian 
peoples (Buryatia June 12, 2004: p. 4). Other articles in Buryatia emphasised 
the value of Buryat culture and religion but were similarly cautious, sometimes 
decrying the Soviet-era repression of Buryat cultural expression, or hinting that 
the Buryat had a special, spiritualised relationship with Buryatia’s landscape.  
Yakutia’s nationalist pieces could make positive assertions that 
concerned the Russian Federation’s state institutions, and their policies. In 
particular, an insinuation that the Sakha cultural heritage gives the Sakha a 
particular right to govern northern areas was made in various different ways. 
The most radical formulation of this argument also asserted that the Sakha 
should take the lead in uniting the Russian Federation’s northern regions with 
the world’s other sub-Arctic territories, in order to create a global coalition of 
northern peoples (Yakutia June 9, 2004: p. 4; Yakutia June 8, 2004: p. 3.). 
Yakutia’s nationalist articles could therefore express pretensions towards a 
higher level of political power for the Sakha. Yakutia also occasionally 
published populist articles insinuating that the Sakha cultural tradition is 
‘greater’ than any other. These pieces used the concept of ‘ethnic culture’ 
explained above, but instead of using it to represent ethnic culture as a selection 
of equally valuable cultural traditions, they implied the various ‘ethnic’ 
traditions to have differing levels of value, according to their level of 
‘development’, or ‘progress’. While Buryatia’s nationalist articles always 
portrayed the Buryat people as a participant in the Soviet-era notion of a 
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‘friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov), Yakutia’s pieces could use the idea 
of cultural ‘progress’, another strand within Soviet nationalities theory, to 
ascribe a unique status to the Sakha.  
The content of Buryatia and Yakutia also revealed the different roles 
Buryat and Sakha nationalists play in their respective republican governments. 
As the appearance of provocative Sakha nationalist articles in Yakutia might 
indicate, there are politicians with Sakha nationalist sympathies that have the 
power to influence Sakha (Yakutia)’s government policy, at least in some areas. 
For example, the republican government’s Children of Asia (Deti Azii) sports 
tournament was launched by means of a specifically Sakha theatrical display. 
The series of Deti Azii tournaments is intended to raise Sakha (Yakutia)’s 
international profile as a self-sufficient state, and in doing so to increase the 
likelihood that foreign investors will approach the republican government 
directly, rather than via the federal administration. Sakha (Yakutia) was thus 
presented to the tournament’s foreign participants as a Sakha state, despite its 
Russian President and large Russian population. The prominence of Sakha 
imagery in major government displays, such as the Deti Azii tournament, reflects 
the power of Sakha politicians publicly to emphasise the importance of the 
Sakha to the republican state.  
Meanwhile, the Buryat cultural presentation in Buryatia’s state occasions 
was balanced by an equivalent Russian show, echoing Buryatia’s impartial 
portrayal of the different ethnic cultural traditions that exist within the 
Republic’s overarching state structure. The Buryat nationalists were constantly 
involved in organising the republican government’s publicity events, apparently 
maintaining their capacity to publish in Buryatia by performing this service. As 
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Buryatia showed, Buryatia’s government legitimises itself by demonstrating its 
commitment to high culture and education, which requires it to collaborate with 
the Republic’s prominent academics and cultural producers, many of whom are 
Buryat nationalist intellectuals. These Buryat nationalists therefore are part of 
Buryatia’s political establishment; however, their power to convert their pro-
Buryat agitation into a genuine political influence is very limited.  
The varying Buryat and Sakha nationalist influence over their Republics’ 
politics appear to correlate with the different levels of concern the newspapers 
displayed towards their Russian and non-Russian audiences. In sum, the 
newspapers show that Sakha culture exerts a much stronger influence over its 
Republic’s general context than Buryat, while consisting of a more coherent and 
distinct set of practices, attitudes and identities. This finding corresponds with 
the large proportion of Sakha in Sakha (Yakutia)’s population (45.5 per cent, 
instead of the 27.8 per cent of Buryat in Buryatia’s population). It also reflects 
the state-building programmes carried out by Sakha (Yakutia)’s nationalist-
dominated administration during the 1990s, made possible by the income they 
received from the Republic’s natural resources.  
 
The distinctive Sakha culture was revealed in the content analysis as a greater 
tendency for Sakha (Yakutia)’s commercial newspapers to refer to Sakha culture 
as contemporary practice rather than past tradition. By contrast, Buryatia’s 
commercial newspapers showed a greater preoccupation with traditional Buryat 
history, religion and culture. Inform Polis, in particular, consistently supplied 
information to attract a reader with the personal interest in Buryat culture that 
would accompany a Buryat identity, but without a confident sense that they 
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understood it. The common references to Sakha cultural practices in Sakha 
(Yakutia)’s commercial newspapers showed that the Sakha have more 
opportunities to relate their Sakha identity to easily distinguishable Sakha habits 
and ideas, and so do not necessarily have the same need to come to an 
understanding of their own cultural tradition. The exception was Yakutsk 
Vecherniy, which occasionally offered idealised representations of Sakha culture 
that made a similar appeal to a reader’s sense of alienation from their Sakha 
identity. These articles indicated that some Sakha also have reason to question 
the meaning of their Sakha identity, despite their exposure to a distinct and 
influential Sakha culture. Yakutsk Vecherniy and Inform Polis have 
predominantly urban readerships, based in Yakutsk and Ulan Ude respectively. 
Their articles on Sakha and Buryat culture are therefore designed for the Sakha 
and Buryat who live in these towns – which suggests that urban Sakha and 
Buryat in particular are prone to doubt ethnic identities.  
The varying proportions of direct cultural expression on the one hand 
and reflection on cultural tradition on the other in the newspaper content 
correspond with the differing patterns of urbanisation in Buryatia and Sakha 
(Yakutia). This process began earlier in Buryatia. Ulan Ude’s Buryat population 
grew rapidly during the late Soviet period: 23 per cent of the Buryat population 
lived in urban areas in 1970, compared to 45 per cent in 1989 (Boronova, 2005: 
p. 131). A population of urbanised Buryat had thus begun to develop before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the mass migration of rural Sakha to 
Yakutsk began during the late Soviet period, it has been greatly intensified by 
post-Soviet republican government policy. Yakutsk’s urban cultures are still 
under the influence of a large population of recent immigrants from 
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predominantly Sakha social and cultural settings, who are faced with the task of 
adapting their rural Sakha outlook to Yakutsk’s relatively cosmopolitan 
environment – while the population of urbanised second-generation Sakha town-
dwellers is smaller than the corresponding Buryat population.  
Sakha (Yakutia)’s commercial newspapers reflect the co-existence of 
these recent rural Sakha incomers with a Russianised urban minority, since the 
combination of the consideration of Sakha tradition with displays of Sakha 
practice they offer would resonate with both groups – and would also be 
expected from a team of journalists made up of both urbanised Sakha, and 
recent rural immigrants. However, a potential culture clash between urban and 
rural Sakha is revealed in the contrast between the apparently unselfconscious 
manifestation of a Sakha worldview and the occasional mention of a complete 
lack of familiarity with contemporary Sakha practice. For example, one of 
Yakutsk Vecherniy’s Sakha journalists was unable to speak Sakha (Yakutsk 
Vecherniy, August 27, 2004: pp. 68–69). Both Yakutsk Vecherniy and Yakutia 
published articles designed to pacify a conflict between young urban and rural 
Sakha, displaying a unity of intention between private and government actors 
that implies the perception of a serious social problem (Yakutia, September 3, 
2004: p. 26; Yakutsk Vecherniy, June 25, 2004: p. 65). This clash is likely to 
create a strong emotional response among both rural Sakha incomers and 
urbanised Sakha. Rural Sakha perceive that the urbanised members of their own 
ethnic group despise its culture and values; the antipathy rural Sakha display 
towards urban Sakha must aggravate a sense that their Russianised outlook has 
made the latter’s ethnic identity meaningless.  
Nevertheless, the diverse approaches to Sakha culture in Sakha 
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(Yakutia)’s newspapers indicate that the personal challenges arising from the 
urban-rural divide are stimulating a development of attitudes and perceptions 
designed to help rural and urban Sakha find a relevance for their Sakha identities 
in their daily experience. Newspapers have a significant role within this 
development, since they are able through repetition to popularise ideas, helping 
individuals to assimilate them into their personal world-views. These developing 
ideas interact with the various other concerns and habits that generate cultural 
development as a whole, although they are likely to influence the growth of 
urban Sakha cultures in particular. They will also develop in dialogue with the 
parallel changes occurring in rural attitudes, through both the contact rural 
incomers retain with their home regions via their networks of family and friends, 
and the interchanges of rural and urban attitudes that take place within 
individuals as they form their own ways of adapting to urban life.  
The distinction between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ culture is extremely difficult 
to define, however. It could lie in the different motivations behind specific 
attitude changes. The radical transformations in lifestyle and environment that 
accompany a move to Yakutsk generate a need to re-assess the meaning and 
value of Sakha identity and culture, while rural populations have to negotiate the 
changes in their personal relationships with urbanised friends and relatives, who 
have acquired new and sometimes unsettling beliefs and aspirations. The 
specifically Sakha culture the newspapers exhibit is in rapid development, 
stimulated by a combination of personal, economic and demographic factors. 
In Buryatia, Inform Polis’ relatively consistent discussion of traditional 
culture indicates the presence of a large Russianised Buryat population, which 
has had the time to develop a set of specific attitudes and practices within Ulan 
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Ude’s mainstream culture. The sub-regional newspaper Barguzinskaya Pravda 
contained unselfconscious revelations of a specifically Buryat worldview, 
indicating that a dichotomy between rural and urban outlooks also exists. As 
with the Sakha, urban and rural attitudes are likely to be developing in tandem, 
since some urban Buryat will have retained contact with their relatives in the 
regions. The precise contentions expressed within Barguzinskaya Pravda’s rare 
displays of Buryat attitudes were not found in any of Inform Polis’ narratives, 
which shows the extent to which urbanised Buryat beliefs differ from rural, due 
to the greater assimilation of urban Buryats into the Russian Federation’s 
mainstream culture.  
However, Inform Polis’ content revealed subtle differences between 
Russianised Buryat attitudes and the mainstream Russian outlook. For example, 
Inform Polis’ articles on religion assumed their audiences had a distinctive 
willingness to believe in a direct effect spiritual entities can have on the material 
world, which was not evident in the material from the Moscow-based 
newspapers Argumenti i Fakty and Moskovskiy Komsomolets. This attitude 
resonates with the remarks Barguzinskaya Pravda’s Buryat authors made about 
area spirits, although it differs slightly from the beliefs they displayed. Russified 
Buryat ideas therefore form a distinct, ethnic-specific cultural development – 
albeit strongly influenced by the need to solve Buryat identity crises, a parallel 
with the problems of the Sakha.  
The similarity in the personal, social and economic motivations behind 
Buryat and Sakha urban cultural development suggests that urban Sakha 
attitudes could also form a distinct outlook similar to that of the urban Buryat, as 
the urban Sakha population produces new generations of Russianised Sakha 
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citizens. Urbanisation acts as an additional influence over the role Buryat and 
Sakha cultures play within their republican contexts, along with the sizes of their 
populations and the financial and political resources available to their nationalist 
movements. The following sections show how all these factors feed into a flow 
of changing ideas, aspirations and practices, which ultimately determines the 
political significance of each culture.  
 
 
Section 7.2: The role of politics in Buryat and Sakha cultural development 
The discourse analysis of both government and commercial newspapers showed 
the attitudes that are arising out of contemporary Buryat and Sakha cultural 
development, and the way they interact with their respective Republics’ political 
contexts. It corroborates the indication provided by the ethnographic research 
that non-Russian ethnic identity is closely involved with political strategy – 
however it presents the interaction between personal perception and political 
strategy in detail, by juxtaposing political legitimising narratives against articles 
created to attract a paying audience (Balzer, Petro and Robertson, 2001; Balzer, 
1993; 1995; 1999; Anderson, 2000; Grant, 1995; Humphrey, 1998). The 
discourse analysis revealed attitudes and discursive practices that explain the 
variation in Buryat and Sakha political influence, while also conveying the 
significance Buryat and Sakha culture can have for individuals. The analysis 
indicated that the policies intended to manipulate understandings of Buryat and 
Sakha identity are part of the intricate combination of personal, social and 
economic factors within Buryat and Sakha cultural development.  
The factors influencing contemporary Buryat and Sakha identities 
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include the nature of these Republics’ government practice. In both Republics 
the governments mask shortcomings in their administration with demonstrative 
strategies, which both influence and are in part determined by Buryat and Sakha 
attitudes and identities. At the same time Buryat and Sakha cultural attitudes are 
essentially independent from political strategy and beyond its power to control, 
like the cultural and social developments that were generated by Soviet policy 
and ideology. This is in part because politicians themselves are subject to the 
changes in attitude and perception brought about by cultural development. The 
Sakha case in particular shows how Soviet-era notions of progress, adapted into 
distinctively Sakha social practice, influence the strategies and aspirations of 
Sakha politicians.  
All of Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers, and especially the Sakha-language 
sub-regional newspaper Erkeeyi, showed that life in the Sakha agricultural 
regions is strongly affected by the presence of localised hierarchies, based on 
Soviet, or even pre-Soviet, family networks. Individual statuses within these 
hierarchies, in addition to those of the hierarchies themselves, are determined to 
a large extent by publicly recognised achievements – be they the acquisition of 
high-level positions in politics, business or academia, or success in public 
competitions such as sports tournaments. Both government and commercial 
newspapers contained articles or statements indicating that individual Sakha 
value themselves according to the statuses of their family and territorial 
networks, in addition to their own status within these groups. This creates a 
powerful imperative for individuals to do well in public arenas, in order to raise 
both their individual statuses and those of the groups they affiliate themselves 
with – which includes the overarching community of the Sakha people.  
 306 
All of Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers showed that the Soviet historical 
materialist notion of national ‘progress’ described above has been incorporated 
into this worldview, as a preoccupation with the Sakha’s status within the 
hierarchy of ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ peoples. The newspaper discourse expressed 
this preoccupation either as a concern that the Sakha ethnic group is 
‘undeveloped’, or as a tendency to claim the Sakha have an exceptionally rich 
and ancient cultural heritage. The newspapers also presented material about the 
Sakha cultural heritage in conjunction with spiritual, supernatural or universally 
valuable phenomena, ascribing a transcendent worth to Sakha culture.  
As the newspaper discourse showed, the Republic’s Sakha politicians 
generally belong to regional Sakha hierarchies. Their elite positions give them 
an exclusive access to their home communities’ economic and social resources. 
However, they are also under pressure to promote their regions’ statuses by 
increasing their level of progress. Their commitment towards improving their 
subject populations’ standing is also expected to extend to that of the entire 
Sakha people, along with their Republic. Their motivation to develop their home 
regions, or the Republic as a whole, does not necessarily translate into a desire 
to govern them efficiently, or to improve standards of living for the citizenry. 
The newspaper content revealed the constant need for Sakha (Yakutia)’s leading 
politicians and businessmen to defend their positions within a dynamic and 
aggressive elite, which includes actors from the federal-level political sphere. 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s prevailing political atmosphere encourages prominent 
displays of government activity, rather than a sustained attempt to create an 
efficient state.  
The popular desire for Sakha (Yakutia)’s ‘development’ influences 
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politicians to construct their legitimisation strategy accordingly, as Yakutia 
showed, consistently emphasising the republican government’s efforts to 
improve Sakha (Yakutia)’s industrial, economic and social progress. The Sakha 
nationalist statements in Yakutia coincided with much more explicit articles in 
the Sakha-language government newspaper Sakha Sire, which presented Sakha 
(Yakutia) as a project to develop the Sakha people. The Sakha politicians who 
wrote them were thus emphasising their specific commitment to the 
development of the Sakha nation, possibly as part of a consistent self-promotion 
technique.  
The constant presentation of the republican politicians’ attempts to 
develop Sakha (Yakutia) enables the Sakha to associate their ethnic identity with 
the political sphere, whether or not they believe their politicians’ assertions. The 
legitimisation techniques used by politicians encourage the Sakha to view their 
republican political establishment as an extension of their regional hierarchies, 
and their culture as developing in conjunction with their Republic. The 
republican government has succeeded in creating a legitimisation strategy that 
encourages loyalty towards the republican state from both the Sakha population 
and its politicians. The risk is that the Sakha awareness of their cultural 
‘progress’ may lead to calls for a greater level of self-government, and even for 
Sakha (Yakutia) to exist as an exclusively Sakha state.    
Sakha intellectual nationalist organisations continue to exist, although 
they do not have overt mass support. Instead, a persistent Sakha desire to live as 
a ‘developed’ nation within their own nation-state can be discerned in 
occasional demonstrations of a radical and exclusive commitment to Sakha 
interests; these are common enough to be recognisable as a distinct pattern of 
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behaviour. The capacity for young Sakha occasionally to attack Russianised 
Sakha is an example, as is the continuing public appearance of exaggerated 
claims about the Sakha people’s cultural achievements – such as an assertion 
that the isolated Sakha have preserved the valuable Turkic roots of English 
culture in a purer form, and are currently helping the English to rediscover their 
Turkic heritage.37 
The Sakha preoccupation with their ethnic culture and its development 
has clear implications for the federal government, given the huge sums of 
money that can be made from Sakha (Yakutia)’s natural resources. So too is the 
presence of several Sakha individuals among the political and economic elites, 
and the increasingly dominant proportion of Sakha in the Republic’s population. 
The federal government, however, has not attempted to remove President 
Vyacheslav Shtyrov’s administration, despite occasional resistance to the 
Kremlin’s policies (Vladimir Putin recommended Shtyrov for a second 
presidential term in 2006). This suggests that their capacity to manage the 
relationships between the Sakha, their politicians, and the republican 
government itself is too valuable to lose, at least for the time being.   
Buryatia’s newspaper content suggests that a sense of pan-Buryat 
identity is increasing in step with the urban Buryat cultural development 
described above. The rural newspaper Barguzinskaya Pravda’s Buryat 
statements referred only once to the Buryat as a whole, instead focusing on 
regional or family communities. On the other hand, Inform Polis’ articles on 
Buryat culture presupposed the existence of a cohesive Buryat ethnic group. 
Inform Polis rarely associated Buryat culture with the Republic’s politics, 
                                                 
37 www.sakhalife.ru: “Yakutiya pomogayet Anglii vspomnit’ tyuretskiye korni”; May 29, 2007. 
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instead implying it to transcend Buryatia’s contemporary context. Buryat culture 
appeared in Inform Polis to have a sacred essence: it enabled its adherents to 
encounter the primordial spiritual forces that exist within Buryatia’s landscape, 
history, and Buddhist tradition. Its connection to an inherently beneficial 
spiritual power was such that an explicit commitment to a Buryat identity was 
implied to be analogous to a statement of religious faith. None of Buryatia’s 
newspapers expressed a strong concern about the Buryat ethnic group’s level of 
‘development’, or its future progress and status: they focused instead on 
portraying an idealised past, while emphasising the spiritual riches that lie at the 
heart of every traditional culture and religion. The attractiveness and 
accessibility of the solution these idealised portraits offer to those who question 
the relevance of their Buryat identity give it the potential to form a central part 
of contemporary urban Buryat cultural development. The importance of these 
idealised representations of Buryat culture could increase, if the current 
urbanisation and Russification of the Buryat continues.  
Inform Polis’ emphasis on transcendent, beneficial forces resembled 
Buryatia’s constant evocation of a striving towards an abstracted, ultimately 
valuable spiritual power, manifested by cultural production, historical tradition 
and pre-Soviet ethnic culture. The evidence of the newspapers is that this 
narrative formed the basis of the republican government’s legitimisation strategy. 
Buryatia displayed the republican government’s keen desire to support those 
who yearn towards the supremely valuable, for example by sponsoring cultural, 
religious or academic ceremonial occasions. Buryatia’s abstracted and idealised 
notion of ethnic culture, promoted as part of this legitimisation display, is 
matched by Inform Polis’ tendency to ascribe a quasi-religious significance to 
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Buryat ethnic culture. In so doing Inform Polis celebrates Buryat culture within 
a value system that echoes the government-sponsored espousal of traditional 
culture and religion. However, Inform Polis’ supernatural forces were portrayed 
as spiritual beings with the capacity to affect the material world, unlike 
Buryatia’s universal but indistinct values – indicating that the cultural 
development Inform Polis expresses does not assimilate its constituent ideas 
directly from government discourse, although it may incorporate the attractive 
aspects of government narratives.   
This dislocation between government and commercial newspaper 
discourse reflects the lack of engagement between Buryatia’s citizens and its 
government. As all Buryatia’s newspapers showed, the republican government 
has a very limited capacity to improve its citizens’ welfare, and lacks the 
financial resources for the sustained display of state-building undertaken by 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s government. Both republican administrations offer their 
populations large public demonstrations in lieu of efficient government; 
however, while Sakha (Yakutia)’s natural resources enable its government to 
organise international sports tournaments, Buryatia’s government has to be 
content with marking its state holidays with firework displays. The lack of 
genuine political initiatives, in addition to the frustration occasionally expressed 
by Inform Polis, Pyatnitsa Plyus and Barguzinskaya Pravda, suggest that 
Buryatia’s citizens have good reason to adopt a dismissive attitude towards their 
government.  
Current developments in Buryat culture do not encourage an aspiration 
towards political autonomy, unlike Sakha culture. While the population of 
Buryatia continues to be predominantly Slavic, no Buryat nationalist movement 
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would be able to make a viable claim for greater Buryat autonomy. The 
activities of the Buryat nationalists who remain in the political establishment are 
restricted to the Republic’s cultural and educational institutions. Buryat culture 
is more likely to continue to be regarded as external to republican and federal 
politics, particularly as the transcendent, spiritual significance ascribed to Buryat 
culture gives it the capacity to generate strong identities that are independent of 
politics. These in turn can weaken the individual’s sense of a federal or 
republican state identity.  
The increasingly significant pan-Buryat identity could potentially form a 
basis for future mass Buryat nationalist movements. The current stirrings 
towards such movements generally take the form of communications between 
young people in Internet chat rooms, which are inaccessible to most of the 
Buryat population. However, the constant presentation of a quasi-religious 
Buryat culture in Inform Polis, Buryatia’s most popular newspaper, shows that 
the possibility of another Buryat ‘national revival’ remains, in the form of 
personal attachments that could under the right circumstances be mobilised into 
a political force.   
The Buryat and Sakha are likely to continue to value their ethnic 
identities and cultures for the immediate future. A pan-ethnic popular 
identification with the republican state institutions is unlikely to develop, at least 
while these republican administrations produce legitimisation displays that 
encourage personal perceptions of ethnic identity. The constant association in 
the public mind of the Russian Federation with the Russian people must hinder 
the development of popular Buryat and Sakha affiliations with the federal state, 
while the frequent negative portrayals of ‘Muscovites’ in both Buryatia’s and 
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Sakha (Yakutia)’s commercial newspapers indicate a general suspicion towards 
the federal government. A marked improvement in quality of life could combine 
with increasing mobility and connection with the outside world to reduce the 
significance of Buryat and Sakha identity, encouraging individuals to focus on 
their prospects within or outside the Russian Federation as a whole. Conversely, 
a continuation of the poor quality of governance exhibited by Buryatia and 
Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers could increase popular feelings of frustration, 
absorbing local populations in the effort to cope with the personal and economic 
pressures created by their immediate environment. Both republican governments 
therefore increase the importance of ethnic identity, despite their interest in 
minimising its emotional power: their policies form part of Buryat and Sakha 
cultural development, rather than acting as an external control.  
 
 
Section 7.3: Ethnic identity and politics in the Russian Federation 
The different sets of attitudes within Buryat and Sakha culture show the 
variance in the ways Soviet ideology was assimilated by non-Russian cultures. 
This variance is likely to correspond with differing experiences of Sovietisation, 
conditioned partly by these Republics’ specific economic, political and 
geographic contexts, and partly by the influence pre-Soviet Buryat and Sakha 
culture would have had on individual perceptions of the Soviet project. The 
differing notions of spirituality within these newspaper discourses suggest that 
Soviet ideology has been adapted into Buryat and Sakha cultural development, 
simultaneously reinforcing and re-shaping cultural tendencies from the pre-
Soviet era. The newspapers corroborate the ethnographers’ suggestion that 
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contemporary non-Russian cultures are formed from the interchange between 
government policy and traditional attitudes. This process of cultural 
development has enabled Soviet-era ideas about ethnicity to acquire a profound 
personal significance, despite their origins in a political project far removed 
from traditional Buryat and Sakha culture. It explains why Russianised Buryat 
and Sakha culture remains distinct from mainstream Russian culture. 
One very significant feature of this distinctiveness is the way the 
newspapers in the sample depict the spiritual world. The Sakha concern about 
talent is connected in the newspaper discourse with the spiritual world in a way 
that recalls their shamanist cultural heritage. Sakha (Yakutia)’s newspapers 
placed an extremely high value on what they portray as innate talent – whether 
this belonged to individual people, or the Sakha ethnic group as a whole. All the 
newspapers contained lengthy celebrations of specific individuals, which lauded 
not only their personal gifts and achievements, but also their good nature and 
positive attitude towards life. These celebrations included representations of 
mysterious, supernatural phenomena: the individual concerned could in some 
cases have outstanding psychic abilities, or knowledge of religious tradition. In 
doing so, they displayed an understanding of the spiritual as continuous with the 
immediately perceptible human world, being manifested by human talent and 
achievement. The connection these newspaper articles made between their 
representation of spirituality and human ability suggests that the pre-Soviet 
Sakha capacity to regard human talent as endowed by benevolent spirits 
continues, if only as a tendency to place an extremely high value on human 
achievement and status.  
These continuities between pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet Sakha 
 314 
society reveal why the Sakha continue to treat the Soviet-influenced idea of 
national ‘development’ as an axiom, while attaching a limited importance to the 
Soviet ideal of a ‘friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov). The competitive 
streak that runs through Sakha culture predisposes the Sakha to assimilate the 
Soviet theory of cultural ‘progress’, since the competitive hierarchy of ‘nations’ 
it posits is likely to be familiar to the Sakha worldview, and therefore easily 
adaptable into everyday patterns of thought.  The notion of a national hierarchy 
based on ‘development’ promotes the habit of viewing individuals and groups in 
terms of their position on a scale determined by public achievement, and thus 
reproduces the tendency to place a high value on innate talent. It encourages the 
Sakha to continue to associate the mysterious, transcending dimensions of life 
with human accomplishment, in addition to creating a strong desire to see the 
Sakha ethnic group itself as unusually gifted. The aspect of Soviet nationalities 
ideology that has the strongest resonance with pre-Soviet Sakha culture has 
become adapted into contemporary Sakha concerns and attitudes, in the process 
creating new formulations of pre-Soviet Sakha beliefs. 
In Buryatia, Inform Polis’ consistent representation of non-material 
entities, which are manifested directly rather than as natural phenomena, could 
equally exhibit the continuing influence of the eastern Buryat Buddhist and 
Shamanist tradition. The idea of a mysterious, transcendent and inherently good 
primordial force appears in all of Inform Polis’ articles about Buryat culture. 
This preoccupation with idealised, abstracted spiritual entities, rather than the 
nuances of social relationships, perhaps marks the continuing relevance of the 
eastern Buryat people’s pre-Soviet exposure to Mongolian Buddhism. It reveals 
a greater willingness to engage with notions about explicitly ‘other-worldly’ 
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forces, whose agency nevertheless has a vital importance for an individual’s 
moral and physical well-being. This emphasis contrasts with the Sakha tendency 
to sublimate a similarly animist cultural influence into an overriding concern 
about status.  
Inform Polis’ articles reflect a tendency to regard the spiritual as 
sufficiently distinct from the material world to have generated the hierarchies 
and practices that accompany the world’s religious and cultural traditions. The 
hierarchy of lamas in Mongolian Buddhism acts to distinguish the spiritual 
sphere from immediate human experience. It presupposes the need for an 
elaborate system of learning and practice in order to encounter the spiritual, 
which requires the existence of a large organisation and is therefore beyond the 
capacity of a single human being. Mongolian Buddhist practice would 
encourage a belief in an abstracted spiritual entity that transcends daily life, such 
as the idealised spiritual forces Inform Polis describes.  
This interest in transcendent dimensions of reality could explain why a 
newspaper produced for contemporary urban Buryats attributes such importance 
to traditional culture. It may also explain why previous Buryat generations were 
so ready to engage with the Marxist-Leninist contention that communist cultural 
production should consist of the Soviet Union’s different ethnic folk art forms 
translated into ‘developed’ Soviet genres. This aspect of Soviet ideology was 
promoted in connection with the korenizatsiya policy, which aimed to create 
non-Russian academic and cultural elites to facilitate such Soviet cultural 
production in the national Republics. Ethnic culture itself was implied to have a 
specific cultural value, although limited by its lack of development: according to 
Soviet-era historical materialism, national groups, who had developed their own 
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national polities, superseded ethnic groups.  
A Buddhist-influenced preoccupation with otherworldly transcendence 
would encourage individual Buryats to place a high value on the Buryat cultural 
production created through korenizatsiya – even if they were thoroughly 
sympathetic to Soviet ideology and believed Buddhism itself to be redundant or 
harmful. The distinction Soviet nationalities theory makes between ethnic 
culture and nation-state politics distances ethnic culture from the more quotidian 
aspects of Soviet life, placing it outside the Soviet-era routines that were 
designed to integrate daily life into the developing Soviet state.  
The apolitical quality Soviet theory ascribes to ethnic culture would 
encourage people habituated to the idea that reality has a mysterious, 
transcendent dimension to associate it with Sovietised ethnic cultural production 
– particularly since this cultural production was accomplished by a highly 
specialised hierarchy of Soviet-trained Buryat intellectuals. These intellectuals 
take the position relative to reality’s transcendent dimension previously held by 
the Buddhist lamas: their increased knowledge and understanding gives them a 
greater access to the higher aspects of existence, allowing them to mediate on 
behalf of ordinary people. Melissa Chakars notes that the Buryat produced one 
of the Soviet Union’s most active cultural elites, displaying an unusual 
enthusiasm for the opportunity to develop their ethnic cultural production 
(Chakars, 2008). However, this did not result in mass support for the Buryat 
intellectual nationalist movement. Indeed, a high regard for ethnic cultural 
production in general could well lessen an individual’s sympathy for a political 
movement prioritising the needs of a specific ethnic group.  
A Soviet-era tendency to impute inherent value to an abstracted ‘ethnic 
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culture’ could be behind the continuing Buryat willingness to idealise the Soviet 
notion of the ‘friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov), rather than developing 
a preoccupation with their place in the hierarchy of nations. The korenizatsiya 
policy and its ideology created the conditions for urbanised Buryats to continue 
to imagine an abstracted spiritual domain. Today, their capacity to associate 
themselves with a spiritualised notion of the Buryat ethnic group appears to be 
growing, rather than diminishing, with increasing urbanisation, as the idealised 
representations of Buryat culture in Inform Polis show. 
 
The complicated interaction between pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet ideas in 
the two Republics’ newspapers indicates a common pattern of cultural 
development, which is stimulated by disjunctions in the relationship between 
beliefs and their corresponding values, and the immediate context. The case of 
Buryat and Sakha urban cultural development shows how the impossibility of 
applying collectively held beliefs and values to a given context can generate 
new popular attitudes. These attitudes are formed out of adapting the available 
ideas into the beliefs, values, practices and aspirations that fit the circumstances 
more easily.  
As the combination of old and new ideas in contemporary Buryat and 
Sakha culture shows, previously held beliefs have a strong effect over the 
adaptation of new ideas into common attitudes. They influence the way ideas 
and events are interpreted, thereby conditioning the assimilation of new 
concepts into contemporary culture. Both Buryat and Sakha cultural 
development is therefore characterised by the adaptation of fresh ideas into older 
worldviews as their respective contexts change, creating re-formed perspectives 
 318 
that in turn influence further cultural development.  
The political events in Russia over the past century have had an integral 
role in this process of cultural development, in that they have accelerated the 
radical social and economic change that motivates it. The Buryat and Sakha 
were exposed to a systematic attempt to reform their entire way of life and 
thought; this attempt was to become distorted beyond recognition as the 
twentieth century progressed. The demographic and economic shifts that began 
during the late Soviet period have intensified, as the influence of global market 
forces over the Russian Federation’s economy has increased. Meanwhile, the 
monolithic Soviet mass media institutions have disintegrated into a varied 
collection of both government-sponsored and commercial media organs. The 
population of the former Soviet Union has again been confronted with a set of 
circumstances that renders many of its central beliefs, values and aspirations 
obsolete – thus stimulating the development of new popular attitudes, heavily 
influenced by ideas formulated during the Soviet era.  
Political legitimisation strategies continue to influence this development 
by targeting personal perceptions of identity, as the Buryat and Sakha cases 
show, although they are simultaneously subject to its effects. The early Soviet 
intervention into its population’s attitudes has made popular ethnic identity a 
compelling political concern.  
The newspaper discourses in both Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) reveal a 
tendency to ascribe a transcending, universal significance to Buryat and Sakha 
culture. This allows individual Buryat and Sakha to incorporate an ultimate 
reason for living into their perception of their own ethnic identity. The Sakha 
can claim their supreme purpose is to help fulfil their people’s destined role in 
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the history of humanity, establishing their status among the world’s ‘great’ 
peoples. The inherent spiritual transcendence imputed to the Buryat cultural 
tradition enables the Buryat to view their quest for the universally good as 
central to their Buryat identity. These goals encompass a sufficiently broad 
spectrum of spiritual, moral and practical associations to allow individuals to 
formulate their habits, aspirations and self-perceptions around them in different 
ways. The newspapers are producing narratives that not only flatter their 
audiences’ Buryat or Sakha identities, but also present them with a life purpose 
capable of generating an entire personhood, via an abstracted portrayal of 
Buryat or Sakha culture.  
The newspaper data suggest that the association Altanhuu 
Hürelbataar and Marjorie Balzer show to exist between religious practice 
and ethnic identity has been extended into the way that ethnicity itself is 
understood (Altanhuu Hürelbataar, 2007; Balzer, 1999). Both 
ethnographers describe cases where a distinctive religious practice has 
provided a way for non-Russian peoples to attach meaning to their 
ethnicity; for example, Balzer contends that the Khanty of Western Siberia 
have maintained their sense of distinctiveness through their belief in 
reincarnation (Balzer, 1999: pp. 173–203).  Tracing the notions of identity 
in newspaper discourse reveals how this association can generate new 
understandings of ethnicity, and its significance.     
The comparison of government and commercial newspaper discourse 
shows that political legitimisation strategies work to reinforce an implied 
connection between Buryat and Sakha identity and an ultimate life purpose. 
Yakutia and Sakha Sire frequently demonstrate the Republican government’s 
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efforts to ‘develop’ Sakha (Yakutia), re-iterating the theory of national progress 
as they do so, while publishing celebrations of the Sakha people’s superlative 
national achievements. Buryatia attributes a spiritual and moral yearning to a 
variety of political acts, as it emphasises the spiritual treasury within ethnic 
cultural production. Non-Russian identity, far from interfering with a loyalty to 
republican state institutions, provides powerful actors with a means to engineer 
a popular relationship with an elite hierarchy that cannot offer its citizens 
effective governance. In the absence of genuinely stable and efficient state 
institutions the management by the elite of ideas associated with non-Russian 
identity has an important role, as the republican administrations demonstrate 
their commitment towards their population through a display of their respect for 
and engagement with their populations’ ethnic identities and cultures. These 
displays are directed towards Slavic as well as non-Russian populations, as the 
careful balancing of non-Russian and Russian folk dancing festivals in Buryatia 
and Yakutia shows.  
The capacity to ascribe a profound, quasi-spiritual relevance to one’s 
ethnic identity could exist in various forms throughout the Russian Federation. 
Indeed, Nick Megoran notes assertions in Uzbekistan’s newspapers and 
popular music that an ‘essence’ of Uzbekness accords the modern state a 
great “spiritual, cultural and political legacy” (Megoran, 2004: p. 743), 
making it “‘as holy as a house of prayer’” (Megoran, 2005: p. 565). As 
Chapter Four described, the representation of Russia and its place in the world 
in the federal-level newspapers Argumenti i Fakti and Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
was reminiscent of Soviet ideology from the Cold War era. It assumed that the 
world exists as a collective of self-sufficient national-ethnic groups – the natsii, 
 321 
who have developed out of narodnosti – which hope to destroy Russia’s power. 
The way these articles represented people was determined by these article 
subjects’ alleged orientation towards the Russian Federation: those who 
supported the Russian Federation’s interests were positive, sympathetic 
characters, whereas the individuals or natzii who were apparently ‘against’ 
Russia were unpleasant. The Russian Federation itself was generally associated 
with ethnic Russians, thus confusing the notion of the Russian state with that of 
the Russian people. The federal-level newspaper Argumenti i Fakti made a 
particularly clear link between the Russian people, the Russian state and the 
Orthodox Church, implying that those seeking to defend Russia from its 
enemies also had a religious motivation: the Russian Orthodox heritage 
appeared to confer a universally significant spiritual dimension on to Russian 
culture and identity (Agadjanian, 2001).  
Argumenti i Fakti and Moskovskiy Komsomolets are among the Russian 
Federation’s most popular commercial newspapers, and so must have been 
reproducing a worldview that is acceptable to a reasonable proportion of the 
Russian Federation’s population. Their articles always corroborated the Putin 
administration’s official line, revealing an additional political influence. Their 
discourse indicates the continuing tendency for the federal government to 
incorporate perceptions of ethnic identity into its public communication 
strategies, as noted by Bo Petersson and Ivan Zassourskiy (Zassourskiy, 2001; 
Petersson, 2001). In doing so, Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Argumenti i Fakti 
could have been aiding a federal self-legitimisation strategy, based on an 
assumption that the Russian population is willing to invest their national and 
ethnic identity with an all-encompassing, quasi-religious significance. Like the 
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newspapers from Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia), they present their audiences 
with the opportunity to adapt their senses of self-purpose into a combined state 
and ethnic identity.  
The paradox is that the federal government’s use of Russian ethnic 
identity as a means to negotiate its relationship with its population appears to be 
contrary to its own interests, given the problems a heightened popular awareness 
of ethnic identity can cause. The Buryat and Sakha cases indicate that non-
Russian cultures and identities can inhibit an affiliation with a federal state that 
emphasises its attachment to the Russian people. Federal policy makers are 
aware of this problem, as is shown by their willingness to privilege non-Russian 
interests over their own if circumstances require. 
Those who create these narratives could also be using representations of 
ethnic identity to manage a difficult relationship with the general population, 
again as Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia). As we saw earlier, federal government 
policy does not always work to benefit either the regional administrations, or the 
general population. Contemporary Buryat and Sakha identities therefore could 
be part of a cultural development in the Russian Federation as a whole, which is 
strongly influenced by the personal and practical problems caused by a 
disjuncture between the republican administrations’ apparent purpose – 
governing their republics’ territories – and their actual achievement. As Nikolai 
Ssorin-Chaikov notes in his account of the relationships developing between 
Soviet government officials and Evenki reindeer-herders, “failures and 
fragmentation have their own normalizing, and indeed, culturally constructive 
effects.” (Ssorin-Chaikov, 2003: p. 7.)  
One is reminded of the complex relationship (discussed in Chapter One) 
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between Soviet ideology and the reality of Soviet life, and the cultural 
development it generated. The cultural development this study has revealed 
suggests that the similarities between Soviet and contemporary political practice 
arise from the amalgamation of politics into an effort to solve a myriad of 
contradictions, affecting ordinary citizens, government workers, and the political 
and business elites. A major continuity between the Russian Federation and the 
Soviet Union therefore could be the influence the faults of their governing 
institutions exert on the nature of their statehood.  
The effect indicated by this research is a tendency for citizens to value 
ethnic identity more highly than an affiliation with state institutions. As new 
versions of the Soviet notion of ‘ethnicity’ are developed into ideas, attitudes 
and aspirations that affect the government, and its population, so the changing 
perceptions of Russian and non-Russian ethnic identity far from threatening the 
state become integrated into its development. However, the nature of the state 
itself is not of a kind to generate either independent state institutions, or a 

















 The newspapers studied in this thesis provide a snapshot of a process of 
rapid cultural and political development which continues to carry the Russian 
Federation, Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia) into their respective futures. Much has 
changed since 2004 in both the Republics and the entire Federation. Buryatia 
has a new President, who as an outsider will have to make a concerted effort to 
assert his authority over the republican political establishment. Sakha 
(Yakutia)’s government has lost control of ALROSA, and with it the capacity to 
make profitable deals with multinational corporations: De Beers’ involvement 
with Sakha (Yakutia)’s diamond industry has been steadily decreasing, as it 
hands the lucrative business of selling the Republic’s diamonds over to the 
consortium of Moscow-based politicians and businessmen who now own 
ALROSA. The Russian Federation has turned from a mysterious but essentially 
co-operative member of the international community to a powerful and 
threatening force. 
What remains unchanged, however, is the notion of a quasi-sacred ethnic 
identity. This forms a consistent part of the logic underlying recent 
developments, while remaining the basis of politically expedient versions of 
events. The Russian Federation’s central government, according to its own 
account, has been forced to defend its people against successive external 
aggressors, from British spies to an unstable Georgian President in cahoots with 
a perfidious West. Whatever the real nature of the threats facing Russia may be, 
the measures the federal government has taken have violated conventional 
international negotiations to an extent that has caused serious alarm, earning the 
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Russian Federation a new unpopularity. The aggressive stance of Russia’s 
leaders makes sense however, when viewed as acting out the stories Russia’s 
population are told via its mass media. The narrative about Russia’s 
‘encirclement’ is predicated on the assumption that ethnic identity is as 
important to the nations of the encircling world as they are to the nations of the 
Russian Federation.   
The regional administrations that deal with Buryat and Sakha populations 
also continue to display their attachment to Buryat and Sakha ethnic culture. 
Buryatia’s new President upbraided Ulan Ude’s architects at the end of August 
2008 for failing to add a “national colour” to their buildings; the Olympic flame 
of the 2008 Dety Azii tournament was blessed at a traditional Sakha Algys 
ceremony in Yakutsk (Inform Polis, August 28, 2008). Ethnic culture retains its 
place in government legitimisation techniques at all levels of the Russian federal 
state.   
Meanwhile, the heated exchanges in the chat-rooms of Buryatia and 
Sakha (Yakutia) continue, as participants complain variously of Russian or 
Sakha chauvinism, demand to know why the President of Buryatia is Russian, or 
call for Americans and “those who call us Yakuts and Nazis” to be “whacked in 
the mug” (dat’ po mordam).38 Ethnic identity will remain a central factor in the 
Russian Federation’s social and political life, and therefore a key to 




                                                 
38 www.ykt.ru/cgi-bin/forum.isa?f=6&a=rx&id=7407582; August 31, 2008. 
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(Map taken from the University of Texas website, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps.) 
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Appendix Two: List of codes used to analyse Inform Polis 
academic work           
accident                
agriculture             
alcohol crisis          
Baikal                  
Beslan (soboleznovaniye)    
Buryat cultural practice   
celebration            
celebration of person   
child vospitanie       
commercial puff         
communist past          
concerned reader        
crime crisis           
demand on citizens      
demand on politician    
diary report            
economic crisis        
Edinaya Rossiya         
environment (threat)    
federal level          
foreigners             
gossip                 
grazhdanskiye activity   
health (problem)       
history or tradition   
human interest         
information            
kitchen gardening       
kul'turnoe tvorchestvo   
law enforcement (agency)   
military                
morals                  
narodnaya kultura       
nauchniye seminary      
negative for elites    
new initiative         
new legislation         
non-political aktsiya    
obraschenie             
obsuzhdenie             
paradigm                
patriotism             
political actors, activities   
political aktsiya      
political gathering     
Potapov                
potential crisis       
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privatisation          
region/federation relationship    
religious belief        
republican political scandal 
Russian cultural practice   
social welfare          
SuperBuryatEthnicId    
SuperBuryatEthnicNationalism    
SuperEthnicity         
SuperRepublicanId      
superzakon              
terrorist crisis        
torzhestvennoye sobytyye   
trade                  
unusual                 
useful information     
war veterans            
worker's holiday        
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Barguzinskaya Pravda (Barguzin), June 1–30, August 25–September 22, 2004.  
 
Buryatia (Ulan Ude), June 1–30, August 25–September 22, 2004.  
 
Buryaad Unen (Ulan Ude), June 1–30, August 25–September 22, 2004.  
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